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Bankruptcy Preferences: 
Recalcitrant Passengers Aboard the 
Flight From Creditor Equality 
by 
Lawrence Ponoroff* 
"It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." 
-Sir Winston Churchill, October 1939 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his famous radio address from London, the then First Lord of the Ad-
miralty was referring to the action likely to be taken by Russia in the war 
that had recently erupted on the European continent. He could just as easily, 
however, have been speaking about bankruptcy preference law. Alas, while 
Churchill flirted often with bankruptcy in his personal life, his public remarks 
usually inclined toward "less weighty" topics than preference liability and 
recovery. Undoubtedly, with the possible exception of the discharge, there is 
no aspect of the bankruptcy law so utterly misunderstood by and exasperat-
ing to the credit community than the rules governing preferential transfers. 1 
Their frustration is understandable. But even bankruptcy professionals and 
specialists struggle to articulate a coherent and consistent account of bank-
ruptcy preference policy and doctrine. 
Ultimately, any discussion of the scope and function of preference law in 
isolation from the larger goals of the bankruptcy system is an empty one. 
What is more, meaningful discourse about the goals of a bankruptcy regime 
must take place against the backdrop of the larger legal framework, competing 
public policy considerations, and differing perceptions over the social as well 
as economic costs of bankruptcy. Should individuals and entities be permit-
*Dean and Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. The author wishes readers 
to be aware that this article was finali~ed prior to the automatic adjustment of certain dollar amounts in 
the Bankruptcy Code that occurred on April 1, 2016 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 104(a). 
1J.A. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY§ 247, 83 (1956) (observing that ~[t]he law of preference is the 
most significant contribution of bankruptcy to commercial law ... ~). It is also perhaps the most distinctive 
and controversial contribution inasmuch as targeted creditors in particular have a hard time wrapping 
their minds around the fact that a prebankruptcy transfer that was in payment of a valid debt and per-
fectly lawful under state law may set aside as a preference under 11 U .S.C. § 54 7(b) and, thus, recovered 
by the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 550(a). 
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ted-indeed even encouraged-through the bankruptcy process to alter their 
behavior so as to avoid a result that would otherwise attain under applicable 
state or nonbankruptcy federal law? Correspondingly, when and why should 
other parties be compelled to abide by results that, but for the interposition 
of a bankruptcy proceeding, would not need to be countenanced? More 
broadly posed, what are the distributive goals that should govern the bank-
ruptcy system and what is the optimum institutional design for achieving 
them? And how are these essential questions regarding the political economy 
best decided? Soon it becomes difficult to even know where to start. 
So, let us begin with a basic axiom; namely, that bankruptcy entails the 
balancing not only of the competing interests of debtors and creditors, but 
also of competing interests among creditors. But the act of "balancing," by 
definition, implies that there is some point along the spectrum, perchance 
equidistant from the two antipodal ends, where the fulcrum can be placed to 
ensure perfect equipoise. That is not, however, the kind of balancing that 
goes on in the bankruptcy arena, where the exercise is a normative one, not a 
feat of mechanical engineering. There is no point of perfect equilibrium. 
Hence, where the pivot is placed at any point in time will depend on those 
larger moral and social value judgments, not only with respect to which una-
nimity of opinion will never be achieved, but that, like public policy, will 
tend to wax and wane over time. 
Further complicating matters, the dialogue concerning bankruptcy policy 
and bankruptcy reform does not occur behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.2 
Different system participants will necessarily push for rules that favor their 
particular interest at the expense of others.3 It may be a zero sum game, but 
there are spoils to be gained and plunder to be had (or preserved). As public 
choice theory, gloomy as it may be, has long recognized, economic rent-seek-
ing is an inevitable (and not always undesirable) aspect of virtually any politi-
cal system, but exacerbated in a society marked by widely pluralistic 
differences in belief over key abstractions such as fairness, equality, and jus-
tice.4 And, even the most objective commentators will disagree over how 
2jOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF jUSTICE, 118 (Rev. ed. 1999). 
3See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63, 
94-110 ( 1990) (discussing the relative efficiency of the political versus the economic markets). For applica-
tion in the bankruptcy context, see Mark]. Roe & Frederick Tung, Brea~ing Ban~ruptcy Priority: How 
Rent-See~ing Upends the Creditors' Bargain, 99 VA. L. REv. 1235 (2013) (referring to the phenomenon as 
"priority jumping" on the part of creditors who, through clever lawyering, litigation, or lobbying, attempt 
to improve their position in bankruptcy at the expense of other creditors). Cf David G. Epstein, Casey 
Ariail & David M. Smith, N.ot]ust Ana N.icole Smith: Cleavage in Ban~ruptcy, 31 EMORY BANKR. DEv.]. 
15 (2014) (taking a jaundiced view of the efforts to elevate prepetition claims to postpetition status). 
4See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of Legis-
lative Resolutions, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 801 (1997) (proposing a model for explaining bankruptcy legislation 
based on a combination of game theory and public choice theory, and demonstrating the effect that interest 
groups have in directing bankruptcy reform legislation away from the intended objects of the system). 
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much sacrifice we should demand of debtors, or who should bear the costs of 
financial failure, or how losses should be apportioned to assure the optimum 
allocation of those costs. 
In fact, while everyone has an opinion on these questions, no one knows 
the real answers because there are none to be had. In the world of debtor-
creditor relations there are no absolutes, only relativistic and situational judg-
ments that surely coalesce over time at the fringes-no one advocates for 
debtors' prison any longer (at least not openly)-but that will never achieve 
the certainty of the ""laws" say of Physics. And that's why Law is a human-
ity and not a science. And yet, it will not do to simply throw in the towel; 
we have to have the conversation and continue to make decisions about how 
our system of bankruptcy is to look and function. 
Not long ago, and perhaps in an overly cranky mood, I described the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
("BAPCPA)5 as ""oxymoronically titled ... clumsily drafted, unnecessarily 
prolix, internally inconsistent, and annealed in a cauldron of special interest 
pressures."6 But, as Professor Mechele Dickinson has quite fairly pointed out, 
the legislation was the product of broad bipartisan support? So if the finger 
of blame is to be pointed accurately, we may need both hands. 
Bearing in mind that BAPCP A represented a series of amendments to an 
existing Code, it may be profitable to consider what it was that Congress so 
desperately thought needed amending. As originally enacted, the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 (the ""1978 AcC)8 was unquestionably the most debtor-
friendly U.S. bankruptcy law ever enacted, and much of the history of bank-
ruptcy reform legislation since that date is explicable in terms of efforts by 
the financial services industry and credit providers to claw back what they 
regarded as the undeserved and disproportionate advantages conferred on 
5Pub. L. No. 109·8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
BAPCPA became fully effective for cases filed on or after Oct. 17, 2005. 
6Lawrence Ponoroff, Reclaim This! Getting Credit Seller Rights in Ban~ruptcy Right, 48 U RrcH. L. 
REv. 733·34 (2014). Judge (now Professor) Markell made the same point by citing Lewis Carroll. See In 
re Trejos, 352 B.R. 249·253·54 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (~Making practical sense ... of much of BAPCPA 
requires bankruptcy judges to adopt the approach of the White Queen, and believe in 'as many as six 
impossible things before breakfast."). 
7See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Ban~ptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84 
WASH U. L. REv. 1861, 1866 (2006) (observing that members in both the House and Senate voted in 
overwhelming numbers in favor of the various, but substantively very similar, versions of bankruptcy 
reform legislation introduced between 1997 and the enactment of BAPCPA). 
8Pub. L. No. 95·598, 92 Stat. 2549, enacted on November 6, 1978, and governing all cases filed on or 
after October 1, 1979. The 1978 Act, as amended, is the current law of bankruptcy and is found in Title 
11 of the United States Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1530 (2013), amended by Pub. L. No. 113·296 (2013). 
In this Article, except where otherwise indicated, all references to the "Code" or the ~Bankruptcy Code" 
are to Title 11 of the United States Code as amended through January 1, 2015. 
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debtors.9 BAPCP A doubtless represented the most successful of those ef-
forts to date, 10 but we should not lose sight of its place in that larger contex-
tual dynamic, or, for that matter, of the ironic precipitant that brought 
bankruptcy reform center stage. 
Specifically, as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,11 Congress 
created an independent commission, the National Bankruptcy Review Com-
mission (the "NBRC"), to "investigate and study issues relating to the Bank-
ruptcy Code; to solicit divergent views of parties concerned with the 
operation of the bankruptcy system; to evaluate the advisability of proposals 
with respect to such issues; and to prepare a report to be submitted to the 
President, Congress and the Chief Justice."12 The NBRC's report was to be 
publicly released on October 20, 1997.13 Fully aware of its content and gen-
eral orientation, the lobby for consumer creditor providers and organizations 
connived to ambush the report by pressing furiously for the introduction of 
bipartisan legislation that largely advanced the views of the four dissenting 
NBRC commissioners. 14 Their efforts were ultimately successful. It was 
that legislative proposal and its successors, not the NBRC Report, which 
dominated the conversation over the next several years, and eventually re-
sulted in the enactment of BAPCP A. 15 
In many ways, BAPCPA was not only an anti-NBRC bill, but also a 
wholesale rear-guard action against the 1978 Act. Most well-known for 
9See generally Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Ban~ruptcy Reform: 'The Need for Simplifica-
tion and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1295, 1301·03 (discussing the credit industry's efforts to 
nullify the 1978 Act's perceived liberalization of personal bankruptcy). See also Kenneth M. Ayotte & 
Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 511·12 
(2009) (discussing the dramatic expansion of control exercised by secured creditors in Chapter 11 over the 
preceding decade). 
10Which is to say, there was a lot more ~abuse protection" than ~creditor protection" in BAPCPA, 
although, if one looks hard enough, one does find some scraps, such as the additional protection for retire· 
ment assets in §§ 522(b)(3)(C) and 541(b)(7), greater controls over reaffirmations in § 524(k), expansion 
of the discharge injunction in § 524(i) to include the proper crediting of payments, and elevated protection 
in several areas for Domestic Support Obligations. See infra note 192. Of course the parties who have to 
make good on those domestic obligations are ~consumers," too, and they likely do not regard most of these 
provisions as providing them with greater relief. Also at least one skeptic (or realist) has wondered aloud 
how much of the motivation had to do with grabbing an opportunity for ~positive political relations." See 
CHARLES]. TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 673 (3rd ed. 2013). 
"See H.R. 5116, Pub. L. No. 103·394, 108 Stat. 4106. 
12/d. at tit. VI, § 603, 108 Stat. at 4147. 
"NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW CoMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS (1997) (the ~NBRC 
REPORT"), available at http:/ I govinfo.library .unt.edu/nbrc/ reportcont.html. 
14NBRC REPORT, supra, at 1029, et seq. (Individual Commissioner views). See Dickerson, supra n.7, at 
1065 (noting that before the NBRC's Report was even filed, the credit lobby found supporters in the 
105th Congress to sponsor legislation adopting the views of the dissenting Commissioners). 
15See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Ban~ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 485·93 (2005) (detailing the legislation's history going back to its 
original antecedents in the dissent to the NBRC REPORT). 
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tightening of the screws on consumer debtors, 16 whether in the form of the 
means test, elimination of ride-through, or the insistence on use of retail valu-
ation of personal property collateral in Chapters 7 and 13,17 BAPCPA also 
openly sought to limit judicial involvement, and hence judicial discretion, in 
several areas perceived as bearing unfavorably on creditor payouts. 18 Receiv-
ing only slightly less attention was BAPCPA's lopsided leaning toward pre-
serving the contractual rights of secured creditors at the expense of their 
unsecured counterparts, 19 as evinced by the above-mentioned valuation rules 
in § 506(a)(2);20 prohibition against strip down of most vehicle (and some 
16See generally Braucher, supra note 9, at 1301 (observing that the credit industry never accepted the 
1978 Act's perceived liberalization of personal bankruptcy); Linda Coco, Debtor's Prison in the ]\{eo Liberal 
State: "Debtfare" and the Cultural Logics of the Ban~ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005, 49 CAL W. L. REv. 1 (2012) (suggesting that BAPCPA shifts the risk and the responsibility of 
the lending relationship onto consumer debtors by forcing financially distressed individuals to continue 
servicing debt obligations both inside and outside the bankruptcy system); (Robert]. Landry, III & Nancy 
Hisey Mardis, Consumer Ban~ruptcy Reform: Debtors' Prison Without Bars or "just Dessert.s" for 
Deadbeats? 36 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 91 (2006) (reviewing the consumer features of the bill and their 
likely impact). 
17The means test is found in § 707(b )(2) and the elimination of ride-through in a combination of 
§§ 521(a)(2), 521(a)(6) and 362(h)(1). Newly-added § 506(a)(2) mandates the use of replacement value, 
without deduction for costs of sales or marketing, for individual debtors in Chapters 7 and 13. 
18See, e.g., Jean Braucher, 'The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Ban~ruptcy Act: 
Resistance ]\{eed N.ot Be Futile, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 93, 94 (observing that the subtext of BAPCPA "was 
the view that bankruptcy judges and consumer debtors' lawyers needed to be reined in to keep them from 
facilitating abuse by consumer debtors."); Kara Bruce, Rehabilitating Ban~ruptcy Reform, 13 NEv. L.J. 174 
(2012) (discussing BAPCPA's emphasis on a rules-based framework to limit what was perceived as uncle· 
sirable judicial interference in Chapter 11). See also Coop v. Fredrickson (In re Fredrickson), 545 F.3d 
652, 658 (8th Cir. 2009) (pointing out that in requiring that above-median-income debtors' "projected 
disposable income" in Chapter 13 be calculated using the "means test," Congress wanted to eliminate what 
it perceived as widespread abuse of the system by curtailing bankruptcy courts' discretion and requiring 
debtors to pay more to their unsecured creditors); In re Nance, 371 B.R. 358, 366 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2009) 
nt is clear from the Chapter 7 means test, the adoption of standardized expense calculations for above· 
median debtors, and the calculation methods for determining 'projected disposable income' that a major 
goal of Congress was to replace judicial discretion with specific statutory standards and formulas."). Of 
course, consumer bankruptcy lawyers came in for their share of criticism as well: "Mr. President, I think 
there is a widespread recognition that bankruptcy lawyers are preying on unsophisticated consumers who 
need counseling and help in setting up a budget and who do not need to declare bankruptcy. Bankruptcy 
lawyers are the fuel which makes the engines of the bankruptcy mills run." 144 GONG. REc. 510649 
(1998) (remarks of Sen. Grassley). 
19By definition, an insolvency situation is a zero sum game. Thus, provisions in BAPCPA, including in 
§§ 547(e)(2) and 547(c)(3), that provide greater protection for secured claims must come at the expense of 
unsecured creditors. See infra notes 25, & 195· 206 and accompanying text. An exception to this state· 
ment might have been the provision that disables bifurcation under§ 506(a)(1) as to certain secured claims 
in Chapter 13, see§ 1325(a)(*) (infra note 21) where the debtor elects to surrender the collateral. How· 
ever, now that the weight of authority in the appellate courts is that the unsecured claim persists where 
the debtor surrenders rather than retains the collateral, even that small exception has been desiccated. See, 
e.g., In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829 (2007) (holding bifurcation may still occur under state law when the 
collateral is surrendered to the secured creditor). 
20See supra note 17. 
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other) loans in Chapter 13;21 provision for recovery of costs, charges, and fees 
in favor of oversecured statutory lienors;22 elimination of Chapter 13 prop-
erty valuations on conversion to Chapter 7;23 and assuring that Chapter 13 
plan payments are not only at least equal to the present value of allowed 
secured claims, but also sufficient to provide adequate protection to the hold-
ers of such claims.24 One might have fairly questioned, as many did, whether 
this was a good thing from the perspective of the larger national economy.25 
Others might have, and did,26 question its fair-mindedness given that, other 
than the amounts owing on undersecured debts in excess of the value of the 
underlying collateral, unsecured claims generally consist of smaller trade debt 
and obligations owing to nonconsensual creditors, such as tort victims and 
other so-called non-adjusting creditors.27 
21 This prohibition against strip down of certain (mostly motor vehicle) liens in Chapter 13 is con· 
tained in what's famously referred to as the ~hanging paragraph" following § 1325(a)(9). See generally, 
David Gray Carlson, Cars and Homes in Chapter 13 After the 2005 Amendments to the Ban~ruptcy Code, 
14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 301 (2006). 
22This was accomplished by adding the language "or State statute under which such claim arose" to 
the end of§ 506(b), and, in so doing, partially overruling the Supreme Court's decision in Ron Pair Enters., 
Inc. v. United States, 489 U.S. 225 (1989). 
23Codified as § 348(f)(1)(C). 
24Codified as § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II). See In re Nichols, 440 F.3d 850, 857·58 n.6 (6th Cir. 2006) 
("[T]he new language seems to require that payments made after confirmation be in equal amounts and 
keep pace with depreciation during the term of the plan."). 
25ln discussing the impact of BAPCPA in Chapter 11, Professor Bruce wisely cautioned: "When 
considering future revisions to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress need not ignore the agendas of commercial 
landlords, utility providers, and other interest groups. Congress should, however, more carefully weigh 
those interests against the broader values sought in bankruptcy."). Bruce, supra note 18, at 213. See also 
Brian Rothschild, 'The Illogic ofN.o Limits on Ban~ptcy, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEv.]. 473,475 n.1 {2007) 
(collecting BAPCPA criticism and describing the academic response as "consistently negative"). In addi· 
tion, empirical work has now revealed that BAPCPA has certainly resulted in higher attorneys' fees, 
delay, and time consuming paperwork, but not necessarily higher payouts to unsecured creditors. See Lois 
R. Lupica, 'The Consumer Ban~ruptcy Fee Study: Final Report, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 17 (2012) 
(finding significant post·BAPCPA increase in the cost of access to the Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 con• 
sumer bankruptcy systems); and 'The Consumer Ban~ruptcy Creditor Distribution Study: Final Report, 
which can be found at http:/ /mainelaw.maine.edu/wp·content/uploads/2014/01/lupica-creditor·distribu· 
tions.pdf, (concluding that no matter how it is looked at, unsecured distributions declined nationally as a 
share of total distributions under both Chapter 7 and 13, and that the decline was statistically significant). 
On the other hand, some scholars have speculated that this was the nature of the game all along. See 
Ronald J. Mann, Ban~ruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 ILL. L. REv. 375, 385· 
92 {2007) (suggesting that by slowing the tide of personal bankruptcies, credit card issuers intended to 
profit from debt servicing revenues from debtors not yet in bankruptcy). 
26See Keith M. Lundin, 'fen Principles of BAPCPA: N.ot What was Advertised, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. 
]. 1, 70 (2005) (commenting that: "Anyone who drills into BAPCPA can't help but be astonished by how 
often wealthier debtors get better treatment than less-wealthy debtors."); Henry J. Sommer, 'Trying to 
Ma~e Sense Out ofN.onsense: Representing Consumers Under the "Ban~ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con· 
sumer Protection Act of 2005", 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191 (2005) (finding BAPCPA's enactment to be mean· 
spirited and intellectually dishonest). 
27Non·adjusting creditors would include both nonconsensual creditors, including employees, as well as 
small unsecured creditors who lack either the leverage or the sophistication to raise their costs of credit to 
2016) BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCES 335 
Critiques of BAPCP A along these lines are well-known. But there is 
another related, broader, but less widely considered tension embedded not 
just in BAPCPA, but in bankruptcy reform legislation generally. That is the 
tension between the values underlying state law debt collection remedies, 
generally including the primacy of security, and the equality and rehabilita-
tive objectives of a collectiviz;ed regime for dealing with default and financial 
distress. And here, BAPCPA seems to have signaled a decisive victory for 
state law in the epic battle between federal bankruptcy policy, on the one 
hand, and state debt collection rules and norms, on the other.28 The story of 
the degree of deference bankruptcy should afford to state law rights and enti-
tlements is a larger one than can be told here.29 However, it is one that can, I 
believe, profitably be illustrated by examining BAPCP A's changes to the 
preference and preference-related provisions of the Code. Just as the 1978 
Act is widely recogniz;ed as representing the high water mark of debtor re-
lief,30 it also signaled the historical apogee of the core bankruptcy principles 
take account of the higher risk associated with unsecured lending. The phrase developed as a response to 
defenses of the efficiency of security that were predicated on the assumption that, although unsecured 
creditors will receive less on insolvency, they should be able to compensate by charging a higher interest 
rate. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims 
in Ban~ruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 882·83 (1996). 
28See, e.g., Daniel Keating, RadLAX Revisited: A Routine Case of Statutory Interpretation or a Sub 
Rosa Preservation of Ban~ruptcy Law's Great Compromise?, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 465, 466 (2012) 
(referring to the delicate balance in bankruptcy between a secured creditor's state-law rights to foreclose 
on collateral and a debtor's need to use that same collateral to reorganize as the "Great Compromise"); 
Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible Force: Re-
thin~ing the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Ban~ptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2234 (1997). 
While both of these articles focused on secured credit, the tension between state collection law and 
bankruptcy affects unsecured creditors as well, since state law's emphasis on "first come, first served" in 
terms of sharing the debtor's assets encourages unsecured creditors to reduce their claims to judgment and 
obtain an execution lien on the debtor's property before their counterparts, thereby becoming a secured 
creditor. The existence of the lien creates new issues because of the special solicitude shown for in rem 
rights, but the point is that bankruptcy norms and state collection remedy norms are fueled by very 
different impulses. See generally Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 927 (2005). 
Bankruptcy law accomplishes equitable distribution through a distinctive form of 
collective proceeding. This is a unique contribution of the Bankruptcy Code that 
makes bankruptcy different from a collection of actions by individual creditors. In a 
world of individual actions, each creditor knows that if he waits too long, the 
debtor's assets will have been exhausted by the demands of the quicker creditors 
and he will recover nothing. The creditors race to the courthouse, all demanding 
immediate payment of their entire debt. Like piranhas, they make short work of the 
debtor, who might have survived to pay off more of his debts with a little bit of 
reorganization-or at least might have more equitably fed the slower piranhas. 
Id. at 1202·03. 
29Some additional discussion, however, can be found infra in Part VILA. The issue arises because, 
while state law must of course yield to federal bankruptcy law, it is also true that bankruptcy law could 
not operate other than against the backdrop of state commercial law. 
30See DAVID A. SKEEL,jR. DEBT's DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 131-
336 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 90 
of debtor continuation through reorganization and creditor equality, both im-
plemented through, inter alia, the trustee's avoiding powers, including princi-
pally the power to set aside and recover preferential transfers.31 And just as 
has been the case in the consumer arena, 32 legislative action affecting prefer-
ence liability and recovery since that time, culminating (at least to date) with 
BAPCPA, has been to retreat from that summit in favor of ever-increasing 
obeisance to the state law bargain and to the growing hegemony of a creditor 
competition model over a creditor cooperation modeP 3 
II. PREFERENCE LAW AND POLICY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The power to set aside preferential transfers is certainly not the only 
avoiding power with which trustees are vested in order to assist in realizing 
the objectives sought to be served in a bankruptcy case, but it is undoubtedly 
the most controversial, misunderstood, and, to borrow a word from Churc-
hill, enigmatic of the trustee's array of avoiding powers.34 Voidable prefer-
ences may, but need and generally do not, involve fraud;35 they also may, but 
need and generally do not, involve policing the commercial law's concern 
59 (2001) (discussing the profound changes in the bankruptcy system occasioned by the 1978 Act, the 
factors that accounted for expansion of the bankruptcy law and the decision to make it more attractive for 
individuals and corporations). 
31The role of the preference law in reorganization cases is more complicated and more controversial. 
Certainly, creditor equality remains an objective in Chapter 11, but it must compete with other policies 
that attain in reorganization that do not apply in Chapter 7. See infra text accompanying notes 39 & 258· 
263. 
32 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
33See infra note 57. Of course, the rhetoric of those supporting legislation to further dismantle the 
1978 Act speak in higher·minded, moralistic terms. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki, Ban~ruptcy Law as Social 
Legislation, 5 TEx. REv. L & PoL. 393, 430 (2001) ("A primary impetus for bankruptcy reform is thus to 
rein in the excesses of the bankruptcy system that were created in the 1970s and to bring the bankruptcy 
laws back into line with traditional, universal notions of morality and personal responsibility. As such, it 
is consistent with other legislative initiatives, such as welfare reform, which similarly attempt to reinstate 
the traditional moral foundations of our social legislation."). 
34In one of the classic treatments of the evolution of bankruptcy preferences from its English law 
origins through its different iterations in American bankruptcy legislation, Professor Robert Weisberg 
concludes ultimately that the effort to objectify the law of preferences has failed, and was doomed to fail, 
inasmuch as it only masks what remains a centuries-old unresolved cultural division over acceptable com· 
mercia! behavior and the true goals of the commercial law. See Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, 
the Merchant Character and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3, 10·11 (1986). 
35Section 5(b) of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (1984), for example, treats the transfer by an 
insolvent debtor to an insider-creditor on account of an antecedent debt as fraudulent with respect to a 
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer, if it can be shown that the insider-creditor had reasonable 
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. In fact, even a transfer to a real creditor has been regarded 
as fraudulent under certain circumstances going back as far as Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601) 
(finding the transfer of property in satisfaction of an existing debt to be fraudulent based on the fact that it 
was made in secret and the transferor retained possession of the property). However, most preferences 
involve payments that are perfectly lawful under applicable nonbankruptcy law and are unassailable under 
the fraudulent transfer law. 
2016) BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCES 337 
with secret liens.36 Many people, therefore, find the idea of preference liabil-
ity counterintuitive, certainly on first encounter, and often even after re-
peated exposure.37 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the preference law 
has been a lightning rod for brickbats whenever the occasion for reexamining 
preference recovery arises. 38 
The concept of a preference is a very basic one; namely, that one creditor, 
who has been advantaged by the prebankruptcy transfer from an insolvent 
debtor of cash or security, should return that cash to the bankruptcy estate 
(or lose that security) in order to ensure equality among all of the debtor's 
similarly positioned creditors.39 Preference law focuses on the relationship 
36Because of the operation of§ 547(e)(2), the transfer of a lien on personal or real property given in 
exchange for new value becomes a preference only if the lienor fails to take the steps necessary to perfect 
its lien within 30 days of the date "it becomes effective between the transferor and transferee: Until 
BAPCPA, the relation-back period was limited to ten days. See infra text accompanying notes 195-197 
for further discussion. Section 60a (7) of the 1898 Act contained a similar provision, with a twenty-one-
day grace period (or such shorter time if prescribed by state law)-in the case of a transfer for present 
consideration-to perfect in order for the transfer to be deemed to have been made at the time the lien 
was granted rather than the time of subsequent perfection. As one example of the dissatisfaction felt by 
some over the use of the preference law to address the problems associated with ostensible ownership, see 
C. Robert Morris, Jr., Banl{ruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens, and Floating Liens, 54 MINN. L. 
REv. 737, 740 (1969) (noting that originally voidable preferences "were voidable without regard to the 
form of transfer, and nonpreferential transactions were not within the reach of the section," but that 
"subsequent amendments, however, have extended the provision of § 60 to condemn certain unrecorded 
transactions regardless of whether they were, in fact, preferences."). Professor Morris went on to con-
demn the confusion created by conflating unrecorded transfers with "true" preferences. Id. at 753-57. In 
point of fact, life might be simpler if we simply had a statute that provided that all security transfers (save 
for purchase money transactions) not recorded within x days after attachment may be invalidated by the 
trustee. However, for the time being, we have consigned regulation of delayed perfection transactions to 
the preference law. 
37It seems odd at first blush that a professional creditor would inveigh against preference law as 
vehemently as an occasional creditor, inasmuch as the former will presumably benefit at times from a 
preference recovery in a case where it holds an unavoidable claim in the case. The impact in those situa-
tions, however, is likely to be diffused (and accordingly) small and not very visible. On the other hand, 
when a creditor is the target in a preference action, the impact is direct and almost invariably much more 
significant in financial terms. See generally Brooke E. Gotberg, Conflicting Preferences: Avoidance Proceed-
ings in Bankruptcy Liquidations and Reorganizations, 100 IowA L. REv. 51, 54-56 (2014) (pointing out 
that while dismay over application of the preference law is understandable among creditors who are "non-
repeat players," the disapproval by repeat players, who might from time-to-time actually benefit from 
application of the preference law, is no less vehement). 
38See infra notes 88-95 & 279-280 and accompanying text. 
39Equality of distribution is central to bankruptcy policy and summed up in the frequently invoked 
maxim that "equality is equity." See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 346 (1874) ("It is obviously one of the 
purposes of the Bankruptcy law that there should be a speedy disposition of the bankrupt's assets. This is 
second only in importance to securing equality of distribution."); Frank R. Kennedy, Statutory Liens in 
Bankruptcy, 39 MINN. L. REv. 697, 699-00 (1954) (noting that American bankruptcy law has moved in 
the direction of increasing distributions to unsecured creditors by decreasing the portions that go to se-
cured and priority claimants). See also Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins., 547 U.S. 651, 667 
(identifying the deep roots of the equality of distribution objective in the Bankruptcy Code). It is impor-
tant to point out that, in connection with preference liability, equality policy is served not only when 
other unsecured creditors receive more than they would have without return of the preference. We 
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among creditors in light of the unique goals of a collectivized debt collection 
proceeding and, therefore, is quite different in operation and objective than 
the state law "'race of the diligent" where the baseline rule is "'first in time 
first in right." It is as if the dawn of the 90th day before filing (in the case of 
noninsiders) witnesses the imposition of a kind of commercial ceasefire, under 
the terms of which all interests are frozen in place so that, by the time the 
case is formally commenced, the horse (to mix my metaphors) will not already 
have exited the barn.40 That proposition seems innocuous enough, yet it has 
been anything but so in its application under the Code. As fashioned by the 
1978 Act, the determination of a preferential transfer was recast and broad-
ened to operate (at least on the face of it) as a rule of strict liability.41 That is 
to say, there was no longer any need to prove intent, culpability, complicity, 
or consanguinity to establish an avoidable preference; just that the transfer 
had preferential effect. 4 2 
determine recovery of avoided transfers under § 550(a) based upon whether the estate will be made better 
off, not whether one particular group of creditors or another will be better off as a result of its recovery. 
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Conagra Grocery Prods. Co. (In re Purrs Supermarket, Inc.), 373 B.R. 691, 699 (B.A.P. 
lOth Cir. 2007) (noting that ~benefit to the estate" refers to all potentially interested parties and not just 
unsecured creditors or any other class of creditors). Cf Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 
477 B.R. 176, 188-90 (B.A.P. lOth Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Furrs where avoidance and recovery of a 
postpetition transfer would only benefit the trustee, not the estate, in the form of increased compensation, 
but noting that ~benefit to the estate" is to be broadly construed). The point to be made is that if the 
estate is administratively insolvent, the preference recovery may principally, or even only, benefit priority 
claimants. That does not make use of the preference power inappropriate and "equality," in the broad 
sense of the term, is still served in that the preferred creditor is now treated in a nondiscriminatory 
manner in relation to all other general creditors, which is to say they together equally receive nothing. 
What is promoted by application of the preference law is not necessarily equality of distributions from the 
estate, as much as protection of the bankruptcy law distributional scheme-which also makes certain 
claims more ~equal" than others. Preference policy is also more nuanced in the Chapter 11 context because 
of the presence of other policy considerations in reorganization that do not exist in liquidation and must be 
accommodated along with preference policy. See infra notes 258-266. In short, equality may be a desirable 
goal for a variety of reasons ranging from a commitment to fairness, to maximizing economic utility, to 
enhancing the prospects for debtor survival through reorganization. 
40In a sense, except for transactions involving new value, the suggestion is that the preference law 
should be seen as imposing the same kind of standstill as the automatic stay does upon filing, and largely 
for similar reasons. See Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Ban~ruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725,758-59 
(describing preference law as a means to police Jackson's hypothetical "creditor's bargain" model under 
which creditors would, ex ante, agree to ratable distribution of the debtor's assets after insolvency). 
41See Charles Jordan Tabb, Rethin~ing Preferences, 43 S.C. L. REv. 981, 1035 (1992) (advocating 
repeal of§ 547(c)(2) as undermining the operation of preference law as a rule of strict liability). 
42Section 547(b) sets out two initial unnumbered elements of a preference: (1) a "transfer," and (2) "of 
an interest of the debtor in property," and then five additional numbered requirements. Looking to the 
numbered requirements, the bankruptcy trustee may void a transfer of property of the debtor if she can 
establish: 
• first, the transfer was "to or for the benefit of a creditor"; and 
• second, the transfer was made for or on account of an "antecedent debt," i.e., a debt owed prior to 
the time of the transfer; and 
• third, the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer; and 
• fourth, the transfer was made within ninety days before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy 
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This was not always the case; in fact, had never been the case.43 For the 
last 40 years of its existence, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,44 for instance, only 
permitted a trustee to avoid a preferential transfer if the creditor receiving 
the transfer, or benefitted thereby, "has reasonable cause to believe that the 
debtor is insolvent."45 In fact, until adoption of the current Code, every U.S. 
bankruptcy law that had anything at all to say about preferences incorpo-
rated some notion of culpability or intent as one of the elements of a preferen-
tial transfer.46 This was quite consistent with English law,47 from which our 
concept of a preferential transfer was inherited.48 There are already extant 
several fine treatments of the historical evolution of preference law,49 which 
petition, or was made between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition if 
the transfer was to an "insider"; and 
• fifth, the transfer has the effect of increasing the amount that the transferee would receive in a 
Chapter 7 case. 
It is the last of these elements-that the transfer enable the transferee to receive more than it would have 
received had the transfer not been made and the debtor's estate liquidated in Chapter 7-that makes the 
preferential effect dispositive. In other words, the fact that setting aside of the transfer will not increase 
distributions to other unsecured creditors (perhaps the recovery will all go to pay the trustee's attorney or 
pay other administrative expenses in the case) is irrelevant to the existence of a preference if it can be 
shown that the estate was made better off by the transfer. See supra note 39. 
43See Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Ban~ruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 713, 
725 (1985). See also Lawrence Ponoroff, Evil Intentions and an Irresolute Endorsement for Scientific Ration-
alism: Ban~ruptcy Preferences One More Time, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1439, 1477-78 (suggesting that elimina-
tion of a mens rea test from preference law was an evolutionary one, wending its way from the more 
demanding requirement of proving the debtor's intent to prefer, to the less demanding rule that the trans-
feree have knowledge of the preferential result). Even the 1978 Act contained a limited knowledge/intent 
standard for a time. Until 1984, in the case of a transfer to an insider made outside of the ninety days prior 
to filing, the trustee still had to show that the insider-transferee had "reasonable cause to believe the 
debtor insolvent."). Id. at 1479, n.109. 
44See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 ("An Act to establish a uniform system of 
bankruptcy throughout the United States.") (repealed 1979). 
45See § 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. As originally enacted, the 1898 Act required proof that 
a preference was intended. Act if July 1, § 60, 30 Stat. 562. This requirement was softened by an amend-
ment in 1910 substituting reasonable cause to believe that a preference would be effected, Act of June 25, 
1910, § 11, 36 Stat. 842, and then revised further by the Chandler Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 870, to require 
only reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. And yet, this requirement still often 
proved the most difficult element for the trustee to establish inasmuch as insolvency under the Act was 
defined, as it is in§ 101(33) of the Code, in balance sheet, and not equity sense, terms. See§ 1(19) of the 
former Act. 
46The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 did not address preferential transfers at all. See Countryman, supra 
note 43 at 718. However, Professor McCoid suggests that preferences were nonetheless sometime recov-
ered under the 1800 Act based on principles derived from English law at the time. See John C. McCoid, 
II, Ban~ruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REv. 249, 253 (1981). 
47Countryman, supra note 43, at 114-18 (identifying the connection between early English preference 
law and law of fraudulent transfers). 
48See Weisberg, supra note 34 at 40-41, 55-56 (citing Lord Coke in The Case of Ban~rupts, 76 Eng. 
Rep. 441, 473 (K.B. 1584) concerning the moral dimension of preference liability, and noting the influence 
of British thinking on early American commercial ideology). 
49See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 43, at 714 -26; McCoid, supra note 46, at 250-60; Tabb, supra note 
41, at 995-1014; Weisberg, supra note 34. 
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obviates the need for recounting the unfolding of those historical antecedents 
at this juncture, though these narratives are all well worth the read. 
Just as the elimination of a mens rea standard for establishing a voidable 
preference is of relatively recent origin, so, too, is the adoption of an inte-
grated scheme of exceptions or defenses to preference liability a fairly new 
phenomenon.5° The coincidence of these two developments is a manifesta-
tion of the deep-seated dualism, if not outright schizophrenia, that has long 
beleaguered the development of a reasoned and dependable approach to pref-
erence recovery.51 In significant measure, the exceptions to preference liabil-
ity in § 54 7(c), including particularly the all-important ordinary course of 
business exception in subsection ( c)(2), highlight the fact that the normative 
justification for the preference law remains in the minds of many not solely 
(or even primarily) "equality," but also ''deterrence."52 This is quite consis-
tent with Congress's articulation in the legislative history of the 1978 Act of 
500f the current nine exceptions in § 54 7(c), only the subsequent advance rule in § 547(c)(4) had a 
specific counterpart under the former Act. See § 60c of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. However, many 
commentators believe that§ 547(c)(2) is a form of codification. of the judicially-created "current expense 
rule" applied from time-to-time under the former Act. See, e.g., Lissa L. Broome, Payments on Long-'Term 
Debt as Voidable Preferences: 'The Impact of the 1984 Ban~ruptcy Amendments, 1987 DuKE L.]. 78, 89·91; 
Countryman, supra note 43, at 767-69. 
51See Tabb, supra note 41, at 1016·1027 (describing§ 547(c)(2) as irreconcilably at odds with proper 
basis for preference liability). Professor Countryman was of the same mind. Countryman, supra note 43, 
at 817-18. See also Ponoroff, supra note 43, at 1481 n.199 (noting that "[i]t would be difficult and perhaps 
unfair to disassociate completely the scheme of preference exceptions in § 547(c) from the sentiment that 
these transactions do not involve the sort of deliberate 'eve of bankruptcy' grab which colored earlier 
preference law" and identifying§ 54 7(c)(2) as the most direct expression of that sentiment."); infra note 52 
and accompanying text. 
52The House Committee Report that accompanied the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, provided as 
follows: 
The purpose of the preference § is two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to 
avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, 
creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor 
during his slide into bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often 
enables him to work his way out of a difficult financial situation through coopera-
tion with all of his creditors. Second, and the more important, the preference provi-
sions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among 
creditors of the debtor. The operation of the preference § to deter "the race of 
diligence" of creditors to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy furthers the sec-
ond goal of the preference §-that of equality of distribution. 
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Gong., 1st Sess. 177·79 (1977) [hereinafter HousE REPORT]. Consistent with 
the suggestion in the HousE REPORT regarding the hierarchy between the two policies, most commenta· 
tors, believe that the "equality" objective is p~eeminent. See authorities cited infra note 189. See also 
Gotberg, supra note 37, at 64-65 (noting that the deterrence policy encourages exceptions to preference 
liability, while the equality policy would avoid all preferential transfers regardless of whether they pro-
moted on-going economic activity between the debtor and its creditors); Rafael I. Pardo, On Proof of 
Preferential Effect, 55 ALA L. REv. 281, 283 (2004) (noting that the greater amount test in § 547(b)(5) 
determines preferential effect on the basis of whether the actual result of the transfer is greater than the 
result of a hypothetical liquidation without the transfer-and that's it). 
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the alternative purpose for the preference law.53 It is also consistent with 
carving ciut an exception for behavior that "leave undisturbed normal finan-
cial relations";54 the justification offered by Congress in 1978 for inclusion of 
an ordinary course of business defense to preference recovery. 55 This concep-
tualization of preference liability appeals to credit providers precisely because 
it comports with their instinct that they should only be "penalized" for exe-
crable behavior, but it does so by subordinating the collectivized goals of the 
bankruptcy system to the individual creditor/debtor state law relationship. 
It is, therefore no accident that, as with most of the 1978 Act amendments to 
the Code generally,56 the amendments to § 54 7 since its original enactment 
principally have operated either to enlarge the exceptions or, with the same 
effect, to contract the reach of the statutory definition of a preferential 
transfer. 57 
5
' See id.; and text accompanying infra note 189 regarding the primacy of the equality objective over 
deterrence. 
54 See HousE REPORT supra note 52, at 373. The Report goes on to explain obliquely that the reason 
for this is "because it does not detract from the general policy of the preference section to discourage 
unusual action by either the debtor or his creditors during the debtor's slide into bankruptcy," seeming to 
forget entirely about the "more important" equality objective. See also Templeton v. O'Cheskey (In re 
American Housing Foundation), 785 F.3d 143, 160 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing§ 547(c)(2) as providing "a 
safe haven for a creditor who continues to conduct normal business on normal terms."). 
55 See also Michael]. Herbert, The Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor: A Critique of Section 547(c)(l), 
(2), &(4) of the Ban~ruptcy Code, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 667,691-94 (1983) (suggesting the inconsistency 
between a justification based upon the policy of rewarding creditors that provide the debtor with new 
credit and the primary explanation for § 54 7(c)(2) that the ordinary course creditor was unaware of the 
debtor's situation and thus had no intent to gain an advantage over other creditors). For another critique 
of that justification of the ordinary course of business defense, see Tabb, supra note 41, at 1022-24 (arguing 
that the assumption about affecting creditor behavior with the chosen legal rule is extremely dubious). 
There was a time that I was more sanguine about the relative merits of a more limited version of an 
ordinary course of business exception based on the justification of encouraging creditors that supply criti· 
cal operating capital to continue to do business with the debtor-see Lawrence Ponoroff & Julie C. 
Ashby, Desperate Times and Desperate Measures, The Troubled State of the Ordinary Course of Business 
Defense-and What to do About It, 72 WASH L. REv. 5, 58 (1997)-but I have now come to believe that 
Professor Tabb was right and the harm caused by its existence outweighs any vestigial benefit along such 
lines. See also infra note 72. 
56See supra note 9. 
57The most expansive set of revisions were accomplished under the 200 5 amendments to the Code and 
are discussed in detail below. See infra notes 78·81 & 130·134 and accompanying text. The 1984 amend· 
ments, Pub. L. 98·353, 98 Stat. 333, notably eliminated the forty·five·day limitations on the incurring and 
payment of debts in the ordinary course of business under§ 547(c)(2). The 1984 Act also introduced the 
low-dollar safe harbor for consumer debts of less than $600, currently in § 54 7(c)(8). See generally, Po· 
noroff & Ashby, supra note 55, at 22·27. The former opened the door to a major expansion of the 
exception by virtue of application of the exception to payments on long-term debt. See Union Bank v. 
Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991); infra text accompanying notes 125·127. Section 304(f) of the 1994 amend· 
ments, Pub. L. 103·394, 108 Stat. 4106 added the exception currently in§ 547(c)(7) for transfers made in 
payment of a domestic support obligations, and § 202(c) added a new subsection (c) to§ 550 to protect 
noninsider creditors benefitted by a payment to an insider made more than ninety days but less than one· 
year prior to filing. The latter, of course, was a response to the Seventh Circuit's DePrizio decision. See 
infra note 130. The only pre·BAPCPA amendment that arguably expanded the scope of preference liabil· 
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Although each tinged to one degree or another by the notion of creditor 
inculpability, the other preference exceptions involve transactions that can be 
sorted into one of three categories: (1) meeting the technical definition of a 
preference under § 547(b),58 but not having actual preferential effect; i.e., do 
not result in a diminution of the estate;59 (2) reflecting a legislative judgment 
that a competing, nonbankruptcy policy objective outweighs bankruptcy 
equality policy;60 or (3) representing an attempt to inhibit the trustee from 
bringing a preference claim either improvidently or with improper ulterior 
motive.61 
Exceptions that simply clarify and refine what kind of transfers violate 
the equality norm underlying the definition of a preference in§ 547(b)-the 
first of the above-three categories-are necessary and largely unobjectionable. 
Exceptions explained by the second category represent policy determinations 
that are made from time to time, any one of which we might agree with or 
not, but that are an inescapable consequence of the reality that bankruptcy 
law doctrine, at any given moment in time, is an expression of political judg-
ment and interest group politics (which may not be very different things). 
The balancing of bankruptcy policies against the policies underlying other 
specific laws is inevitable and is reflected in multiple locations throughout the 
Code.62 Thus, the only significant question to be addressed is not necessarily 
how the balance has been struck in any particular situation, but rather when 
ity was the elimination in 1984 of the provision that, until then, had required proof of reasonable cause to 
believe the debtor insolvent. in the case of actions against insider-creditors for transfers made outside the 
standard ninety day preference period. See supra note 43. 
58The exceptions in§§ 547(c)(1) and (c)(3) clearly fall into this category. 
59I would also include the subsequent ne-w value and improvement in position test in, respectively, 
§§ 547(c)(4) and (c)(5) in this category. I do so because they can, at least in part, be defended on the basis 
of the absence of preferential effect. Section 547(c)(4), of course, is also frequently justified on the basis 
that it encourages debtors and creditors to continue normal financial relations and, thus, enhances pros-
pects for the debtor to remain out of bankruptcy altogether-a justification that derives from the deter-
rence rationale of the preference law and ignores the equality consideration. However, as noted, I believe 
the subsequent advance rule in subsection (c)( 4) can be defended as well as not interfering with equality 
policy, as the estate is replenished by the amount of the new value. See also infra note 298. 
60Clearly, the exceptions in §§ 547(c)(7), 547(h), and 546(e) fall into this category. Also, while per-
haps sui generis, § 547(c)(6)'s protection for statutory liens probably comes closest to this category of the 
three offered. For a somewhat different classification of the preference exceptions, see Gotberg, supra note 
37, at 69·81 (dividing the subsection(c) exceptions into two categories: narrowing exceptions (such as 
§ 547(c)(1)) and true exceptions (such as§ 547(c)(2)). 
61The so·called de minimis dollar value exceptions in §§ 547(c)(8) ands (9) are clearly in this category. 
See also infra text accompanying notes 220-224, regarding modification of the venue rules for the same 
purpose. 
62This is evident, for example, in the § 507(a) unsecured claim priorities and several of the noncon· 
duct· based exceptions to the dischargeability of a particular debt in § 523(a). In a different sort of way, 
the limitations on rejection of collective bargaining agreements in Code § 1113, and the special provisions 
regarding retiree benefits in § 1114, are also illustrations of how the Code seeks to accommodate the 
conflicting policy considerations animating other laws. 
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do the sum of these policy-based exceptions to a bankruptcy rule begin to 
take a toll on the effectiveness of that rule (and eventually the larger aspira-
tions of the bankruptcy regime) that is greater than the sum of their individ-
ual parts?63 Regarding the third category of preference exception, as 
discussed more fully below,64 the approach taken in §§ 547(c)(8) and (c)(9), 
imposing a minimum dollar threshold for invoking the bankruptcy court's ju-
risdiction in, respectively, consumer and nonconsumer preference cases, repre-
sents unimaginative and almost certainly ill-fitting responses to the putative 
problem it purports to address. 
Returning, to the broader theme underlying the scheme of preference ex-
ceptions, a deterrence rationale conflicts with equality policy in a fashion that 
at best simultaneously diminishes the effectiveness of each, and at worst ob-
structs realization of the core ambitions of the bankruptcy system.65 It is also 
unrealistic to imagine that any defense to preference liability founded on the 
absence of the opprobrious behavior perceived as principally animating pref-
erence law in the first instance could ever be crafted with the precision nec-
essary to capture only and all of the conduct sought to be approved and none 
of the praxes intended to be proscribed. That is to say, any defense to prefer-
ence liability founded chiefly on a deterrence-oriented rationale will serve its 
intended objective, if at all, only on occasion and serendipitously at that. Sec-
tion 54 7(c)(2), which rests most squarely on this explanation of preference 
policy, is the exemplar.66 This alone might not be so alarming but for the fact 
that, at the same time, exceptions of this ilk critically erode the preference 
law's ability to serve its other, and assuredly its primary,67 core objective. 
For these reasons, many commentators,68 myself included,69 have been 
63Certainly, this is a circumstance we have witnessed in other parts of the Code. The proliferation of 
exceptions to the automatic stay, twenty-eight in total after the addition of ten more by BAPCPA, might 
be a case where this phenomenon has taken effect. Likewise, the ever-increasing scope of debt categories 
excepted under § 523(a) from the individual discharge might qualify as well. 
64See infra text accompanying notes 207·219. The changes to venue rules, also discussed below (infra 
text accompanying notes 220·224) present a somewhat different approach to regulation of misuse of the 
preference power and, as such, are much more defensible. 
65This includes not only the traditional notion of ~equality of distribution," but also debtor continua· 
tion and the Code's distributional scheme generally. See infra Party VII. 
66See infra Part VIA. 
67See supra note 52, quoting legislative history describing the equality objective as the most important. 
See also infra note 189. 
68See Countryman, supra note 43, at 748 (suggesting that, despite the legislative history discussing the 
aim of "deterring creditors from scrambling for advantage," it seems ridiculous to expect [the preference 
law to produce] deterrence ... ."); McCoid, supra note 46, 263·64 (offering reasons to be skeptical of 
preference law's deterrent effect). To be sure, McCoid also questioned whether there were sufficient 
preference recaptures to warrant the assertion that preference law actually ameliorates distributional 
equalities. Id at 262·63. See also David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable Prefer· 
entia!. 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 211, 215·18 (identifying several reasons that raise serious doubt over whether 
deterrence is the principal purpose of voidable preference law); Tabb, supra note 41, at 986~94 (discussing 
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critical of the deterrence justification for the preference law. In part, this is 
based on the aforementioned impotence of deterrence-based defenses actually 
to achieve their desired aim. More importantly, however, it is grounded on 
the increasingly corrosive impact that the growth of these exceptions has had 
since 1978 on the framing of a comprehensible and internally consistent pref-
erence policy. The deterrence justification of voidable preferences rests on 
three highly dubious assumptions: (1) that there are "'good"" and "'bad" prefer-
ences; (2) that it is possible to easily (or even not so easily) distinguish be-
tween the two; and (3) that the distinction, even to the extent it exists and 
can be detected,· matters. And yet, the thrust and focus of most reform legis-
lation since 1978 has been based on the conviction that each assumption is 
true beyond the shadow of a doubt. 
The ineffectiveness of the deterrence explanation for bankruptcy prefer-
ences can best be illustrated by looking closely at the description in the legis-
lative history of how it operates.7° To paraphrase, without a preference law, 
creditors that supposedly might otherwise have been inclined to work with 
the debtor will feel obliged to swoop in to claim their share of the available 
spoils as soon they learn that the debtor has come upon financially-troubled 
waters. Thus, the debtor's slide into bankruptcy will become inevitable. 
But, with the existence of preference liability, the reasoning goes, any such 
efforts will be futile, so that the creditors will say, "'shucks, no point if I'm 
just going to have to give it back." The yarn continues, moreover, that the 
protection of the preference law will also encourage both existing and new 
creditors to continue doing business with this debtor despite its financially 
unstable position.71 Finally, then, in a truly utopian world, both of these 
phenomena will, in some number of cases, coalesce to create the conditions 
that will allow the debtor actually to right the sinking ship, return to sol-
vency, and avoid bankruptcy entirely.72 
the primacy of the equality over deterrence explanation for the preference law). But see Jackson, supra 
note 40 (identifying the purpose of the preference law as preventing creditors, with or without the 
debtor's help, from "opting·ouC of the collective proceeding during the transitional period prior to 
bankruptcy). 
69Ponoroff, supra note 43, at 1479, 1484 (discussing the impact of accepting the rationale that "the 
policy of the preference law is to ensure substantial equality, not punish nefarious behavior.~). 
7°See supra note 52. 
7
'The argument is merely the flip side of the proposition that the preference law will in fact deter 
precipitous collection activity and, in substance, is really nothing more than part of the apology for ever· 
more exceptions to preference recovery that hinge on the creditor's supposed innocence. See infra note 94. 
It also ignores a critical passage from the House Report accompanying the 1978 Act, stating: "To argue 
that a creditor's state of mind is an important element of a preference and that creditors should not be 
required to disgorge what they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the strong bankruptcy policy of 
equality among creditors." See HousE REPORT, supra note 52, at 178. 
72 See, e.g., David]. DeSimone, Section 547(c)(2) of the Ban~ruptcy Code: The Ordinary Course of 
Business Exception Without the 45 Day Rule, 20 AKRON L. REv. 95, 99 (1986) ("If the bankruptcy laws in 
2016) BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCES 345 
Of course, overlooked in ·this simplistic and rosy picture of creditor be-
havior is the fact that the existence of a preference law might just as easily 
motivate a creditor, otherwise inclined to work with the debtor, to race to 
the courthouse and grab the debtor's remaining assets with the hope not only 
of getting ahead of its fellow creditors, but also of getting ahead of the ninety-
day clock. The point being that (short of collusion)73 the beginning of the 
preference period can only be known retrospectively. Thus, a preference law 
is just as likely to precipitate the premature dismantling of the debtor and the 
slide into bankruptcy as it is to prevent those events from occurring. Effec-
tive deterrence-based rules hinge on their in terrorem effect; the penalty must 
exceed the crime, but the only "penalty" for receiving a preference is the 
obligation to return it. Thus, the in terrorem effect of preference law is tepid 
at best.74 The rules of preference recovery simply provide no meaningful or 
predictable motivation for creditors to refrain from collection activity, and 
surely critics of the current preference law are hardly remonstrating for stif 
fer penalties as the solution.75 The possibility that the debtor will not file, or 
will not file within 90 days, or that the trustee will not pursue the claim, are 
each alone enough, and together more than sufficient, to warrant investment 
in the modest costs of judgment execution even with the threat of a future 
preference challenge looming. 
Although, as noted earlier,76 BAPCPA originated as a preemptive strike 
against the NBRC Report, uncharacteristically its provisions concerning pref-
erence law included the near verbatim adoption of three of the NBRC's rec-
ommendations. 77 These were: ( 1) further broadening of the exception in 
general, and specifically the preference laws, did not 'discourage the dismemberment of ailing, but salvage· 
able debtors; there would be far more bankruptcies."). Personally, I used to be more sympathetic to the 
encouraging creditors to continue doing business with the debtor argument. See Ponoroff, supra note 43, 
at 1516 (proposing a preference rule guided by strict liability, but "tempered by defined exceptions that 
protect the existing life-blood of the troubled firm and offer hope for badly needed new infusions .... ~). In 
my dotage, however, I have now come to agree with Professor Tabb's assessment that: "Whether a debtor 
will or will not go into bankruptcy, whether a preference action will even be brought if bankruptcy does 
ensue, and whether such a preference action will be successful if brought are all much more remote con· 
cerns than the basic question of whether the debtor will pay." Tabb, supra note 41 at 1023. See also 
supra note 55 & infra note 295. 
73The ability of creditors to force the debtor into a proceeding under § 303 provides some protection 
against such conspiratorial collusion between the debtor and one of its creditors. Moreover, most transac· 
tions of this sort are likely to involve creditors with access to or control over the debtor, who would thus 
be subject to the extended insider preference period. 
74See McCoid supra note 46, at 263·65 (pointing out that because preference law does not penalize, it 
may not act as an effective deterrent). 
'
5Id. at 269·70 (conceding, in something of an understatement, that a more deterrent-designed prefer-
ence section would likely have costs that exceed its benefits). 
76See infra text accompanying notes 13·15. 
77The remaining amendments to preference law accomplished under BAPCP A are reviewed infra text 
accompanying notes 130·134. 
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§ 54 7(c)(2) by substitution of a disjunctive test in place of the then-current 
objective test for ascertaining whether a preferential payment qualifies for 
protection as an "'ordinary" transaction;78 (2) inclusion of a new exception in 
cases involving nonconsumer debtors, essentially operating as a safe harbor 
for transfers to a noninsider creditor of property aggregating less than 
$5,00079; and (3) a change in the venue rules to require that preference claims 
against noninsiders on nonconsumer debts seeking recovery of less than 
$10,00080 be brought in the district where the creditor maintains its princi-
pal place of business.81 In turn, these NBRC recommendations were a nearly 
wholesale incorporation of certain of the recommendations made in a study of 
preferences sponsored by the American Bankruptcy Institute and conducted 
between May of 1995 and May of 1997.82 Hence, a brief review of that 
study helps to paint a more complete picture of the landscape. 
III. THE ABI STUDY 
The ABI Preference Study remains the only large-scale, major empirical 
study of preferences and preference litigation to date. It was, however, an 
attitudinal not an observational study, which is to say that the basic data 
that the Task Force83 conducting the study worked from were survey re-
sponses. T~o surveys were employed by the Task Force; one designed for 
78The requirement that the debt be incurred in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of 
the debtor and the transferee remained unaltered. However, the requirements that the payment be made 
in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the parties and according to ordinary business 
terms, was amended to state these latter two requirements in the alternative. Thus, after BAPCP A, 
"ordinariness" as between the parties or in terms of objective industry practices suffices to establish the 
defense, rather than, as had been the case, have to satisfy both the subjective and objective standards. It 
should, however, be noted that in the explanatory text to this recommendation there is a suggestion that 
the intent was that ordinary business terms could provide the standard of "ordinariness" only when there 
is insufficient prepetition conduct to establish a course of dealings between the parties. See NBRC RE-
PORT, supra note 13, at 802. That limitation is not, however, reflected in the language of the actual 
recommendation, which is what was effectively adopted by BAPCPA; thus, perhaps, broadening the ex-
ception beyond what the Commission intended. 
79-fhe recommendation eventually became codified as§ 547(c)(9). Due to the fact, however, that this 
dollar amount is one of the amounts that is adjusted every three years under § 104(a), the current mini-
mum amount sufficient to allow a creditor to invoke this defense is $6,225. 
80 Again, because this figure is also one that adjusts every three years under § 104(a), the minimum 
current amount that must be exceeded to overcome the requirement that the action be brought in the 
district of the creditor's place of business is $12,475. 
81 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) (2013). Prior to BAPCPA, venue was proper in the district court where the 
case was pending, except for a narrow limitation if the amount of the claim was less than $1,000. That 
narrow limitation has been retained, although the dollar figure has been adjusted upward under § 104(a) 
to $1,250. 
82American Bankruptcy Institute Task Force on Preferences, PREFERENCE SuRVEY REPORT (PART OF 
THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM STUDY PROJECT) (1997), available at: http://www.abiworld.org/legis/re-
form/preferencesurvey.html {the "ABI STUDY"). 
83The Task Force consisted of 13 attorneys, six accountants/turnaround specialists, seven credit man-
agers, one banker, and a Reporter. The individual members of the Task Force, and the Reporter, are listed 
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credit providers (Survey 1), a group anticipated as most likely to be affected 
by the preference laws,84 and the other for bankruptcy professionals (Survey 
2), a group perceived to be most ~nowledgeable about the actual day-to-day 
operation of the preference laws.85 A total of 1,586 copies of Survey 1, and 
1,000 of Survey 2, were disseminated.86 According to the ABI Study, the 
return rates for these surveys were, respectively, 29.4% and 35.6%.87 
It should have come as no surprise to anyone to learn that the credit 
provider group was overall much more dissatisfied with, and jaundiced about, 
the operation of the preference law than the bankruptcy professionals 
group.88 There was, however, some shared sentiments, as both groups (1) 
were apparently suspicious about the effectiveness of the preference laws in 
serving their stated objectives,89 (2} believed that the ordinary course of busi-
ness defense should be clarified and made easier to apply,90 (3) supported a 
minimum dollar amount floor as a condition to the trustee's ability to bring a 
here: http:/ /www.abiworld.org/Content/N avigationMenu/NewsRoom/Bankruptcy Research Center I 
Bankruptcy ReportsResearchandTestimony I ABI/Report_on_the_ABI_P 1.htm 
84ABI STUDY, supra note 82, at 2. While regular credit providers are most likely to be defendants in 
preference actions, they are also likely to be beneficiaries of preference actions in situations where they are 
creditors in a proceeding in which preference actions are successfully brought against other creditors, 
thereby, at least in theory, adding to the estate and potentially the amount of the dividend to unsecured 
creditors. However, as discussed supra note 37 and infra note 88, even professional credit providers, who 
are just as likely to be benefitted as disadvantaged by the preference law, are generally hostile to the 
concept in the abstract and in practice. 
85Jd. 
86Survey 1 was mailed to: (i) all 386 members of the Commercial Finance Association, and to (ii) the 
1200 members of the National Association of Credit Management with Certified Credit Executive (CCE) 
or Certified Business Fellow (CBF) designations. Survey 2 was mailed to 1000 randomly selected mem· 
bers of the American Bankruptcy Institute who were listed in the membership rolls as being an attorney, 
accountant, or turnaround consultant, and who stated that at least part of their practice involved business 
bankruptcy. Jd. at 2·3. 
87Those percentages may represent statistically representative sample sizes from which to draw con· 
elusions with some confidence, but my nonstatistically·based experience has been that the naysayers are 
generally more likely to speak out, and in a louder voice, than their more contented counterparts. 
88 Although the ABI STUDY observed that credit providers could be affected both positively and nega· 
tively by application of the preference law, supra note 82, I believe the overall hostile attitude toward 
preference law was predictable. Even though it is true that they may sometimes benefit from a preference 
recovery in a case where they hold a claim, the impact is likely to be small and not very visible. On the 
other hand, when they are the target in a preference action, the impact is direct and usually significant in 
financial terms. See supra note 37. See also Gotberg, supra note 37, at 54 (pointing out that another 
reason why preference law is not popular with ~repeat players" is that preference liability is not contin· 
gent on recovery inuring to the benefit of unsecured creditors); infra note 246. 
89 ABI Study, supra note 82, at 3 (noting a widely-expressed criticism about the coercive nature of 
many preference actions, and the belief that often recoveries funded administrative expenses without any 
benefit in the form of increased distributions to general creditors). The assumption, even if true, that this 
renders the preference law "ineffective" is open to serious question. See infra notes 217, 261, & 318 and 
accompanying text. 
90ld. at 4. 
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preference action,91 and (4) were concerned that the difficulty and expense of 
preference litigation created pressure on defendants to settle preference 
claims of even dubious validity.92 The two groups disagreed fairly sharply 
over the extent to which unsecured creditors as a group benefitted from ap-
plication of the preference law,93 but were more in accord in expressing sup-
port for reforms aimed at providing protection for creditors that had 
~assisted" the debtor prefiling in its efforts to avoid bankruptcy entirely.94 
Again, not unexpectedly, the credit provider group was strongly of the mind-
set that the recipient of a preferential transfer should only be required to 
91 This was hardly a new concept. The idea of a dollar-denominated threshold for bringing preference 
actions goes back at least to the Commission established by Congress in 1970 to "study, evaluate and 
recommend changes to [the existing bankruptcy law]. 14 Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91·354, 86 
Stat. 468. See COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE CoMMISSION ON THE 
BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. NO. 93·B7, pt. 2, at 166 (1973) (the "1973 
CoMMISSION REPORT") (setting a proposed floor of $1,000·$5,287 in inflation-adjusted dollars). 
92 ABI STUDY supra note 82, at 25. Those criticisms have persisted. See Pardo, supra note 52, at 298, 
n.86 (pointing out, with reference to the NBRC Report, that concern exists that preference litigation is 
sometime initiated improvidently simply for its settlement value, unnecessary and undesirable costs); infra. 
text accompanying notes 279·280. 
9 lSee ABI STUDY, supra note 82, at 5 (showing that almost 75% of the credit providers believed that 
preference recoveries rarely or never increased distributions to unsecured creditors, compared with 37.5% 
of the professional group). Of course, the production of additional distributable assets for unsecured credi-
tors is not a requirement of the statute. Equality is achieved when all similarly-position creditors receive 
the same amount, even if that amount is zero. See supra note 39. 
94Both groups thought that creditors who tried to work with debtors were penalized by the prefer· 
ence laws, and that those laws discouraged settlements and workouts. While proposed reforms, such as 
protecting additional collateral granted to a creditor in exchange for favorable concessions, were couched 
in terms of encouraging creditors to help debtors work out of their financial troubles, the subtext seemed 
to be a polemic for yet more defenses to preference liability. As noted earlier (supra note 72 ), I used to be 
more persuaded by the "encourage creditors to do business" argument (as opposed to an outright deter· 
rence) rationale for preferences. See also Ponoroff & Ashby supra note 55, at 58·62 (suggesting a more 
modest construction of§ 547(c)(2) focused on this rationale). I also concede that a preference exception 
may operate after the fact to reward a creditor who dealt with the debtor in the shadow of bankruptcy, 
but I have become more cynical and simply no longer believe that protection from preference liability, 
which again can only be known in retrospect, can really influence creditor behavior. Moreover, since we 
are only arguing over this issue once a bankruptcy case has been filed, even in the unlikely event the 
creditor was influenced to deal with the debtor because of insulation from preference liability, it is appar· 
ent that this "assistance" was not very effective. Creditors, whether in continuing to do business with a 
troubled debtor or pulling the plug, act out of self-interest-and properly so. It is fanciful to assume that a 
creditor that is concerned about a debtor's financial condition will decide to extend credit to that debtor 
because a subsequent repayment might be immune from the trustee's preference power. Given that there 
is no assurance that the subsequent repayment will be forthcoming at all, and in fact considerable doubt 
about the matter, it is hard to imagine the preference defense having any effect on the relationship or 
creditor behavior. See Tabb, supra note 41, at 1024 (pointing out that in this situation what the careful 
creditor would do is insist on cash on delivery regardless of what the preference laws say). The best, 
therefore, that can be said is that the exception does not discourage a creditor from continuing to do 
business with the debtor-but it surely does not encourage any extension of new credit to the debtor. 
And, in most cases, there are already enough of other reasons for the creditors to be dissuaded from 
extending new credit to the debtor that the absence of one more is hardly likely to make much of a 
difference. 
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disgorge the value of the payment (or forfeit transferred lien) if either the 
debtor or the creditor had "'done something wrong."95 
· The ABI Study ultimately concluded with four specific recommendations 
for reform (Recommendations One through Four)96 and nine "'other ideas for 
consideration" (Recommendations Seven through Thirteen),97 oddly includ-
ing reinserting an "'intent" requirement as an element of a voidable prefer-
ence.98 As noted above,99 of the major revisions to the preference law made 
under BAPCPA, two came from the Task Force's recommendations,100 and 
one from the other suggested ideas. 101 
. Professor Charles Jordan Tabb, who. served as Reporter on the ABI 
Study, published an article shortly after the enactment of BAPCPA describ-
ing and analyzing the Act's changes to bankruptcy preference law. 102 While 
a faithful and diligent Reporter, it is clear that, as a matter of his own per-
sonal views, Professor Tabb was skeptical about these changes, including the 
ones derived directly from the ABI study, referring to them collectively as 
"'further weakening the normative underpinning of preference law and pre-
dicting that, no doubt as intended, preference recoveries would decline 'in the 
'brave new world' of preferences in which we now live."103 
Professor Tabb's skepticism was warranted. 104 And it goes deeper than 
the not inconsiderable damage to the bankruptcy system caused by shielding 
prefiling transfers that advantage one c~editor at the expense of all similarly 
95ABI STUDY, supra note 82, at 12. This simply confirms why a bankruptcy regime is required so as 
to constrain the inevitable exercise of self-interested behavior by individual creditors-and behavior that 
undermines both fresh start and rehabilitation policy. 
96ABI STUDY, supra note 82, at 25·27. 
97/d. at 27-31. 
98See ABI STUDY, supra note 82 (Recommendation Seven) ("Require proof that the debtor intended to 
prefer the creditor; or, alternatively, provide a safe harbor from preference liability for transfers made by 
the debtor in response to creditor collection efforts."). 
99See supra notes 77·83 and accompanying text. 
100These were the provision of a safe harbor for preferential payments below a certain dollar amount 
(§ 547(c)(9), and expansion of the ordinary course of business defense in § 547(c)(2)). ABI STUDY supra 
note 82 (Recommendations One and Four). 
101Amendment of the venue statute, 11 U.S.C. § 1409(b) was proposed by Recommendation Thir-
teen. ABI STUDY, supra note 82. Perhaps the most significant of the other changes to the preference law 
accomplished under BAPCPA-expansion ofthe grace period in§ 547(e)(2) from ten to thirty days (infra 
text accompanying notes 195·197)-was not raised in the ABI Study. Instead, the Task Force proposed 
as an idea for consideration to make the date of transfer of a security interest coincide with the date the 
security interest is deemed perfected under state (or other applicable nonbankruptcy) law. This sugges-
tion was, however, made with the least enthusiasm of the Task Force's recommendations. ABI STUDY, 
supra note 82 (Recommendation Nine). · 
102Charles J. Tabb, 'The Brave N.ew World of Ban~ruptcy Preferences, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 
425 (2005). 
IOlJd. at 455·56. 
104Ponoroff, supra note 43, at 1490·1514 (proposing a new ~super rule" of preferences entailing amend-
ment of§§ 547(c)(2) & (4), and making the presumption of insolvency conclusive). 
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situated creditors. It is also a tile in a larger mosaic that evinces a fundamen-
tal shift in emphasis away from the goals of the bankruptcy law as embodied 
in the 1978 Act toward a system that exhibits far greater deference to the 
inefficiencies and wastefulness of state collection rules, a deference that inevi-
tably comes at the expense of the bankruptcy system's commitment to the 
goals of equality and rehabilitation. 
IV. THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATION OF THE 1978 ACT 
The 1978 Act signaled a major shift away from fealty to the state law 
bargain and the state law of creditors remedies105 (which work well enough 
so long as the debtor remains solvent) and toward attainment of the purpo-
sive objectives of a modern bankruptcy system, 106 which are vastly superior 
in the aggregate to state law tools when there are insufficient fish and loaves 
to go around. This change in emphasis did not go unnoticed by many influen-
tial commentators writing about the time that the 1978 Act came into effect 
or shortly thereafter. Typically, however, the focus was either on the con-
sumer-friendly provisions of the 1978 Act or what some perceived as its dis-
dain for the contractual rights of secured creditors. 
Regarding the latter, consider, for example, the not entirely tongue m-
cheek observation made by Professor Peter Coogan: 
When I first heard of Grant Gilmore's The Death of Con-
tract107 my initial expectation was that he would point out 
105 As observed, the shift was in certain respects a tentative one, given the continued adherence to a 
deterrence justification for the law and the exceptions that hinge to one extent or the other on the view 
that innocent transferees should be accorded some shelter since, if innocent, they did not need to be 
"deterred" in the first place. See supra notes 50·55 and accompanying text. 
106As far back as in Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 343, 346 (1874), the Supreme Court described equality 
of distribution as the most important purpose of the bankruptcy law. See also Young v. Higbee, 324 U.S. 
204, 210 ( 1945) ("[H]istorically one of the prime purposes of the bankruptcy law has been to bring about 
a ratable distribution among creditors of a bankrupt's assets; to protect the creditors from one another. 
And the corporate reorganization statutes look to a ratable distribution of assets among classes of stock· 
holders as well as creditors."). To achieve this goal, the Bankruptcy Code creates a comprehensive and 
intricate scheme designed to equitably distribute the debtor's nonexempt assets. See Sherwood Partners, 
Inc. v. Lycos, Inc. 394 F.3d 1198, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Bankruptcy law accomplishes equitable 
distribution through a distinctive form of collective proceeding. This is a unique contribution of the 
Bankruptcy Code that makes bankruptcy different from a collection of actions by individual creditors. In a 
world of individual actions, each creditor knows that if he waits too long, the. debtor's assets will have 
been exhausted by the demands of the quicker creditors and he will recover nothing .... Federal bank· 
ruptcy law seeks to avoid this scenario by ~creat[ing] a whole system under federal control which is 
designed to bring together and adjust all of the rights and duties of creditors and embarrassed debtors 
alike."). 
107The reference, of course, is to Professor Gilmore's 1974 book in which he observed that Contract 
Law appeared to be on the verge of being reabsorbed into Tort Law, and losing its identity as a separate 
and coherent area legal field of study. As with the rumor of Mark Twain's death, the concern turned out 
to have been greatly exaggerated. 
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the extent to which the exercise by Congress of its power to 
enact law on the subject of bankruptcy already had, and 
through the then-current proposals for a new Bankruptcy 
Act probably would, cut down or change the effect that the 
parties thought they could provide for under prevailing state 
contract law.ws 
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Along similar lines, Professor Ted Eisenberg, in his criticism of § 54 7s 
treatment of inventory and receivables financing, mused that, "[ t ]he reform 
movement's technicians should have articulated the costs of a separate bank-
ruptcy rule and decisionmakers should have considered these costs before im-
posing such a rule" (upsetting state law priority under Article 9 in the name 
of "equality").109 Finally, on a cheerier note, Professor Richard Hagedorn 
noted that: 
One of the more significant departures of bankruptcy law 
from the common law of debtor-creditor relationships is the 
condemnation of preferential transfers. Although some cred-
itors are given priority treatment under bankruptcy law, one 
of the basic underpinnings of bankruptcy law is the equal 
treatment of creditors .... [T]he new Bankruptcy Code ap-
propriately eliminated the reasonable-cause requirement ex-
cept for transfers involving "insiders," .... The effect on the 
survival of the secured claim is somewhat deleterious. How-
ever, the Code will undoubtedly eliminate a great deal of 
litigation and the need to interpret conflicting judicial deci-
sions, thus adding more predictability to the position of the 
holder of a secured claim. In the balance, it would appear 
that the change constitutes a definite improvement in bank-
ruptcy law.uo 
108Peter F. Coogan, The New Ban/cruptcy Code: The Death of Security Interest, 14 GA. L. REv. 153 
(1980). 
109Theodore Eisenberg, Ban~ruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 953,959 (1981). See also 
Albert F. Reisman, The Challenge of the Proposed Ban~ruptcy Act to Accounts Receivable and Inventory 
Financing of Small-to Medium-Sized Business, 83 CoM. L.]. 169, 174 (1978) ("[t)he proposed Bankruptcy 
Act would virtually negate the effectiveness of Article 9 security interests in bankruptcy proceedings 
.... "). But see Dean C. Gordanier, Jr., The Indubitable Equivalent of Reclamation. Adequate Protection for 
Secured Creditors Under the Ban~ruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.]. 299, 299 (1980) ("[i]n facilitating 
business reorgani;:ations .... the Code may prove to be no more successful than its predecessor, the 
Bankruptcy Act, and for the same reason: secured creditors have, practically speaking, a veto over many if 
not most of the plans proposed under chapter 11."). 
110Richard B. Hagedorn, The Survival and Enforcement of the Secured Claim Under the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8·10 (1980). The prediction about eliminating litigation 
turned out to be off-target largely because of the resurrection of culpability as a real or subliminal element 
of a voidable preference. 
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The consumer provisions of the 1978 Act, in turn, were soon pilloried for 
causing a sharp spike in bankruptcy filings. For example, according to Vern 
McKinley, writing for a Cato Institute journal: .... A clear cui prit of the rise in 
bankruptcies is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 that moved the Code in 
a decidedly pro-debtor direction as part of the 'consumer' movement of that 
period." 1ll Critics of the 1978 Act argued that by, among other changes, 
establishing a federal exemption scheme more generous than that available in 
many states and enhancing the desirability of Chapter 13 through the crea-
tion of the so-called superdischarge, the new law made filing easier, less stig-
matiz;ing, and thus more attractive to the average prospective debtor than 
had been the case under prior law. 112 
Still, the movement away from state law rules and remedies in 1978 
(which prompted Professor Eisenberg to deem the 1978 Act a ""failure")113 
was not nearly as abrupt as it may have seemed to some at the time. !14 Most 
of the legislative changes were in fact evolutionary, not revolutionary. As 
Professor William Vukowich commented in response to the charge that the 
1978 Act was responsible for the rapid surge in consumer filings, .... [ t ]hese 
slight changes [involving discharge provisions under Chapter 13 as well as a 
minimum federal exemption] hardly account for the large increase in bank-
ruptcy filings or for all of the 'abuses' alleged to occur under the new law."11 5 
111Vern McKinley, Ballooning Banl{ruptcies: Issuing Blame for the Explosive Growth, 20 REGULATION 
33, 38 (1997). See also the authorities collected in Todd]. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer 
Ban~ruptcy Refonn, 62 WASH. LEE L. REv. 1071, 1080 n.18 (2005); Todd ]. Zywicki, An Economic 
Analysis of the Consumer Ban~ruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. L. REv. 1463, 1467 (2005) (noting the "stunning 
increase" in consumer bankruptcy filing rates between 1979 and 2004, and the inability of traditional 
explanations to account for this increase other than by reference to the to the added benefits and reduced 
costs associated with bankruptcy since the 1978 Act). 
1120f course, with the majority of the states opting out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, and 
gradual elimination of the Chapter 13 superdischarge beginning in 1990 and nearly completed by 
BAPCPA, these factors no longer play whatever role they might have in 1979. See also David A. Moss & 
Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Ban~ruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both? 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
311, 328 (1999) (offering several explanations debunking the belief that the explosion in consumer filings 
was attributable to the 1978 Act, including the fact that rate of growth did not slow down or reverse 
course when Congress enacted a set of pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms in 1984). 
113See Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 953. 
114Coogan, supra note 108, at· 154-55 (acknowledging that the new bankruptcy law, while perhaps 
most shocking at first blush in its treatment of security interests, at bottom involves a balance that must 
occur between the need for overburdened debtors to return to financial viability and the rights and inter-
ests of creditors and lessors who are due sums owed by the debtor); Hagedorn, supra note 110, at 28 
(concluding that, in comparison with the former Act, holders of secured claims will have a more difficult 
time protecting their interests under the new Code, but that the changes appear warranted in light of 
competing interests entailed in the reform of the bankruptcy law). 
115See Moss & Johnson, supra, note 112, at 329-31. Of course, as BAPCPA finally proved, eventually 
these pro-creditor reforms will take their toll on consumer filings. It is no coincidence, for example, that 
consumer filings peaked in 2005 prior to the effective date of BAPCPA. See http:/ /news.abi.org/sites/ 
default/files/statistics/Total-Business-Consumer1980-2013.pdf. See also Zywicki, supra note 111, at 1080 
(noting the spike in consumer bankruptcy filings between the passage of BAPCP A in April 2005 and its 
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As for the Act's assault on secured credit, Professor Margaret Howard has 
pointed out that, "'the history of bankruptcy law shows a steady alteration of 
the rights of secured creditors, undertaken for the purposes of achieving 
equality of distribution and assuring the debtor a fresh start. No revolution 
occurred with passage of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in 1978; rather, 
the Code continued a progression that began in 1898."116 
What the disparagers of the 1978 Act overlooked (or, in the case of the 
credit industry, chose to ignore out of self-interest) was that, in its contempo-
rary form, bankruptcy is intended to be a mechanism for nonfulfillment of 
state law contract and tort obligations without consequence; or at least with-
out being subjected to the liability that would normally attend nonfulfillment 
of such duties. Unless we are prepared as a society to wholly subsidize their 
losses, achievement of enhanced debtor protection has to come largely at the 
expense of the debtor's creditors.l 17 At the same time, typically, a debtor's 
creditors are not an undifferentiated, monolithic horde. Creditors come in 
many flavors, secured and unsecured, consensual and nonconsensual, commer-
cial and consumer, just to name a few. The payback for unsecured creditors 
(which in bankruptcy of course includes undersecured creditors) is the possi-
bility of a bigger pie118 and substantially equal treatment of claims,119 
achieved, in part, through the preference law. Accordingly, the 1978 Act's 
pursuit of a more robust fresh start for debtors, greater creditor equality, and 
effective date in October); Thomas Bak, John Golmant, & James Woods, A Comparison of the Effects of the 
1978 and 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Legislation on Bankruptcy Filing Rates, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEv.]. 11 
(2008). 
116Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1]. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 513, 527 (1992). 
See also Kennedy, supra note, at 482·83 (1982) (observing that nineteenth century bankruptcy legislation 
became reflected a growing tendency to restrict the rights of secured creditors ~in the interest of facilitat· 
ing attainment of the objectives of the bankruptcy laws to effect equality of distribution and to afford a 
fresh start for the debtor."). 
117See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policyrnaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 361 
(1992) (discussing as one of the normative functions of the bankruptcy law a desire to constrain externali· 
zation of losses to parties not dealing with the debtor firm). 
118To be sure, it will be less than equivalent return value in many cases. Bankruptcy is, at its core, a 
system for distributing limited assets and, when feasible, assuring debtor continuation. Therefore, max· 
imization must be understood in relative, and not absolute, terms and must be viewed from the perspective 
of creditors as a group, rather than any individual creditor that could be better or worse off as a conse· 
quence of the debtor's bankruptcy. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bani~: 
ruptcy, 97 CoRNELL L. REv. 1399, 1405 (2012) (describing bankruptcy as involving an inherently political 
distributional exercise, rather than purely a system to maximize returns to creditors). 
''
90f course, painstaking and unremitting equality has never characterized our bankruptcy law. Or, 
put another way, as the unsecured priorities in § 507(a) vividly illustrate, some claims are more equal than 
others mostly due to countervailing policy (or political) considerations. Still, the view has always been 
that such exceptions should be narrowly construed so as to interfere to the least extent possible with the 
Code's underlying theme of creditor equality. See, e.g., Nathanson v. Nat'! Labor Relations Board, 344 
U.S. 25, 29 (1952) (~The theme of the Bankruptcy Act is 'equality of distribution' ... ; and if one claimant 
is to be preferred over others, the purpose should be clear from the statute," quoting Sampsell v. Imperial 
Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941)). 
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enhanced prospects for debtor survival through reorganization, all pressed for 
less deference to state law distributional rules and creditor remedies than 
theretofore had been the case, including limiting the scope of protection af-
forded to secured claims to the value of the underlying collateral, and not the 
full array of state law contract rights.120 As noted,l21 however, ever since 
the 1978 Act, the thrust of most so-called bankruptcy reform legislation has 
been to halt and then begin to reverse the swing of the pendulum in favor of 
debtor relief and ratable distribution among creditors122-with BAPCPA il-
lustrating the physical law that when the pendulum does swing back, rarely 
does it stop at dead center. 
V. POST-1978 PREFERENCE REFORM 
A. EARLY AMENDMENTS 
The impact of the backlash against the 1978 Act on the preference law 
was, until BAPCP A, rather modest. 123 Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the 
120This is why, for example, we do not provide adequate protection when the creditor has an equity 
cushion in the collateral (Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Neb. v. Alycan Interstate Corp (In re Alycan Interstate 
Corp.), 12 B.R. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)), and why we do not provide adequate protection for lost 
opportunity costs (United Savs. Assoc. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 
(1988)). Of course, BAPCPA has made serious inroads on that principle (supra notes 19·23 and accompa· 
nying text) and the Supreme Court has been less than perfectly consistent on the point. See Keating, 
supra, note 28, at 495·97 (suggesting 'Timbers was an outlier and the Court's bias is toward preserving, to 
the extent possible, the secured creditor's state law remedies). See also Douglas G. Baird, Secured Credi· 
tors' Rights After ResCap, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. (questioning the conventional explanation of secured 
creditors' rights in bankruptcy). Nevertheless, the decision to limit the protection afforded to security is 
reflected by the Code's elimination of any reference to ~secured parties." Instead, § 506(a)(1) refers to 
secured and unsecured claims, with the former being determined by reference to the value of the collateral 
rather than the state law status of the creditor holding the claim. The one statutory exception that has 
always existed of course is in the case of over secured claims per § 506(b ). One early commentator had 
gone so far as to suggest that Congress intended section 54 7 to allow for the redistribution of funds from 
secured to unsecured creditors, Ross, 'The Impact of Section 547 of the Ban~ruptcy Code Upon Secured and 
Unsecured Creditors, 69 MINN. L. REv. 39, 41·42 (1984). The suggestion is a dubious one to begin with, 
and, in any case, that is certainly not the way things have worked out. 
121 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
122The process was likely aided by the fact that the one major attempt to create a unified theory of 
bankruptcy, grounded in the law and economics tradition, emphasi~ed a contractual approach to the sub· 
ject. See generally THOMAS H. jACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 8·21 (1986) 
(setting forth basic principles of bankruptcy law and presenting bankruptcy as a system of contracts be· 
tween creditors); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Ban~ruptcy: A Reply to War· 
ren. 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815, 831·33 (1987) (advocating for a view of bankruptcy that would preserve in 
bankruptcy proceedings the rights and relations creditors have outside of bankruptcy law). Jackson's cred· 
itors' bargain theory posits that bankruptcy law should try to emulate the bargain that creditors would 
have made themselves. From this, it follows that the avoiding powers, and particularly the preference law, 
should be seen as a mechanism for policing creditors that seek to ~opt·ouC of the bargain by jumping the 
gun to obtain more than their contractually-agreed share. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 40, at 756·59 
(describing preference law as a means to bind creditors ~to their presumptive ex ante agreement and to foil 
the attempts of each creditor to welsh on the agreement for individual gain."). 
123See supra note 57. 
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most important amendment occurred in 1984 with the elimination of the 
language in § 54 7(c)(2) that had required that the ordinary course payment 
be made "'not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred" in order to 
qualify under the exception. 124 That small change fully flung open the door 
to the argument that the ordinary course of business defense should not be 
limited to current expenses, 125 a position that the Supreme Court eventually 
sanctioned in Union Ban~ v. Wolas, 126 holding that payments on long-term 
debt could qualify for protection under the exception. The policy signifi· 
cance of this expansion in the scope of§ 547(c)(2) was arguably even greater 
than its practical impact in specific cases, despite the fact that the practical 
impact was itself of no small consequence. Because the ordinary course of 
business defense has always stood out like a s~re thumb under the 1978 Act's 
new conception of a voidable preference, 127 its extension beyond short-term 
recurring debt not only expanded its reach, but also planted the seeds for the 
reintroduction of a subliminal but very real bad faith or bad motive element 
into the fundamental conception of what constitutes a bankruptcy preference 
in the first place. 12s 
B. THE REST OF THE BAPCP A AMENDMENTS 
Those seeds took root, and the preference law's relative insulation from 
legislative tinkering came to a clattering and unceremonious end with 
BAPCP A. In addition to codification of the recommendations of the ABI 
Study detailed above,129 BAPCPA made the following changes to the prefer· 
ence law: (1) included a new subsection designed to protect a noninsider-
creditors benefitted by the transfer of a security interest to an insider during 
124See Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 509·11 (7th Cir. 1984) (pointing out that this 
limitation had narrowed the exception to credit transactions that were not intended to be outstanding for 
very long). 
125See generally Broome, supra note 50, at 81 (observing that extension of§ 547(c)(2) to payments on 
long-term debt reflects yet another shift in the goal of preference law-from that of preserving equality of 
distribution of the debtor's assets among its creditors to that of avoiding preferential transfers received by 
creditors under unusual circumstances). It also may have eviscerated what at least some believed was the 
original, and much less ambitious, rationale for § 547(c)(2), which was simply to codify the judicially· 
created "current expense" rule, under which some courts indulged the fiction that payments on short-term 
debt (to creditors unlikely to be in a position to monitor the debtor's financial condition) did not meet the 
requirement of antecedence. See Thomas M. Ward & Jay A. Shulman, In Defense of the Ban~ruptcy 
Code's Radical Integration of the Preference Rules Affecting Commercial Financing, 61 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 
18 (1983). See also infra note 295. 
126Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991) (applying the plain language of the statute). At the 
time of the amendment in 1984, the sponsors of the amendment explained only that elimination of the 
forty-five-day rule was intended to "relieve buyers of commercial paper with maturities in excess of [forty· 
five] days of the concern that repayments of such paper at maturity might be considered as preferential 
transfers." See 130 CoNG. REc. S8897 (daily ed. May 27, 1984). 
127See Countryman, supra note 43, at 775 (describing the exception after 1984 as "indefensible"). 
128 See infra text accompanying notes 1 71·1 72. 
129See supra notes 77·81 and accompanying text. 
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the extended insider preference period;130 (2) added an exception, peculiarly-
placed in § 574(h), for payments made under a repayment schedule created 
by an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency; (3) re-wrote 
and expanded the purview of the defense in§ 547(c)(7) for domestic support 
obligation payments;131 ( 4) raised the threshold amount in the case of con-
sumer debts from under $5,000 to under $15,000 for triggering the require-
ment in 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) that the case be brought in the district where 
the defendant resides;132 and (5) extended the relation-back period in 
§ 547(e)(2) for when a transfer would be deemed to occur from ten to thirty 
days,133 and, correspondingly, raised the grace period in § 547(c)(3) from 
twenty to thirty days. 134 
Collectively, these changes accelerated, as intended, a movement toward 
narrowing the scope of transfers that qualify as preferential, and, even among 
those that still do, increasing the type and number of such transfers immu-
niz;ed from avoidance and recovery.135 Clearly, there is a need for empirical 
work to determine whether the perceptions so strongly voiced in the ABI 
Study, and repeated in the NBRC Report, concerning the ineffectiveness and 
the misuse of the preference power are as widespread as they are alleged to 
be,136 as well as to assess the impact of BAPCPA on the number of prefer-
ence adversary proceedings brought by trustees, the siz;e of the recoveries, 
and the benefit (or not) to other creditors. Almost certainly, however, that 
work would reveal that (1) prior to 2005, some preference actions produced 
no increase in distributions to unsecured creditors and, likely, were brought 
solely for their settlement value; and (2) since 2005, there has been an overall 
decline per capita in preference litigation and recoveries. But so what? 
Those observations, even once corroborated, would only beg the question 
what ought to be the goal of the preference law. In other words, we cannot 
meaningfully assess any empirical findings until we establish the appropriate 
"
0Section 1213(2) ofBAPCPA added subsection (i) to§ 547 in an attempt to put the final nail in the 
coffin of the "single transfer" theory first articulated by the Seventh Circuit in In re Deprizio. The first 
nail was the addition in 1994 of § 550(c). See supra note 57. The effort though, like the rest of the 
amendments, also involved a narrowing of the scope of preference liability. In addition, Professor Tabb 
still questions whether Congress has really closed the door all the way on DePrizio's (847 F.2d 1186 
(1989) single transfer theory. See TABB, supra note 10, at 504-05. 
BIBAPCPA § 217. 
132BAPCPA § 410. Because of subsequent adjustments under § 104(a), that dollar figure is currently 
$18,675. 
133BAPCP A § 403. This section is oddly captioned "Protection of Refinance of Security Interest," 
even though it has nothing to do with the refinance of a security interest. 
134BAPCPA § 1222. 
"
5The 2005 amendments to the preference law and practice are examined in depth in Tabb, supra 
note 102. 
136The complaints about preference law along these lines have persisted to the present day, despite the 
changes made by BAPCPA. See infra text accompanying notes 279-280. 
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evaluatory criteria against which they are to be held and the relative weight 
to be accorded to each such criterion. Before turning to those inquires, how-
ever, it may be worthwhile to consider briefly each of BAPCPA's preference 
amendments in somewhat more depth and, where appropriate, to scrutinize 
how they have fared in the case law. 
VI. PREFERENCE LITIGATION POST-BAPCPA 
A. THE ORDINARY CouRsE oF BusiNEss DEFENSE 
Turning first to what was assuredly the most impactful amendment-the 
further expansion of§ 547(c)(2)-recall that, before BAPCPA, the received 
understanding was that the transfer had to satisfy both objective and subjec-
tive components in order to be insulated from preference recovery. That is, 
the transfer must have been ordinary in subjective terms of the actual prac-
tices and dealings of the debtor and the transferee as required by former 
subparagraph (2)(B), and also ordinary in objective terms of standard industry 
practice as required by former subparagraph (2)(C). 
After 2005, § 54 7(c)(2) on its face provides two, alternative defenses: a 
subjective "'ordinary course of business" defense under subsection (2)(A), and 
a separate, independent objective "'ordinary business terms" defense under 
subsection (2)(B). Thus, so long as the debt is incurred in the ordinary course 
of business (or financial affairs) of the debtor and the transferee,l37 if the 
transfer is ordinary in terms of the actual practices of the debtor and the 
tran~feree, whether or not the transfer also complies with any objective stan-
dard set by industry practice is irrelevant; and so presumably is the converse 
true as well.DS 
Initially, a question arose as to whether the interpretation of the phrase 
137Most courts agree that because the statute refers to "of the debtor and the transferee" and not 
"between the debtor and the transferee," even first time transactions can qualify for exception under the 
statute. See, e.g., Jubber v. SMC Elec. Prods., Inc. (In re C.W. Mining), 798 F.3d 983 (lOth Cir. 2015) 
(noting this view is followed in three other circuits). 
138As discussed earlier, the NBRC Report's discussion of this recommendation suggests that subsec-
tion (C) should only supply a separate defense when there is no established course of dealings between the 
parties. See supra note 78. The language of the statute does not support that construction, although it has 
been suggested that some courts have applied it as such. See Bryan Kotliar, A N.ew Reading of the Ordi-
nary Course of Business Exception in Section 547(c)(2), 21 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 211, 246-47 (2013) 
(describing the practice as "fudging" on the language, as Professor Tabb predicted (see Tabb, supra note 
102, at 443) might occur when there is an established course of dealings between the parties). But see 
Noreen Wiscovitch-Rentas v. Villa Blanca VB Pla2:a LLC (In re PMC Marketing Corp.), 543 B.R. 345, 
357, n.8 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016) (holding that after BAPCPA, satisfaction of both subjective and objective 
tests is no longer required); Stanziale v. Southern Steel & Supply, L.L.C. (In re Conex Holdings, LLC), 518 
B.R. 269, 283, n.64 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014), reconsid. denied, 524 B.R. 55 (2015) (noting that the statutory 
language of the BAPCPA amendments to § 547(c)(2) is clear and that if Congress intended to add a 
subjective component to § 547(c)(2)(B) or to somehow make it more difficult for a creditor to prevail 
under the subsection, it could easily have done so). 
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"'ordinary business terms" in § 54 7(c)(2)(B) should continue to be governed 
by pre-BAPCPA case law now that paragraph (B) provides a stand-alone 
basis for relief, no longer subject to the discipline of paragraph (A)'s subjec-
tive focus on the dealings of and between the parties. That case law had 
largely treated "'ordinary business terms" as a lesser or secondary require-
ment, easily met so long as the parties had an established and reasonably 
lengthy relationship that could be examined.139 That is to say, if the transfer 
met the subjective test of ordinariness, the additional requirement of ""ordi-
nary business terms" primarily operated as a safeguard against collusion and 
creative testimony.140 As such, in situations where the transfer at issue was 
made on terms that conformed more or less with the historic pattern of obli-
gations and payments between the debtor and the transferee-creditor, the 
review under former subsection (2)(C) (now subsection 2(B)) called for a 
relatively cursory examination of congruity of that pattern with industry-
wide norms. 141 
In one of the first cases decided under the revised exception, in In re 
National Gas Distribs., LLC, 142 the corporate debtor paid off two loans (to-
taling over $3.2 million) to the defendant-bank shortly before their maturity 
dates (which the bank willingly had extended on several previous occasions) 
and shortly before the debtor filed under Chapter 11. Coincidentally (or not 
so coincidentally), both loans, although unsecured by assets of the debtor, 
139The seminal explication of the phrase can be found in the Seventh Circuit"s decision in In re Tolona 
Pi~~a Prods., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993) ("We conclude that 'ordinary business terms' refers to the 
range of terms that encompasses the practices in which firms similar in some general way to the creditor in 
question engage, and that only dealings so idiosyncratic as to fall outside that broad range should be 
deemed extraordinary and outside the scope of subsection C.") This standard, although extremely lax, was 
eventually adopted by all of the circuits and ended the debate that has earlier existed over whether the 
"ordinary business terms" language played any role in the face of an established course of dealing between 
the parties. See, e.g., Wood v. Stratos Prod. Dev., LLC (In re Aha~a Sys. Inc.), 482 F.3d 1118, 1130 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking, 931 F.2d 494, 498·99 (8th Cir. 1991). 
140ln 'Tolona, the court identified two functions for the "ordinary business terms" requirement: (1) 
evidentiary in the situation where the parties direct testimony is wildly out of line with standard industry 
practices, and (2) as a precaution where the parties specifically worked out a late payment practice ar· 
rangement in anticipation of later being able to raise a § 547(c)(2) defense. Tolona Pizza, 3 F.3d at 152. 
Both of these functions merely served to corroborate the finding of ordinariness with respect to the prior 
dealings of the parties. The exceedingly low bar for ordinary business terms was obviously much more 
defensible when meeting that standard could not alone support establishment of the defense. 
141 See Kotliar, supra note 138, at 28 (suggesting that it is hard to imagine a case where a payment 
would fail the Tolona Pizza test for ordinary business terms). In Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical 
Prods. (In reMolded Acoustical Prods.), 18 F.3d 217 (3d Cir 1994), the court, while following 'Tolona 
Pizza, added a refinement by adjusting the level of scrutiny accorded to § 547(c)(2)(C) to correspond 
inversely with the extent and duration of the parties pre-preference period relationship. This is similar in 
approach to the NBRC's commentary suggesting the paragraph (B) might alone save a transfer in the 
absence of significant prepetition conduct between the parties, but not otherwise, even though that con· 
cept did not get integrated into the statutory language of the amendment to § 547(c)(2) in 2005. See 
supra notes 78 & 138. 
142Hutson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 346 B.R. 394, 402 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006). 
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were guaranteed by the owner of the debtor and his spouse.143 It was ""ex-
plained" that this was done as part of the couple's end-of-year tax planning 
and, apparently, without any prompting by the bank. There was no question 
that both transfers satisfied the elements of a preferential transfer. In re-
sponse, however, to the Chapter 11 trustee's motion for summary judgment, 
the bank contended that the payments were not recoverable because they 
had been made according to ordinary business terms in the banking industry, 
as purported to be established by the affidavit testimony of one of the bank's 
vice presidents. 144 
In his ruling, Judge A. Thomas Small sensibly surmised that with ""ordi-
nary business terms" now representing an autonomous, self-contained defense, 
pre-BAPCPA interpretations of the phrase might no longer be appropriate, 
thus requiring that the provision be looked at afresh. 145 Upon so doing, the 
court initially parted ways from most pre-BAPCPA precedent by deciding 
that, when (as in this case) the parties are in different industries, conformity 
with the industry standards of both the debtor and the creditor must be 
considered.146 Once identified, the court continued that the applicable indus-
try standards must then be applied to the factual circumstances of the trans-
fer in a much more granular manner than had characterized the approaches of 
the courts prior to 2005.147 On application of these requirements to the facts 
of the case, Judge Small concluded that the transfers to the bank could not 
143/d. at 397. In addition, at about the same time as these transfers, the debtor transferred $850,000 to 
the bank as collateral for two outstanding letters of credit, which theretofore had been secured by a 
hypothecation of assets from the debtor's owner's spouse. Upon receipt of that transfer, the bank released 
its security interest in the spouse's assets. For reasons that are unclear, while the trustee apparently 
demanded repayment of those transfers, he did not seek recovery under § 547(b). Thus, although not 
directly at issue in the case, the court observed that the transfer was still relevant to the course of dealing 
between the debtor and the bank. Id. In any case, there appears to have been no question that the 
obligations at issue were incurred in the ordinary course of business and financial affairs of the debtor and 
the bank. 
1440ne of the questions left unanswered by 'T olona Pizza was whether testimonial evidence such as 
this is alone sufficient to establish industry norms and the conformity of the transfer with those norms, or 
whether some form of either expert testimony or documentary evidence is required. Cf Stam:iale v. 
Southern Steel & Supply, L.L.C. (In re Conex Holdings, LLC), 518 B.R. 269, 285-86 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014), 
reconsid. denied, 524 B.R. 55 (2015) (finding affidavit testimony from officer of defendant-bank, even 
though uncontroverted, insufficient to prove industry standard where it lacked any objective basis of 
analysis). 
145/d. at 400. This seemed to make sense in that, prior to 2005, the "ordinary business terms" require· 
ment served a "back-up" role. See supra notes 140·141. In addition, as the court observed, neither a plain 
meaning analysis nor the legislative history to BAPCP A provided any guidance. I d. 
146The question had not been addressed in 'Tolona Pizza because, in that case, the debtor and creditor 
were in the same industry. While pre-2005 case law was split on whether to focus on the debtor's 
industry or, as the bank argued for, the creditor's industry, the governing law in the Fourth Circuit, Judge 
Small noted, was to examine the creditor's industry in determining conformity with industry terms. I d. at 
404, citing, Advo-System, Inc., v. Maxway Corp., 37 F.3d 1044, 1048 (4h Cir. 1994). 
147/d. at 404-05. 
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meet the standards necessary to qualify for protection under § 54 7(c)(2)(B). 
By way of explanation he offered that: 
It may be standard practice for borrowers to pay loans close 
to the time that the loans mature, but is it standard in the 
banking industry for a borrower with a multi-million dollar 
enterprise to pay all of its corporate loans based upon the 
owner's end-of-the-year personal financial planning, espe-
cially where the corporation has not arranged for financing 
to continue the business? If that conduct is standard within 
the banking industry, it is certainly not ordinary from the 
debtor's perspective and is not consistent with sound busi-
ness practice in general. . . . The change made by the 
BAPCPA amendments "substantially lightens the creditor's 
burden of proof, by allowing the creditor protection from 
preference recovery if the transfer meets industry standards, 
regardless of whether it was in the ordinary course of busi-
ness of the debtor and the creditor. ... "148 Although the 
creditor's burden has been lightened by BAPCP A, it still has 
some weight, and it has not been lightened to the extent that 
[the defendant] can prevail in this proceeding_149 
As well thought-out and reasoned as the decision in National Gas seems 
to be, to date, it is the only case to find that the standard of what constitutes 
"ordinary business terms" has in fact changed after BAPCP A.150 Other 
courts addressing the issue have continued to follow the pre-BAPCPA case 
law construing "'ordinary business terms," rather than applying a heightened 
standard per National Gas. 151 And so, at least thus far, the opportunity to 
148Citing Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The Signif-
icant Business Provisions of the Ban~ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 603, 637 (2005). 
149National Gas, 346 B.R. at 405. 
150But see Kotliar, supra note 138, at 252 (arguing that carrying the Tolona Pizza standard forward 
after 2005 is unwarranted and urging adoption of the court's approach in In re Midway Airlines, 180 B.R. 
1009 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995)). 
151See, e.g., Faith v. Inline Distrib. Co. (In re Newton Enters.), No. 9:13·bk·12388·PC, 2015 WL 
3524603, *3-4 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015) (applying pre·BAPCPA case law in construing§ 547(c)(2)(B)); 
Anstine v. Barclays Bank Delaware (In re Strauss), No. 12·14162-HRT, 2015 WL 1221380 *3 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 2015) ("Only a transaction that is so unusual or uncommon 'as to render it an aberration in the 
relevant industry' falls outside the broad range of terms encompassed by the meaning of 'ordinary business 
terms,'" citing In reJan Weilert RV, Inc., 315 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir.2003); Stam;iale v. Southern Steel 
& Supply, L.L.C. (In re Conex Holdings, LLC), 518 B.R. 269, 285 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014), reconsid. denied, 
524 B.R. 55 (2015) (applying pre·BAPCPA standard); Pereira v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. (In re 
Waterford Wedgwood USA, Inc.), 508 B.R. 821, 832·33 nn.8 & 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (pre·2005 case 
law interpreting "ordinary business terms" remain probative); Simon v. Gerdau MacSteel, Inc., (In re Am. 
Camshaft Specialties, Inc.), 444 B.R. 347, 364 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (suggesting that revisiting the 
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tap even lightly on the brakes insofar as the ever-increasing acceleration of 
the ordinary course of business exception is concerned has been lost. 
While § 547(c)(2) threatens to become the exception that consumes the 
rule, and is the undisputed darling of the credit industry, mercifully, since 
BAPCP A other courts have been more vigilant in policing and holding the 
line on what constitutes the parties' ordinary course of business under sub-
section (2)(A) of the exception. Three decisions involving the Litigation 
Trust established under the confirmed plan in the Quebecer World (USA) 
Chapter 11 case are illustrative. In the first, In re E{uebecor World (USA), 
Jnc.,152 the trustee sought to recover a preferential payment of $67,078 made 
ninety-one days after the invoice for $74,998 was issued. The difference in 
amounts was due to the fact that the debtor had been inadvertently 
overcharged by $7,920, and a credit memo for that amount was eventually 
issued by the defendant. However, the parties had been doing business with 
one another for nearly three years and, prior to the preference period, defen-
dant's invoices were on average paid in less than sixty days. The defendant 
attempted to explain the disparity by arguing that correction of the error in 
the original invoice accounted for the late payment, but the court had none of 
it given the more than thirty-day deviation from past practice and the ab-
sence of evidence to establish that billing errors had typically caused this kind 
of delay in the past. 153 
In the next reported E{uebecor World case,154 the preference defendant 
had been providing transportation services to the debtor for about six years. 
The trustee was attempting to recover ten payments made to the defendant 
during the preference period on account of prior unsecured debts. The defen-
dant relied on § 54 7(c)(2) to oppose the trustee's action, utilizing one year's 
worth of historical data reflecting the parties' pre-preference period course of 
dealing as the baseline against which to compare the challenged payments. 
The trustee urged instead, and the court accepted, a baseline based on two-
years of prior dealings between the parties, which, using a weighted average 
analysis, I 55 shortened the time between invoice and payment from thirty-five 
issue might be warranted in other circuits where controlling precedent is unclear-though, as noted, the 
circuits have overwhelmingly followed 'Tolona Pizza); Jacobs v. Gramercy Jewelry Mfg. Corp. (In reM. 
Fabrikant & Sons, Inc.), No. 06·12737, 2010 WL 4622449, *2 (holding that because the words of the 
statute have not changed, pre-2005 case law remains controlling). 
152Davis v. All Points Packaging & Distrib. Inc., 491 B.R. 363 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013), affd & adopted, 
2013 WL 6233905 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
153Id. at 370·71. 
154Davis R. A. Brooks Trucking Co., Inc., 491 B.R. 379 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
155Id. at 387 n.3 (explaining the weighted average method as "a manner of calculating the average days 
to payments taking into account the sum of each payment by multiplying the amount of the invoice by the 
days it took to make payment then dividing that value by the total amount of the invoices in the data 
set."). 
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to twenty-seven days. 156 
Next, in terms of the methodology to be used in comparing these histori-
cal pre-preference period data to the actual preferential payments, the court 
rejected the defendant's proposed "total range" approach, 157 which would 
have treated as ordinary anything falling within the high and low during the 
applicable pre-preference period. Instead, the court adopted an "average late-
ness" method, calling for the grouping of payments into individual "buckets" 
by age, 158 and then an analysis to determine the percentage of the historical 
payments falling into each bucket. Based on this analysis, the court found 
eighty percent of the pre-preference period payments had been made in one 
or more of the buckets representing eleven to thirty-five days from the date 
of invoice and, from this, concluded that preferential payments made more 
than forty-five days after the date invoiced could not reasonably be character-
ized as having been made in the ordinary course of business. 159 
In the final S?(uebecor World case of note,160 the trustee maintained that 
several payments totaling $69,207.60 made to the defendant shortly before 
the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy case were preferential under § 54 7(b ). 
Following an accounting, it was agreed that approximately $34,000 of this 
amount was protected by undisputed defenses. In response to the balance of 
payments, the defendant relied on § 547(c)(2) to shield the funds from prefer-
ence recovery. Again, the court adopted a two-year baseline "to reduce the 
likelihood that the debtor's financial difficulties had already taken hold ... 
thus distort[ing] otherwise 'ordinary' practices under regular financial 
156Id. at 387. Although the difference was not great, the court believed the two-year baseline was 
more appropriate not simply because it was longer, but also because it included, or was more likely to 
include, a time frame when the debtor was financially healthy. 
157Id. at 387-88 ("Such a theory, however, has previously been rejected as impermissibly expanding the 
ranges of ordinary transactions. See In reM. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc., No. 06-12737,2010 WL 4622449, *3 
n.2; In re CIS Corp. 214 B.R. at 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). The Court rejects it here as well because 
that proposed methodology captures outlying payments that skew the analysis of what is ordinary."). 
158Id. at 388. For an in-depth discussion and critique of the two approaches, see Joseph M. Mulvihill, 
'The Ordinary Course of Business Defense in Bani{ruptcy Preference Actions: Methods of Comparison, 38 
DEL.]. CoRP. L. 637 (2013). Of course, as noted above, supra note 139, the 'Tolona Pizza (and most 
circuits) follow a total range approach in relation to determining conformity with "ordinary business 
terms." 
159Id. (allowing that same deviation from the historical average is tolerated, but that this disparity was 
too great to be considered ordinary). There is general agreement in the case law that particular impor-
tance is placed on timing of payments, but a myriad of other factors can bear on whether the payments 
were made in the ordinary course for purposes of subsection (c)(2)(A). See, e.g., Stanziale v. Industrial 
Specialists, Inc. (In re Conex Holdings, LLC),- 522 B.R. 480,486-87 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014) (detailing factors 
other courts have considered as relevant to the inquiry of whether the transfer was ordinary as between 
the debtor and creditor). See also Faith v. Inline Distrib. Co. (In re Newton Enters.), No. 9:13-bk-12388-
PC, 2015 WL 3524603, *4 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that the fact that a payment was made after 
the cessation of business is not only one factor to consider in defining ordinary course). 
160Davis v. Clarklift-West, Inc. (In re Quebecor World (USA), Inc.), 518 B.R. 757 (Bank. S.D.N.Y. 
2014). 
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conditions."161 
Turning next to a comparison of the average time of payments, 162 the 
court found that over ninety·nine percent of the preference period payments 
at issue were made more than sixty days after the invoice date, whereas, 
under the parties' baseline pre-preference period practice, payments were, on 
average, made in slightly over fifty days after invoices were received. 163 In 
concluding that the payments at issue were hence not made in the ordinary 
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the defendant, the 
court made clear that what was important was the disparity in the length of 
time that elapsed from invoice to payment during the two periods under 
examination.164 Accordingly, the court observed that it did not matter that 
there was no evidence of any unusual creditor collection activity, or that the 
preference period payments, apart from this significant shift in timing, were 
made in a manner consistent with prior practice.165 By way of explanation, 
the court noted that, while the fact that preference payments are made in 
response to creditor pressure can often be indicative of transactions out of 
the ordinary course, 166 the absence of such creditor pressure does not estab· 
!ish the opposite. 167 For this reason, it was incumbent on the defendant to 
come forward with at least some evidence to establish that late payments of 
this magnitude were consistent with the standard course of dealings between 
161Id. at 762. 
162The court, once more, rejected the "total range~ approach. Id. 
163/d. at 763. More specifically, the weighted average time to payment increased from fifty days to 
almost eighty days-a roughly ftfty·five percent increase. 
164Id. at 765 (noting that late payments alone are "presumptively nonordinary~). 
165/d. (explaining that creditor collection pressure can support a finding that a transfer was out of the 
ordinary course, but that its absence does not prove the opposite, and that consistency in the manner of 
payment cannot overcome a significant increase in average payment time during the preference period). 
166See A.E. Liquidation, Inc. v. Texstars, Inc. (In re AE Liquidation, Inc.), No. 08·13031, 2013 WL 
5488476 •5 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013) (noting that unusual collection activity during the preference period can 
defeat an ordinary course of business defense); Compton v. Plains Marketing, LP (In re Tri·Union Dev. 
Corp.), 349 B.R. 145, 150 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (stating that unusual creditor collection activity is a 
signal factor in finding nonconformity with the ordinary course of business defense). Cf T roisio v. E.B. 
Eddy Forest Products U.S. (In re Global Tissue LLC), 106 Fed. Appx. 99, 102 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he 
court's general inquiry in these preference cases is to determine whether the payments to a creditor made 
in the 90 days preceding a filing for bankruptcy were in response to a 2;ealous creditor's attempt to collect 
on a debt through preferential treatment ahead of other creditors, or an attempt by the debtor to maintain 
normal business practices in hope of staving off bankruptcy.~). 
167See Jubber v. SMC Elec. Prods., Inc. (In re C.W. Mining), 798 F.3d 983 (lOth Cir. 2015) (identify· 
ing four factors bearing on whether a payment was made in the ordinary course); !i(uebecor World, 518 B.R. 
at 765, citing Ames Merch. Corp. v. Cellmark Paper, Inc. (In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc.), 450 B.R. 24, 33 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 470 B.R. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), affd, 506 Fed App'x 70 (2d Cir. 2012). See also 
v. Schoenmann v. BCCI Constr. Co. (In re Northpoint Communications, Inc.), 361 B.R. 149, 157·58 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that when the objective characteristics of the transfer deviate signifi· 
candy from the parties' prior dealings, the transfer should not be regarded within the ordinary course, 
despite evidence that the transfer was not the product of either creditor pressure or the debtor's desire to 
prefer). 
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the parties. Because the defendant was unable to do so, the court concluded 
that it had failed to establish a material issue of fact that would preclude 
award of summary judgment in favor the trustee. 168 
It is decisions like these, and recent others of their ilk, 169 that have added 
(or at least retained) some bite in the subjective test for establishing ordinari-
ness under § 54 7(c)(2)(A). However, it will be of small consolation if courts 
continue to treat the objective test in subsection (2)(B) with an insouciant 
wave.l7° Moreover, as discussed further below,m while I would favor either 
the elimination of the ordinary course of business defense in its entirety or at 
least a significant reduction in its reach, irrespective of whether it stays or 
goes, it is critical to the future integrity of bankruptcy reform legislation to 
clearly and definitively prioriti2;e the equality and deterrence rationales that 
have put §§ 54 7(b) and 54 7(c)(2) into irreconcilable conflict with one an-
other from the beginning.l72 The final ~uebecor World decision, by rejecting 
168Id. at 765-66. 
169See, e.g.,]ubber, 798 F.3d at 990 (stating that although the exception is broad enough to encompass 
first time transactions between the parties, ~there are real teeth in the ordinary-course requirement~); 
Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Wiscovitch-Rentas (In re PMC Marketing), 526 B.R. 441 (D.P.R. 2015) 
(upholding the bankruptcy court's finding of a lack of subjective ordinariness where the average lateness 
prior to the preference period was 86 days and during the preference period increased to 134 days); The 
Unsecured Creditors Committee of Sparrer Sausage Company, Inc. v. Jason's Foods, Inc. (In re Sparrer 
Sausage Co., Inc.), 2014 W.L. 4258103, *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill 2014) (applying the second approach of com· 
paring average lateness during the baseline period to the time it took to pay invoices during the preference 
period from ~uebecar Warld, 491 B.R. 379, 386 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) ); Bruno Machinery Corp. v. Troy 
Die Cutting Co., LLC (In re Bruno Machinery Corp.), 435 B.R. 819, 839-42 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(analyzing the parties' prior course of dealings in terms of the timing of payments during and prior to the 
preference period in concluding that the defense was not available, with only an offhand dismissal of the 
possibility of saving the transfers under§ 54 7(c)(2)(B)). But see Faith v. Inline Distrib. Co. (In re Newton 
Enters.), No. 9:13-bk-12388-PC, 2015 WL 3524603, *4 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that even lack of 
an on-going business at the time of the challenged transfer does not necessarily negate a defense under 
§ 547(c)(2). 
''
0 In fairness, it should be noted that, even though applying the pre-2005 standard, courts have 
stopped short of giving defendants a free pass on proof of ordinary business terms. See, e.g., Burtch v. 
Revchem Composites, Inc. (In re Sierra Concrete Design, Inc.), No. 08·12029, 2015 WL 4381571, *10·11 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2015) (holding that the defendant failed to meet its burden of proof where evidence 
consisted of undetailed testimony from its CEO about various acceptable payment ranges in the industry, 
unsupported by any objective reports or data). The other hope, of course, is that, despite the plain statu· 
tory language, courts will continue to insist on ordinariness in relation to the parties' prior dealing when 
such dealings actually exist-the approach contemplated when the decoupling of the subjective and objec· 
tive prongs of§ 547(c)(2) was first proposed. See supra notes 78 & 138. In this respect, the approach 
taken in the ~uebecor World cases is promising, although a direct explanation of the relevance of subsec· 
tion (c)(2)(B) when a course of dealings exist would have been even more helpful. 
171See infra text accompanying note 295 and accompanying text. 
172I use the word prioritize cautiously here, since, as we've seen, once deterrence is offered as a policy 
defense things can come unhinged pretty quickly. However, the fact is that a preference law intended to 
promote equality of distribution will, in some instances, necessarily have a deterrent effect, and potentially 
a desirable deterrent effect along the lines of what Congress hoped would be the case. Surely, the con· 
verse is true as well. But just because application of the rule may serve a deterrence function does not 
translate automatically into a view that culpable behavior should become an element of the cause or 
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the argument that the absence extraordinary creditor collection pressure 
should alone be sufficient to establish protection under subsection (c)(2), or 
even to create a presumption of "ordinariness,"' 173 was a tacit vindication of 
the equality rationale in its refusal to accept what would have been a much 
broader construction of the exception.174 To be sure, "ordinary course" re-
mains a proxy for no preferential intent, but at least the court resisted a 
construction that would have made the mere absence of collection pressures a 
proxy for ordinariness. 
B. STEALTH ExcEPTIONS 
In addition to the § 54 7(c) exceptions to the trustee's preference recov-
ery authority, the Code contains a couple of other exceptions-one of consid-
erable importance and the other of more trifling practical significance, but 
nonetheless representing a potentially disturbing precedent. Although only 
one of these "stealth exceptions" is a product of BAPCPA, brief considera-
tion of both may be instructive. 
1. Settlement Payments 
As for the first, the 1978 Act contained certain statutory protections 
from the trustee's avoidance powers, called "safe harbors," in order to avoid 
upheavals in the commodity futures markets.175 The financial contracts qual-
ifying for protection were gradually expanded to include securities contracts, 
commodities contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swap 
agreements, and master netting agreements. 176 These exemptions, as 
amended, from the trustee's avoiding powers (including § 54 7) are still part 
innocence a basis for defense. One objective must be dominant and control formulation and application of 
the rule on a consistent basis and without regard to other objectives that may or may not be served in any 
particular instance. Arguably, Congress recognized that at some level in 1978, by indicating that the 
equality component was the most important. Somewhere, however, the wheels quickly came off the track. 
173See supra notes 166·168 and accompanying text. 
174The fact that the preferred creditor placed no special pressure on the debtor and otherwise behaved 
in the same fashion in its dealing with the debtor as had always been the case, is a strong indicator that the 
creditor was not seeking to gain any advantage. Indeed, the increase in average lateness without collection 
pressure could even be taken as a signal that the creditor was actually attempting to be helpful to the 
debtor during this period of financial distress; behavior that a deterrence explanation of the law would 
commend. However, this type of outlook is (1) fraught with difficult proof issues-part of the reason 
Congress eliminated the Act's "reasonable cause to believe" requirement, and (2) ignores the criticality of 
equality to the success of a collective proceeding. Once the debtor is insolvent, it is a zero sum game, and 
the fact that the debtor is in bankruptcy means that deterrence has already failed. Thus, permitting 
preferences that upset equality to be retained based on how and why the payment was attained is truly an 
exercise in missing the point. 
1755. REP. No. 95·989, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. This protection was ini· 
tially found in § 746(c), which was subsequently repealed and replaced in 1982. See infra note 178. 
176Each of these types of contracts and agreements are defined in separate subsections of § 10 1 of the 
Code. 
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of the Code.177 They protect transfers that are in the nature either of (1) 
settlement payments by or to a financial institution, or (2) transfers made in 
connection with financial contracts. In both cases, the purpose is to minimize 
the disruption that might otherwise be caused in commodities and securities 
markets in the event of a major bankruptcy affecting those industries. 178 Spe-
cifically, if a firm were required to repay amounts received in settled securi-
ties transactions, and as a result be left with insufficient capital or liquidity to 
meet its current securities trading obligations, this could place other market 
participants, and the even capital markets themselves, in jeopardy. 
The safe harbors from preference recovery in § 546(e) fall into the cate-
gory of exceptions reflecting a legislative determination that, in this particular 
context, a competing policy interest outweighs full realization of bankruptcy 
goals. With that principle, I have no objection in general, 179 and in this in-
stance, no objection in particular. The problem, however, is with the execu-
tion. Specifically, multiple amendments to these safe harbors, and the 
definitions of the type of agreements insulated by them, have expanded their 
potential reach far more broadly than necessary in order to protect against 
market instability and financial contagion. 18° For example, applying a plain 
meaning approach, some courts have sheltered from preference recovery even 
transfers made pursuant to ordinary physical supply contracts. 181 The 2014 
Final Report and Recommendations of the American Bankruptcy Institute 
Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 182 recognizes the disconnect 
between the expansive language of§ 546(e) and its intended purpose, and 
177See §§ 546(e)-(g) and (j). See generally Eleanor Heard Gilbrane, Testing the Ban~ruptcy Code Safe 
Harbors in the Current Financial Crisis, 18 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 241 (2010) (reviewing the evolu-
tion of the safe harbor provisions). 
178See H.R. Rep. No. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583 (discussing the 
need to prevent the failure of one securities· or commodities firm from infecting the industry more generally 
and potentially even "collapse of the affected market.~). 
179No objection, that is, except perhaps when the totality of carve-outs from bankruptcy policy be-
come so numerous as to create an imbalance solely by virtue of their collective weight. See supra notes 62 
& 63 and accompanying text. 
180E.g., Grede v. FCStone LLC, 746 F.3d 244, 253 (7th Cir. 2014) (overturning the district court's 
limitation on policy grounds of§ 546(e) to shareholders in public companies based on the language of the 
statute). See also Stephen]. Lubben, The Ban~ruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.]. 
123, 141-43 (2010) (proposing amendments to the Code to address the legitimate concerns behind the safe 
harbors, but severely limiting their application). 
181See, e.g., Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Elec., Inc. (In re MBS Mgmt. Servs., Inc.), 690 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 
2012); (characteri;:ing electric requirements contracts as forward contracts under the Bankruptcy Code 
and, thus, as immune from recovery under§ 547(b)). But see In re National Gas Distribs., LLC, 369 B.R. 
884, 899-900 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007), rev'd, 556 F.3d 247 (4th Cir. 2009) (refusing to apply the safe 
harbors in a fraudulent transfer action, with their attendant chilling impact on the "established aims and 
order of bankruptcy proceedings," where there was no threat of disruption or instability in the financial 
markets). 
182The report, hereinafter referred to as the "CHAPTER 11 CoMMISSION REPORT," can be found at: 
https:/ /abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h. 
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specifically recommends a number of narrowing amendments so as to limit its 
application in connection with these and similar transactions that do not im-
plicate a threat to the securities transfer system or the capital markets. 183 
Adoption of these proposals would represent a healthy correction in terms of 
accommodating the legitimate concerns over unregulated application of the 
bankruptcy law in capital and commodity market transactions, but without 
interfering unduly with the objectives to be attained in a bankruptcy case. 
At the same time, it would mark an almost historic reversal of the trend since 
1978 to limit continually the scope of the trustee's preference authority, and, 
in so doing, frustrate full attainment of core bankruptcy policy objectives. 
2. Alternative Repayment Plan Payments 
The second stealth exception, provided courtesy of BAPCPA, is con-
tained in § 54 7(h) and pertains to transfers made under an alternative repay-
ment schedule created by an "approved nonprofit budgeting and credit 
counseling agency." BAPCPA was keen, of course, on the idea that, with 
proper credit counseling, many debtors would be able to work out their fi-
nancial problems without needing to resort to bankruptcy. 184 Thus, presum-
ably to encourage creditors to go along with these repayment plans,§ 54 7(h) 
offers amnesty from preference prosecution for payments made under such 
plans. 185 The effort brings to mind one of the catch phrases from the motion 
picture Field of Dreams: 186 "Build it and they will come." They did eventu-
ally come to Ray Kinsella's baseball diamond in the middle of his Iowa corn-
field, but it is not at all clear that this similar roll of the dice has paid off thus 
far or will in the future. 187 · 
In the meantime, one thing that is certain is that the safe harbor of 
§ 547(h) represents a stunning triumph for the deterrence theory of the pref-
erence law· and its correlative proposition that the existence of the law will 
183See CHAPTER 11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra, Part IV E, 94-110. These proposed reforms go 
significantly beyond, but also include, the immuni~ing of certain transfers from preference recovery. 
Among them is the specific recommendation the "ordinary supply contracts" be excluded from the safe 
harbors. 
184This is reflected of course in the credit counseling eligibility requirement for individuals in 
§ 109(h)(1) and the provision in § 502(k) for reduction by twenty percent of the claim of a creditor that is 
found to have unreasonably refused to negotiate an alternative repayment plan with the debtor. 
185 A list of approved budget and credit counseling agencies can be found here: http:/ /www.justice 
.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/cc_approved.htm. The requirements for approval are set forth in § 111 of the 
Code. It is not entirely clear why the agency must be "approved" in order for the exception to apply if the 
policy is to encourage out-of-court work-outs, but given its direct assault on preference law's equality 
objective, I will not complain about the limitation. 
186Universal Pictures, 1989. 
187Is this ability to retain what would otherwise be preferential payments enough motivation really to 
induce a creditor otherwise not inclined to modify in any way the debtor's obligation to do so? I question 
that, but if so, Congress might have sought to help the .cause of avoiding bankruptcy by defining "alterna-
tive" to include elements of both composition and extension. 
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incentiviz;e creditors, not otherwise inclined to do so, to engage in credit 
transactions and continue working with financially-struggling debtors. Un-
like other "carve-outs" from preference recovery that may be defensible on 
the basis that they advance important competing policy interests, 188 the only 
justification for § 54 7(h) is to promote a negative agenda; i.e., the avoidance 
of the need for bankruptcy entirely. Put another way, it is premised not on, 
for instance, protection of the public securities markets or the welfare of a 
debtor's former spouse or dependent child, but simply on the belief (princi-
pally held among those most negatively affected) that there ought to be fewer 
bankruptcy cases. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there are no reported cases of consequence that 
I can find involving§ 547(h), so it has likely done no particular damage (or 
good) thus far, and it is probably unlikely to do so in the future. However, 
the very existence of the provision, as narrow in its application as it is, raises 
concern over the continued use of special pleading in connection with bank-
ruptcy reform legislation. There is a lot of that, of course, in BAPCP A, but 
it is particularly troubling when the result is, as here, an exception that takes 
direct aim at the paramount purposive object of the law being revised-in 
this case equality policy.189 Even when individually unremarkable, the 
proliferation of provisions such as these, based on inherently unverifiable as-
sumptions about the benefit of this thing or that, has made for a far more 
ponderous statute than is necessary or desirable. The fact that the door has 
been opened wider under§ 547 to this type of micro-legislation is disquieting 
in that it makes it easier to imagine the adoption of additional exceptions in 
the future that will operate essentially as private bills for a particular interest 
or industry and, in the process, chip away yet further at the scope and cohe-
sion of preference liability. 19o 
C. DoMESTIC SuPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
A consistent theme in BAPCP A was heightened protection for domestic 
support obligations ("DSOs"), which are defined in Code § 101(14A). 
Whether the product of a congressional preoccupation with "family values" 
themes or a more sinister political calculation about the popular public appeal 
188See supra text accompanying notes 60 & 62. 
189See Tabb, supra note 102, at 452 (describing § 54 7(h) as cutting "at the very heart of equality~). 
See also Broome, supra note 50, at 115 (identifying preservation of equality as the main goal of the prefer· 
ence law since 1978, with deterrence playing only an incidental role); Pardo, supra note 52, at 282 (opining 
that while Congress identified deterrence and the equality principle as the twin purposes of the preference 
provision, the latter should be viewed as primary). 
190Section 365 is perhaps the "poster child~ for the adverse and confusing effect on the language and 
coherence of a statute that all too frequently becomes the target of special interest pressure and conse· 
quent congressional meddling. 
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of such provisions, 191 the elevation in the quantum of protection under 
BAPCPA for DSOs is manifested in multiple places,19 2 including the prefer-
ence law. Specifically, former § 547(c)(7), adopted in 1994 to shield child 
support, alimony, and maintenance payments,193 was abrogated in favor of 
the current version of the exception. 
Consistent with the thrust of the other preference amendments, the new 
language represents an expansion on the former version of§ 54 7(c)(7) in that 
it now includes protection not only for the direct beneficiaries of such pay-
ments, but also governmental units that have taken such a DSO claim by 
assignment. 194 Once more, however, research reveals no reported cases in-
volving the exception being invoked by a governmental unit. Obviously, that 
does not necessarily mean that it has not occurred, but one nonetheless won-
ders, as with transfers pursuant to an alternative repayment plan, if this 
growing penchant for narrow, single interest-oriented legislation represents 
wise legislative decision-making as opposed to the proverbial camel's nose 
under the tent for turning the Bankruptcy Code into a pressure group laden 
behemoth along the lines of the Internal Revenue Code. 
D. DELAYED RECORDING 
The decision to increase the grace period in § 547(e)(2) for determining 
when the transfer of an interest in property will be deemed to occur is no 
less, and perhaps even more, curious and inexplicable than the decision to 
utiliz;e the preference law as the mechanism for vindicating the law's hostility 
toward unrecorded liens in the first place. 195 Nonetheless, permitting a short 
delay between attachment and perfection could be defensible, despite the rel-
ative ease under state law in assuring that that perfection will occur immedi-
ately upon attachment. 196 Even in that case, however, one might have 
imagined that the original ten-day period in § 547(e)(2) was more than ade-
quate to the task. Because of BAPCPA's extension of the look-back period 
to 30 days for all security interests, and not just purchase money liens, some 
creditors will be permitted to gain a preferential advantage without conse-
191See supra note 10 
192These provisions derived from Subtitle B of BAPCP A, § § 211 · 220, titled "Priority Child Support," 
and are scattered throughout the Code. See also supra note 10. 
193See supra note 57. 
194The new first priority for DSOs in § 507(a)(1) contains a comparable provision in subsection 
(a)(1)(B). 
195 Although it is easy to see the reason for invalidating liens that are not perfected in a timely fashion, 
it is difficult to understand why the task fell to the preference statute. Congress might just as, if not more 
easily, have adopted as a counterpart to § 544(a) a provision that permitted the trustee to avoid any lien 
required to be recorded under state law for priority purposes, and not so recorded, within x number of 
days of the date of actual transfer. See supra note 36. 
196Under the U.C.C., for instance, the filing of a financing statement can, and often does, precede the 
attachment of the security interest. See U .C.C. § 502( d). 
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quence, and potentially even to do so when it is obtained with purposeful 
intent to evade the bankruptcy proceeding entirely; behavior that 
BAPCPA's view of the preference law would otherwise vigorously condemn. 
The increase in protection for tardily recorded security interests by 200 
percent (at least temporally) becomes even more puzzling in light of the prin-
cipal concern animating asset-based financing under state law; namely, re-
sponding to the potential damaging reliance caused by a debtor's ostensible 
ownership of property. In this respect, BAPCPA-perhaps torn between a 
devotion to state law definition of property rights and priorities on the one 
hand and protection of security on the other-chose to focus on the later by 
adopting an even laxer standard for invalidating untimely recorded liens than 
is observed under state law, where, again, the only relation back rules to gain 
priority over an intervening judicial lien pertain to purchase money security 
interests. 197 
Speaking of purchase money security interests, the extension of the grace 
period in§ 547(c)(3) to coincide with the grace period in§ 547(e)(2) might, 
at first blush, be seen as -somewhat more understandable in that state law has 
always regarded the dangers associated with the wicked "'secret lien" as far 
more attenuated when the creditor has provided that value that allows acqui-
sition of the collateral. But § 54 7(c)(3) already had a relation-back rule that 
coincided with the uniform version of U.C.C. § 9-317(e). Other than appar-
ent symmetry with § 54 7(e)(2), it is hard to imagine a justification warrant-
ing extension of that relation-back period beyond what is allowed in most 
states.198 Moreover, the changes did not in fact place the two rules in actual 
symmetry with one another because they operate in different circumstances. 
Since 1984, the time when the grace period commences to run under subsec-
tion (e)(2)-"attachment"199 of the interest-is different from when the same 
period begins to run under subsection (c)(3)-the debtor's receipt of posses-
sion of the collaterai.2°0 Thus, where the debtor had "'rights in the collateral" 
at the time the lien was granted, 201 but did not obtain possession until ten 
197See U.C.C. § 9·317(e) (twenty·day relation back period for establishing priority of purchase money 
security interest over intervening judicial lien creditors) and U.C.C. § 9·317(a)(2) (unperfected (nonpur· 
chase money) security interest subordinate to the rights of a lien creditor). 
198 As noted, this is twenty days under the uniform version of article 9. I d. See al$0 Countryman, $Upra 
note 43, at 776·79 (citing the legislative history to the 1978 Act in support of the argument that 
§ 547(c)(3) was intended only to apply only when the purchase money collateral was acquired after the 
transfer of the security interest and not to protect provide additional protection in the case of delayed 
perfection). 
199See U.C.C. § 9·203(b). The language used in section 547(e)(2) is the time the transfer "becomes 
effective" between the parties. 
200See Pub. L. 98·353, 98 Stat. 333, 98th Cong. Quly 10, 1984) § 462(d)(3). Time the debtor receives 
delivery of the collateral corresponds with the language in U.C.C. § 9·317(e). 
201 Under Article 2 or other state law, a debtor may acquire "rights in collateral" or the "power to 
transfer rights in the collateral" for purposes of§ 9·203(b)(2) prior to actually taking delivery of the 
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days later, failure to perfect within 30 days of the granting of the lien would 
cause the transfer to be on account on an antecedent debt by virtue of 
§ 54 7(e)(2)(B) and, assuming satisfaction of the remaining elements of 
§ 54 7(b), a preference. If, however, the security interest were purchase 
money, the holder's ability to resist preference recovery would be extended 
based on the defense in subsection (c)(3) for an additional ten days beyond 
expiration of the grace period in § 54 7( e)(2). 
A good illustration of the impact of these changes can be found in the 
bankruptcy court's opinion In re Lloyd. 202 The case itself did not involve a 
preference challenge at all, but rather the trustee's exercise of his strong-arm 
powers under § 544(a) to set aside the lien rights of the defendant in the 
debtors' 2011 Subaru. The facts were undisputed. On December 14, 2013, 
the debtors purchased and took delivery of the Subaru, financed by a $20,495 
loan from the defendant.203 On the same date, the debtors signed and deliv-
ered to the defendant a Title and Registration Application (the "Applica-
tion~) listing the defendant as holding a lien on the vehicle. The debtors filed 
for relief under Chapter 7 on December 18, 2013, and, on January 13, 2014, 
exactly thirty days after debtors' execution of the Application, the defendant 
filed the Application with the state Motor Vehicles Division, thereby 
perfecting its lien on the vehicle. 
The matter was before the court on the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss the trustee's claim on the basis of Code § 546(b) and the language 
of the Arizona Certificate of Title statute,204 the latter providing that that 
the constructive notice arising upon filing the Application relates back to the 
date of execution if it is filed within thirty days thereof. The trustee coun-
tered that the standard twenty-day look-back period in U.C.C. § 9-317(e) for 
purchase money loans should pertain. The court disagreed, concluding that, 
in this case, the motor vehicle title statute, and not the U.C.C., was the 
generally applicable law governing interests that take priority over interven-
ing liens for purposes of § 546(b) and, thus, the trustee's rights under 
§ 544(a) could not be used to set aside the lien.205 
The analysis in Lloyd seems unarguable and the ruling correct. However, 
consider how the matter would have been resolved if BAPCP A had not 
changed the grace periods under §§ 547(e)(2) and (c)(3). Doubtless, the case 
would have been brought as a preference action, as the transfer of the lien on 
property. See generally Margit Livingston, Certainty, Efficiency, and Realism: Rights in Collateral Under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 N.C. L. REv. 115 (1994). 
202Warfield v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 511 B.R. 657 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2015). 
203 Although never stated explicitly in the facts, it seems quite clear that the security interest in this 
case was purchase money, or, in the verbiage of§ 547(c)(3), that this was an ~enabling loan: 
204A.R.S. § 28·2133 (2014). 
20s Lloyd, 511 B.R. at 662·64. 
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the vehicle would have been deemed to have occurred on January 13, 2014, 
having not been perfected by December 24, 2013-within ten days of.when 
it became effective between the parties. Thus, it would have been made on 
account of an antecedent debt and, almost certainly, would have satisfied the 
remaining elements of a preferential transfer under § 54 7(b). Moreover, for-
mer § 547(c)(3) would not have affected the trustee's rights to set aside the 
lien, even though this was a purchase money lien, since the twenty-day grace 
period, which in this case would have commenced to run at the same time; 
i.e., December 14, 2013 (when the debtors received possession of the Subaru), 
would also have expired prior to the defendant's filing of the Application.206 
The rather obvious point to be made is that delayed filings that would 
have triggered avoidance under § 547 prior to 2005 are now shielded from 
challenge, thus vindicating the contract law rights of the secured creditor 
over the policy of ratable distribution among other creditors. And this is 
true despite the fact that, in this case, the secured lender sat on its state law 
rights (perhaps even deliberately), and, in most other cases (not involving 
titled vehicles) where U.C.C. § 9-317(e) would apply, the creditor would not 
even have been protected under state law. To what principled end this addi-
tional protection of security, and the concomitant hobbling of preference law, 
can be ascribed is difficult to apprehend. 
E. Low-DoLLAR FLOOR ExcEPTIONS 
Unquestionably, the inclusion of the new small dollar safe harbor in 
§ 547(c)(9)207 for commercial cases where "the aggregate value of all property 
that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than [$6,225]" has had 
an impact on the volume of preference litigation. But it is a fair hypothesis 
that the impact has cut both ways. Obviously intended, along with the 
venue pro~isions discussed below, 208 to respond to allegations of vexatious or 
groundless preference claims being asserted primarily for their nuisance value 
and to secure a quick settlement,209 this new exception has doubtless caused 
trustees not to assert some number of preference claims that prior to 
BAPCPA would have been filed. At the same time, however, it has gener-
ated (and retains the potential to generate) a fair amount of new litigation 
over issues such as: (a) which of the two § 54 7(c) floors to apply in any given 
case,210 (b) whether the exception applies when the aggregate of all of the 
206Note also that the limitation on the trustee's avoiding powers in § 546(b) does not apply to § 54 7. 
207This new provision joined the existing safe harbor in § 547(c)(8), originally enacted as§ 547(c)(7), 
for transfers to an individual consumer debtor where the value of the property constituting or affected by 
the transfer is less than $600. Also, this dollar limitation does not adjust under § 104(a). See supra note 
57. 
208 See infra text accompanying notes 220-224. 
209See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
210This will turn on the determination of whether or not the debtor's debts are primarily consumer 
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preferences received by the defendant exceed the floor,2 11 (c) whether the 
defense can be applied pro tanto when the aggregate value of the property 
constituting or affected by transfer exceeds the threshold,212 and (d) the rela-
tionship between the low-dollar safe harbor exceptions and other preference 
exceptions.213 In short, while § 547(c)(9) has surely prevented some prefer-
debts. While what constitutes a "consumer debt" is defined with relative precision in § 101{8), "prima· 
rily~ is more ambiguous, as it might refer to the majority of the absolute number of debts, the majority of 
debts by amount, some combination of the two, or even a supermajority-as primarily is not necessarily 
tantamount to fifty percent. Because § 707{b){2) uses the same phrase, authority decided thereunder 
presumably is relevant. See, e.g., In re Hlavin, 394 B.R. 441 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) (observing that courts 
have interpreted the phrase "primarily consumer debts~ in several different ways, although the majority 
view is that a debtor's liabilities are primarily consumer debts if the aggregate dollar amount of such debts 
exceeds fifty percent of the debtor's total liabilities); In re Beacher, 358 B.R. 917 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) 
(accepting the U.S. Trustee's argument that "primarily consumer debt~ means that more than fifty percent 
of the amount of debt is consumer debt, without regard to whether more than fifty percent of the number 
of debts is consumer debt). While the Code does not define nonconsumer (or business debt), the Fifth 
Circuit has offered the standard that "the test for determining whether a debt should be classified as a 
business debt ... is whether it was incurred with an eye toward profit.~ See In re Booth, 858 F.2d 1051, 
1055 {5th Cir. 1988) (holding as well that "primarily~ requires both a numerical and an amount test). 
Does this suggest that there could there be a debt that is neither consumer (within the definition in 
§ 101{8)) nor nonconsumer (acquired with a profit motive) in nature? Moreover, even the existence of a 
clear definition of consumer debt does not prevent disagreement between the debtor and the U.S Trustee 
as to which category any particular debt belongs. E.g., In re Cromwell, No. 14·03707·5-SWH, 2015 WL 
1119711 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2015) (examining the issue under the means test). 
211Slobodian v. United States (In re Net Pay Solutions, Inc.), No. 15-2833,2016 WL 2731676 (3d Cir. 
May 10, 2016) (holding that § 54 7(c)(9) requires a creditor·by·creditor and transfer·by·transfer analysis); 
Elec. City Merchandise Co. v. Hailes (In re Hailes), 77 F.3d 873, 874 {5th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
multiple transfers to the same debtor may be aggregated for purposes of disabling the exception under 
§ 547(c)(8)). Cf Pierce v. Collection Assocs., Inc. {In re Pierce), 779 F.3d 814 {8th Cir 2014), wherein the 
court concluded that although the aggregate value of all sums garnished by judgment creditor during the 
preference period exceeded $600, the judgment creditor was entitled to raise the de minimiJ in§ 54 7(c){8), 
because the last two payments withheld from the debtor's wages were never paid over to the creditor 
prior to bankruptcy. See alJo In re Djert, 188 B.R. 586, 588 {Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (noting authority on 
both sides of the issue in relation to§ 547(c)(8)). In In re Transcontinental Refrigerated Lines, Inc., 483 
B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 20 10), the court looked to the rule of construction in § 102{7) to find that 
the reference to "such transfer~ in § 547(c)(9) should be deemed to include the plural "transfers." Of 
course, this does not resolve the additional argument against aggregation based on the perambulatory 
language in § 54 7(c), which refers to "a transfer.~ 
212See W. States Glass Corp. of N. Cal. v. Barris {In re Bay Area Glass, Inc.), 454 B.R. 86, 89·90 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (holding that § 547(c)(9) cannot serve as a safe harbor for the part of the preference 
that falls below the jurisdictional minimum); Ray v. Cannon's, Inc. (In re Vickery), 63 B.R. 222, 223 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn.1986) ("The wording of the exception[§ 547(c)(8)] clearly makes $600 a cut·off point 
on the trustee's right to recover and more importantly on his decision to bring suit. A [transfer] of $599 is 
protected but a [transfer] of $601 is not.~). And, as if all of this were not enough ado about very little, if, 
as the court noted in Vickery. one dollar makes this kind of difference, then in the case of noncash transfers, 
the issue of valuation will be pivotal in determining applicability of the defenses under both §§ (c)(8) and 
(c)(9). 
213ln other words, assuming, as the majority of courts now do, that we aggregate all preferential 
transfers under § 547(c)(9), suppose that, while insolvent and within ninety days of filing, the debtor 
makes two payments of $5,000 each to a creditor on prior de,bts. In response to the trustee's claim to 
recover the two payments, assume further that the creditor is successfully able to establish that one, but 
374 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 90 
ence filings (or, if filed, recoveries),214 the surfeit of related litigation concern-
ing the scope and proper application of the exception makes one wonder 
whether, from the perspective of the system as a whole, the game has been 
worth the candle. 
Of far greater concern, however, is a conviction that dollar-denominated 
floors are very blunt and inexact tools for accomplishing any objective other 
than eliminating all preference claims below a certain amount, which of 
course is not the raison d'etre for either § 547(c)(8) or (c)(9). In addition, 
unless a minimum amount in controversy is calibrated to the siz;e of estate, 
the magnitude of its impact will fluctuate from case-to-case, and wildly so 
from the largest to the smallest cases. What is "trifling" depends a great deal 
on scale. Finally, bearing in mind that the trustee has discretion whether or 
not to bring a preference claim in the first place, and presumably exercises 
that discretion in at least some number of cases215 where the exercise of the 
preference power would not produce any (or only minimal) benefit to the 
estate, the only reason for a de minimis safe harbor is as an anodyne for those 
situations where the trustee either misuses her authority or misjudges the 
benefits of its application.216 But just how effective is this mechanism for 
achieving that objective? 
Even conceding for sake of argument that abuse of the preference power 
is as widespread of a problem as credit provider complaints would have one 
believe, I would submit that a dollar-denominated floor for bringing a prefer-
ence action is a simultaneously overinclusive and underinclusive strategy for 
responding to the behavior sought to be controlled. To begin with, while it 
not the other payment, was made in the ordinary course of business within the meaning of§ 547(c}(2}. 
Can the debtor now raise§ 547(c)(9) as a defense to recovery of the remaining payment since, after all, it 
is below the de minimis threshold of $6,225? In his excellent treatise, Professor Tabb raises a similar 
hypothetical, although using the subsequent advance defense in§ 547(c)(4) to demonstrate how, if the 
answer is in the affirmative, the creditor can calculate exactly the amount it should return before filing so 
as to fall below the statutory trigger in § 547(c)(9). Tabb concludes that such "piggybacking" ought not 
be allowed, since subsection (c)(9} refers to "such transfer" being below the stated dollar amount, not such 
transfer after reduction occasioned by application of other deductions. He questions, however, whether 
the courts will apply that reasoning in these cases. See TABB, supra note 10, at 556. 
214lt is impossible to know, except anecdotally, about adversary proceedings that were not filed, so it is 
pure conjecture as to whether the number of cases where the trustee has refrained from filing are greater 
or less than the number of cases involving the interpretation of § 54 7(c)(9). Probably the former, but, 
again, it is important to stress that some of the unfiled claims below the minimum are cases where it would 
not have been beneficial to the estate and/ or other general creditors if the trustee had been permitted to 
proceed. 
2151 can be as cynical as the next fellow, but surely it cannot be the case that every trustee indiscrimi· 
nately files preference claims for improper ulterior motive, such as enriching herself or her law firm. While 
the trustee is not necessarily alone in terms of standing to bring preference actions (see infra note 262}, it is 
even less likely that individual creditors or creditors' committees would have any incentive to seek author· 
ity to pursue a preference action other than to benefit the estate. 
216These, of course, were the principal complaints of the creditor provider group during the ABI 
STUDY. See supra notes 88·92 and accompanying text. 
2016) BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCES 375 
is impossible to know how many cases that might otherwise have been filed 
by trustees have been scotched because of § 54 7(c)(9), it is reasonable to 
surmise that the operation of any barrier to preference recovery discriminat-
ing solely on the basis of amount in controversy would be just as likely, when 
applied, to bar an action untainted by bad faith (and that would have in-
creased distributions to unsecured creditors) as it would be to prevent a 
strike suit producing little or no benefit for the estate or general creditors. 
Moreover, it bears reiterating that the recovery of assets sufficient to permit 
or increase distributions to unsecured creditors is desirable, but is not itself 
an element of an avoidable preference, nor is it necessarily the only purposive 
goal of the preference law.Z 17 
At the same time, low-dollar threshold limitations are also underinclusive 
in that they will apply even in situations where the defendant engaged in the 
very sort of intentional opt-out behavior that it is the policy of the deter-
rence-based justification for the preference law to interdict.218 In sum, both 
of the low-dollar exceptions, and particularly so the more impactful limita-
tions of subsection (c)(9), are lazy ways to deal with the problem that they 
seek to remediate, even assuming a problem of the magnitude warranting a 
response exists in the first place. It is a messy shotgun approach that inevita-
bly results in lots of collateral damage while, at the same time, permitting 
some of guiltiest duck to fly away scot free. Obviously, minimum amount 
thresholds for triggering jurisdiction have the benefit of administrative ease, 
precisely because they are blind to any criterion or consideration other than 
the value of the property subject to the challenged transfer. There are, how-
ever, better, more principled, and more finely calibrated ways to address the 
misgivings of creditors regarding wasteful or self-interested use of the prefer-
ence law that do not entail discarding the infant along with its bathwater,219 
217See supra note 39. This is particularly true in reorganization cases where other policy objectives are 
implicated. See Mellon Bank v. Dick Corp., 351 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2003} (permitting use of the preference 
power where the recovery would only directly benefit a secured creditor when the action was necessary 
to secure the lender's agreement to provide critical postpetition financing facility). ~The operating busi· 
ness counts as an 'estate' without regard to the identity (and priority) of those who will receive distribu· 
tions eventually." Jd. at 293. That is, ~benefit to the estate" for recovery of avoided transfers under 
§ 550(a) does not necessarily require that the value recovered flow to unsecured creditors. See infra note 
261 and accompanying text. But see Thomas D. Goldberg, Curbing Abusive Preference Actions: Rethin~· 
ing Claims on Behalf of Administratively Insolvent Estates, 23 -AM. BANKR. INST.]. 14 {2004} (making the 
argument that preference actions should not be brought where there is no likelihood of distributions to 
unsecured creditors). 
218See Jackson, supra note 40, at 759·63. See also jACKSON, supra note 122, at 125·28 (adopting the 
position that the justifications for the preference law are to prevent dismantling of the bankruptcy estate 
and in order to assure that no creditor is able to unilaterally opt·out of the hypothetical creditor's bargain 
model that Jackson posits creditors, as risk·neutral wealth maximizers, would agree to ex ante to assure 
that the law operates as efficiently as possible). Jackson's view is the strongest endorsement of a deter· 
rence·based rationale for crafting the preference law. 
219See infra text accompanying notes 311·314. 
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beginning unexpectedly enough, with the last of the changes to preference 
law and procedure wrought under BAPCP A, to which attention is turned 
next. 
F. VENUE PROVISIONS 
The general rule governing venue of proceedings arising in a bankruptcy 
case is 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a), which calls for such proceedings to be com-
menced in the district where the case is pending-so-called ""home court" 
advantage for the trustee.220 Prior to 2005, subsection (b) contained an ex-
ception to this rule for proceedings ""arising in or related to such case to 
recover a money judgment of or property worth less than $1,000 or a con-
sumer debt of less than $5,000 ... ," In these narrow situations, venue was 
proper in the district where the defendant resided. 
BAPCPA amended subsection (b) in order to (i) raise the consumer debt 
limitation to $15,000 [currently $18,675]; (ii) add an exception to the home 
court advantage for proceedings seeking recovery of a nonconsumer debt 
against a noninsider of .Jess than $10,000 [currently $12,475], and (iii) make 
all of the amounts in subsection (b) subject to triennial adjustment under 
§ 104(a). As set forth in the legislative history to the 1978 Act, these ""small 
debt" (and now not so small debt) exceptions to the general rule are intended 
to prevent unfairness to ""distant debtors of the estate" who potentially might 
otherwise have to incur expenses to defend a preference claim that either 
exceeds the value of the claim or makes the cost of its defense a problematic 
proposition. 221 
Like the low-dollar safe harbors in §§ 54 7(c)(8) and (9), these provisions 
achieve their intended objective only in some of the cases in which they will 
apply and, even then, only fortuitously. However, unlike those other excep-
tions, they do not represent absolute bars to the trustee's ability to pursue 
the action; they just make it a little more expensive and inconvenient. That 
is by no means objectionable; it simply adjusts the playing field. 222 Each case 
can still be evaluated on its own merits and an appropriate decision made 
whether or not to file a claim. It is also more likely than not to be the case 
that in the instances where these exceptions to home court advantage dis-
220E.g., Etalco v. AMK Indus., Inc., (In re Etalco), 273 B.R. 211, 219 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (observing 
that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) is to provide the debtor with a "home court" advantage). See also 
Appel v. Gable (In re B & L Oil Co., 834 F.2d 156, 159 n.8 (lOth Cir.l987) (noting that centralizing 
proceedings in one court advances the important goal of the efficient administration of bankruptcy cases). 
221See HousE REPORT, supra note 52, at 446. 
222It bears noting that the increase in the venue level for consumer cases was not part of the NBRC 
recommendations concerning preferences. See NBRC REPORT, supra note at 800. While raising the level 
from $5,000 (or simply indexing it under § 104(a)) is not itself objectionable, the increase to $15,000 is 
proportionately much higher than the just the $5,000 difference compared with commercial cases, given 
what I presume is likely the mean dollar value of the two types of claims. 
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suade the trustee from initiating a preference action, the claim will have been 
of the sort that was borderline to begin with, which is to say of the type that 
the critics of the preference law had (or claimed to have had) in mind. The 
same cannot be said about a minimum amount in controversy requirement 
that must be met in order to invoke the court's jurisdiction, which is just as 
likely to bar a preference action that might have been beneficial to the estate 
as one that would have produced insignificant return beyond the recovery of 
professional costs entailed in its prosecution.223 In short, I believe 
BAPCP A's changes with regard to proper venue in preference cases were 
not only harmless, but perhaps even beneficial. 
The problem, however, with changing venue rules is that their construc-
tive or favorable impact, whatever it might have been in 1978 or even ten 
years ago, has waned and likely will continue to do so. The near-universal 
adoption of electronic filing and the increased incidence of conducting hear-
ings either telephonically or via videoconferencing technology has rendered 
tinkering with the venue rules of much more limited utility in policing truly 
bad faith preference actions than may have been true in the past. Distance 
alone simply does not create the same potential for prejudice and disadvan-
tage that was earlier true. Concomitantly, the benefits flowing from home 
court advantage are not as fulsome as they might once have been. 
Despite this fact, the call for expansion of the "district where the debtor 
resides~ exceptions has not abated.224 And, a further tapering of the trustee's 
home court advantage would not be deleterious in the grand scheme of 
things.225 However, to address effectively the legitimate dissatisfaction regu-
larly raised concerning trustees' decisions to invoke the preference laws (even 
if the reality is not quite as loud as the din) by means other than continuing 
to impose arbitrarily blanket limitations on the scope of preference liability 
and recovery, tinkering with the venue rules will not be enough. Instead, as 
discussed further below, some fresh approaches will be needed as BAPCPA 
recedes further and further in our rearview mirror. 
VII. PREFERENCE LAW GOING FORWARD 
A. THE RoLE OF STATE LAw IN BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION 
The need to honor creditors' state law rights, interests, and entitle-
223lt is the all or nothing nature of so-called de minims exceptions (which are no longer so de minimis) 
that make them poor proxies for rules prohibiting the actual behavior sought to be proscribed). See supra 
text accompanying notes 217-219. 
224The CHAPTER 11 CoMMISSION REPORT calls for a significant increase (nearly double the current 
level) in the dollar value of preference claims that should be subject to the exception in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1409(b) from the general "where the case is pending~ rule. See infra note 284 and accompanying text. 
225There is, however, a tipping point in terms of how far this strategy can be carried, as its application 
will increase the expense and duration of bankruptcy cases. See supra note 220. 
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ments-and the need from time-to-time to modify those rights, interests and 
entitlements in pursuit of the goals of equality, fresh start, and debtor sur-
vival-generate an essential and inescapable tension in bankruptcy law. The 
future of preference law is inextricably intertwined with the broader ques-
tion of how that tension will be resolved. Federal bankruptcy law could take 
one of many approaches to state commercial law. To be sure, Congress has 
the authority to promulgate an entirely new regime of property rights and 
priorities that would attain upon the debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition. 
Of course, developing such a system would be burdensome. It would also 
expand opportunities, without significant corresponding benefits, for strategic 
gaming by debtors and creditors who might perceive particular advantage 
under one system versus the other.226 Alternatively, a federal bankruptcy 
system might set up a purely procedural mechanism for the collective adjudi-
cation of claims against the debtor, through devices like the automatic stay 
and the discharge, but otherwise leave creditors' state law rights wholly un-
disturbed.227 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898's panoptic incorporation of state 
exemptions is one limited example of this kind of blanket deference to sub-
stantive state law.22s That approach, however, if adopted across-the-board, 
226See. e.g., Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165 (1946), wherein the 
Court began with the principle that the validity of a debt or obligation ~in the absence of overruling 
federal law, is-to be determined by state law.~ The Court noted, however, that in the bankruptcy context, 
the question of allowing any claim ultimately rests with the federal courts and is a matter of federal law in 
which equitable principles play a large part. I d. at 162·63. See also Vern Countryman, The Use of State 
Law in Ban~ruptcy Cases (Part 1), 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 407, 408·09 (1972) (discussing reasons for the 
incorporation of substantive state law rules for application in bankruptcy cases). 
227This is essentially the position taken by contractarian theorists, who advocate that bankruptcy 
should be limited in purpose and operation to enforcing prebankruptcy contractually determined rights 
and priorities, beginning with Douglas G. Baird and Thomas Jackson's ~creditors' bargain" theory of bank· 
ruptcy. Baird and Jackson argued that when pursuing these goals, rights established elsewhere generally 
should not be changed. Thomas H. Jackson, Ban~ruptcy, N.on·Ban~ruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors' 
Bargain, 91 YALE LJ. 857, 860 (1982) (explaining the model generally); Douglas Baird, Loss Distribution, 
Forum Shopping, and Ban~ruptcy: A Reply To Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815, 825·28 (1987) (identifying 
forum-shopping as a principal concern as to why rights established outside of bankruptcy should not be 
altered within bankruptcy). A more extreme version of this outlook was proposed in Michael Bradley & 
Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1078 (1992) (arguing for 
taking bankruptcy, or at least reorganization, out of the judicial process entirely). See also infra note 237. 
But see Elizabeth Warren, Ban~uptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 781 (1987) (taking the position that 
when determining parties' rights in a bankruptcy proceeding, only state substantive law should be relied 
on, not state collection rules). It should also be noted that while differing rules may present a risk of 
forum-shopping, they do not always produce that result. See William J. Woodward, Jr. & Richard S. 
Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary Ban~ruptcy: An Empirical Study, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
53, 66·70 (1983) (concluding that altering federal exemptions probably has no significant effect on bank· 
ruptcy filing rates). Cf Susan Block·Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Ration· 
ality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reforrn" ofBan~ruptcy Law, 84 TEx. L. REv. 1481, 1523·25 (2006) 
(asserting that the evidence thus far as to the correlation between exemption law and personal filing rates 
have produced conflicting and confusing results). 
228Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544. 
2016) BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCES 379 
would surely diminish the prospects for achieving the unique objectives of 
the bankruptcy system in any kind of meaningful way.229 
Wisely, our system eschews both of these extremes, although of necessity 
it leans somewhat toward the latter since the scope of federal commercial law 
is quite limited. The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Butner230 
is frequently and not inaccurately trotted out in support of this view, with an 
emphasis on the portion of the Court's holding that stated: "'Congress has 
generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bank-
rupt's estate to state law."231 Too often, however, the Court's qualification 
to. that statement-unless "some federal interest requires a different result"-
is overlooked or given insufficient attention in the rhetoric of those inclined 
to advocate in favor of the hegemony and unmolested preservation of state 
law contractual and property rights.232 Indeed, Butner is not uncommonly 
cited as making a far more sweeping statement than it really did in terms of 
the division of authority between state and federal law in bankruptcy 
cases.233 Properly understood, the full holding in Butner actually does no 
more. than express in the negative the basic truism that when a state law 
property definition interferes with a federal bankruptcy interest, the state 
law rule must yield under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitu-
tion.234 Put another way, state law often defines the nature, scope, and at-
tributes of a property interest because there is no superseding federal law 
229See infra text accompanying notes 236-241. 
230440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
23
'Id. at 54. 
232Id. See generally Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)use of State Law in Ban~ruptcy: The Hanging Para-
graph Story, 2012 Wise. L. REv. 963, 987-88 (2012) (pointing out as well that, implicitly, the Court held 
that state law generally controlled property rights upon entry into bankruptcy, but not necessarily what 
happened to them in bankruptcy or how they looked upon exit). Professor Moringiello expands on the 
overly broad interpretation that has been given to Butner in the case law in When Does Some Federal 
Interest Require a Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 657 (2015). 
233Id. at 670 (describing Butner as a "default rule" that applies in the absence of a contrary federal rule 
or policy interest). See also In re Pruitt, 401 B.R. 546, 564 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2009) (suggesting that many 
courts read Butner too broadly). 
234U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. In the context of a bankruptcy question, Chief Justice Marshall con-
cluded in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193-96 (1819), that "[w)henever the terms in 
which a power is granted to congress, or the nature of the power, require that it should be exercised 
exclusively by congress, the subject is as completely taken from the state legislatures, as if they had been 
expressly forbidden to act .... " See also Kanter v. Moneymaker (In re Kanter), 505 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 
197 4 ), in which the court invalidated a state statute that purported to defease the bankruptcy trustee of 
any interest in a prepetition personal injury lawsuit. The court found that enforcement of that provision 
directly conflicted with the provisions of the former Bankruptcy Act's definition of property of the estate 
as well as with the overall distributional priority scheme established by the Act. Id. at 230. More re-
cently, of course, Puerto Rico's legislation, permitting public corporations to negotiate with creditors and 
legally reorgani;:e their debt if those negotiations failed, was struck in federal court because it was pre-
empted by the Code. See http:/ /dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/judge-strikes-down-puerto-ricos-
debt-restructuring-law/?_r=O. 
380 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 90 
that plays that role when a bankruptcy case is filed. However, just because 
state law initially determines the nature and substance of a creditor's claim in 
bankruptcy does not mean that state law will in variably control what hap-
pens during the course of a bankruptcy case.235 
Inevitably, incorporation and strict enforcement of state law property 
and contract rights cannot alone define the contours of a bankruptcy system 
(or at least of our bankruptcy system) because federal bankruptcy law seeks 
to attain purposive objectives that have no analog under state law.236 Thus, 
a progressive bankruptcy code cannot merely contain a set of procedural rules 
and leave all of the substantive issues to state law in the manner of a federal 
court adjudicating a state law claim where jurisdiction is .based of diversity of 
citizenship.237 A healthy and utile system of bankruptcy embodies a set of 
distributional norms and outcomes that differ from state law, and that have 
235For example, whether claims are allowed.(and in what amount) or disallowed is a question of federal 
law. Similarly, how claims are allocated between secured and unsecured portions is determined by the 
Bankruptcy Code, not state law. Congress has permitted state law to function within the fabric of federal 
bankruptcy law in order to identify the pre-bankruptcy rights of the parties involved in a bankruptcy case; 
it is not, however, constitutionally compelled to do so. See Pruitt, 401 B.R. at 553-54. For instance, state 
law determines the existence and amount of a lessor's claim arising from the tenant's breach, but, in order 
to not to disrupt the aims of bankruptcy, § 502(b)(6) places on a cap on how much of that claim will be 
allowed. See Moringiello, supra note 232, at 83-85 (distinguishing bankruptcy "entry" rights from bank-
ruptcy "exit" rights). 
236Even one of the early and leading proponents of the view that bankruptcy law should simply sort 
out private state law results without advancing substantive goals to accommodate the competing interests 
that might be seen at stake in a bankruptcy case has acknowledged the need for adjustment and even 
destruction of some private state law rights in order to assure the debtor's right to a fresh start. See 
Thomas H. Jackson, 'The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1394 (1985). 
Similarly, the policy of rehabilitation of the debtor means bankruptcy must offer "a forum in which com-
peting and various interests and values accompanying financial distress may be expressed and sometimes 
recognized." See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 
CowM. L. REv. 717, 766 (1991). 
237See Countryman, supra note 226, at 409 ("Also in the category of judicial errors, in my judgment, 
are those decisions which treat E Tie Railroad Co. v. 'Tompkins as requiring the application of state law in 
bankruptcy cases"). Judge Friendly earlier expressed the same view in Fore Improvement Corp. v. Selig, 
278 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1960) (concurring opinion), noting that, "Congress is not required to direct the 
federal courts to look to state law for the definition of state-created rights asserted in bankruptcy, as it is 
when federal jurisdiction rests solely on diversity of citizenship. The question is of intent, not of power: 
Id. at 147. See also Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 240 (1946) ("In 
determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor's assets shall be distributed, a bankruptcy court 
does not apply the law of the state where it sits. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 
L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, has no such implication .... [B]ankruptcy courts must administer and enforce 
the Bankruptcy Act as interpreted by this Court in accordance with authority granted by Congress to 
determine how and what claims shall be allowed under equitable principles."). 
On the other hand, the view is out there that the Erie model is precisely the method that should be used to 
structure the relationship between state and federal law in bankruptcy. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A 
:Normative 'Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 931, 
934 (2004); Thomas E. Plank, 'The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 633, 691-92 
(2004) (suggesting the desirability, to the extent feasible, of following Erie in bankruptcy cases so as to 
advance the development of a coherent body of national commercial law). 
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aggregate social and economic aspirations, such as allowing for survival of a 
business through reorganization and the discharge of debt, that are alien or 
forbidden to state law.238 The salience of this point is sometimes neglected 
because bankruptcy recognizes, as it must,239 the validity of liens created 
under state law. But even in that regard, the rules of bankruptcy relating to 
secured claims differ considerably from the treatment of secured claims 
outside of bankruptcy, beginning with the bifurcation of undersecured claims 
under § 506(a)(1)240 and ending with the abrogation of certain liens en-
tirely.241 In short, the ""secured creditor" who comes into the bankruptcy 
proceeding with its lien intact may come out of the proceeding resembling 
quite a different character entirely. So, the question (the answer to which is 
never fixed or certain in the fashion of a mathematical exercise) becomes to 
what extent bankruptcy legislation should defer to the contractual or other 
legal arrangement struck by the parties under state law? 
Certainly the 1978 Act, even though advancing a more ambitious bank-
ruptcy-specific agenda than any previous bankruptcy law,242 continued to 
defer to state law in key respects.243 BAPCPA, however, placed a giant 
238The federal Constitution specifically bars the states from granting a general discharge by virtue of 
the Contract Clause, which forbids the states from retroactively passing laws that impair the obligation of 
contracts. U.S. CaNST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. As for reorgani:;:ation, the state law of creditor remedies based 
on a race of the diligent is destined to assure the demise of the insolvent debtor, not its survival or 
continuation. 
239Given the quite limited scope of property interests created and defined by federal law, most claims 
arise under state law. See supra text accompanying notes 226·235, 
240The Code eschews the phrase "secured creditor" entirely, focusing instead on the character of the 
claim under § 506(a)(1), which is defined in relation to the value of the creditor's interest in the debtor's 
property. See supra note 120. Assuming reasonably accurate valuations, this bifurcation actually benefits 
the undersecured creditor by allowing for at least a pro rata recovery on its deficiency claim. 
241 Professor Howard points out that while the Supreme Court's opinion in Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 
617 (1886), is often cited for the proposition that "liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected," that is a 
serious misreading of the case, which did not actually address the ability to a void or reduce liens in 
bankruptcy. See Howard, supra note 116, at 526. See also Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Woolsey), 
696 F.3d 1266, 1274 (lOth Cir. 2012) ("Chapter 7 indubitably permits liens to be removed in many 
situations."). Cf United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), (holding that § 522(1), 
permitting avoidance of certain liens exemption impairing liens, can only be applied prospectively). Finally, 
and most provocatively, recently, Professor Tabb has advanced the thesis that the Fifth Amendment does 
not constrain Congress's ability under the Bankruptcy Clause to modify the rights of secured creditors. 
See Charles ]. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the Limited Rights of Secured 
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. 765 (2015). 
242See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
243This is due, in part, to the fact that most private law rights are still established under state law. Of 
course, how an allowed claim is characteri:;:ed in bankruptcy is another matter and one that is "wholly 
federal" in its determination. See In re Whipple, 417 B.R. 86, 89 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2009); supra note 226. 
See also Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 455 B.R. 590 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 689 F.3d 601 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (observing that when addressing an issue that involves state law, bankruptcy courts should 
ordinarily consider and weigh the constitutional preference for uniformity against the state's interest in 
having its own laws applied). 
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thumb back on the state law rules side of the equation in this delicate balanc-
ing exercise. As noted earlier, this is most evident in the specific provisions 
of the law dealing with restricting access to debtor relief and the protection 
of security.244 My more confined focus, however, has been on how the pref-
erence law has been dragged along in the process, and why that may be sys-
temically undesirable. It is the very nature of preferences to flout state law 
rules in pursuit of bankruptcy distributional goals. Preference law is designed 
to disrupt payments and transfers that are, with certain very limited excep-
tions,245 perfectly lawful under state law-and that, quite frankly, do no 
harm except in the insolvency situation, which is when we must become con-
cerned not only with each creditor's rights against the debtor, but also with 
the competition that exists among creditors for priority in, or even just an 
aliquot share of, the debtor's limited assets. 
It is hardly unexpected that those who find themselves on the defensive 
side of a preference lawsuit might be more than just disappointed at the pros-
pect of having to return to the estate a payment lawfully received from (or 
forego a lien validly given by) the debtor on a bona fide debt.246 But this is 
the classic example of a place where state and common law rules and proce-
dures, preoccupied with the individual creditor collection effort and not the 
interests of creditors inter se, may provide plainly inappropriate guidance. 
This is due to the fact that these rules are predicated on an entirely different 
allocational scheme than the distributional principles that govern in system 
where contemporary bankruptcy norms are given preeminence. That is part 
of the reason why individual creditors, focused narrowly on their own claims, 
should be fully expected to squawk about the "ineffectiveness" and "unfair-
ness" of the preference law, and also why these complaints have to be sifted 
through that filter of self-interest. 
244 See supra text accompanying notes 16-24. 
245 While preferences are fully permissible under common law, some, but certainly less than all, states 
provide "mini" preference provisions in their assignment for the benefit of creditors statutes. However, 
such attempts by the states to authorize the assignee of an assignment for the benefit of creditors to 
prosecute and recover a preferential transfer have on occasion been struck on pre·emption grounds. Sher· 
wood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 927 (2005) 
(pointing out that recovery by a state assignee will preclude later recovery by the bankruptcy trustee, thus 
thwarting bankruptcy distributional policy over which Congress has exclusive authority). But see Ready 
Fixtures Co. v. Stevens Cabinets, 488 F.Supp.2d 787 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (holding that Wisconsin's mini· 
preference provision is not preempted); Geoffrey L. Berman & Catherine E. Vance, State Law Preference 
Actions: Still Alive after Sherwood Partners v. Lycos, 26 AM. BANKR INST. J. 24 (2008) (suggesting that 
state-enacted preference avoidance statutes might not be entirely a thing of the past). 
246!t is of small solace to a creditor compelled to disgorge a preferential payment or lose on lien on 
valuable property to be assured that their "selfless" actions will help advance bankruptcy fresh start and 
rehabilitation policy. Moreover, whether exaggerated or not, there is still the widely held belief among 
creditors and more than a few bankruptcy professionals that many preference claims are brought without 
proper prior investigation and deliberation. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 217, at 14. 
2016) BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCES 383 
As Thomas Jackson colorfully explained many years ago in his explana-
tion of bankruptcy by analogy to a lake filled with fish, bankruptcy is de-
signed to make one hundred competing fishers act like the sole owner of the 
lake, thereby ensuring a sustainable supply of fish.247 As opposed to state 
grab law rules and their allocation of limited assets on a first-come-first-
served basis, by imposing mandatory rules requiring a group of creditors to 
cooperate in a coordinated manner, bankruptcy is much more efficient and 
cost effective, even in a liquidation mode, than each creditor pursuing its own 
individual interests. A key to achieving that aim is ratable distribution of the 
assets in possession of the estate at filing. However, it also requires adminis-
tration of those assets possessed by the estate sufficiently in advance of filing 
so as to assure that the effort is not undermined either by the frantic machi-
nations sometimes characterizing the debtor's activities in the days and weeks 
immediately preceding the filing, or by purely routine transactions that hap-
pen to result in one or more creditors receiving more than a ratable share of 
the common pooJ.248 This is where the preference law steps into the breach. 
But BAPCP A has eroded the effectiveness of the preference law largely in 
pursuit of either questionable goals249 or the correction of unsubstantiated 
abuses.250 In the process, the 2005 Amendments have further muddied the 
waters in relation to why we need a preference law in the first place. There-
fore, a renewed focus on that elementary but vital question is in order. 
Before turning finally, however, to the considerations that might profitably 
guide preference reform in the future, it is worth examining a couple of recent 
proposals addressing the desired direction of preference law and policy. 
B. SoME OTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE FuTURE 
In a 2014 article,251 Professor Brooke Gotberg took her crack at resolving 
the conundrum of the preference law. Like myself and others,2 5 2 she en-
247See jACKSON, supra, note 122, at 11·13. 
248Jackson was concerned of course about transfers that were occasioned by the very deliberate jock· 
eying for position that can go on once creditors become aware that the debtor is floundering financially. 
See Jackson, supra note 40, at 759·60. However, under a view where preference law does not police the 
creditors' bargain, but actually advances the achievement of substantive goals distinct from state law, it is 
of no moment whether the transfer was extraordinary or routine. 
249 See supra notes 70· 72 and accompanying text concerning the futility of the deterrence explanation 
of preference law and its counter hypothesis, i.e., that preference exceptions for innocent transferees will 
encourage creditors to continue to do business with the financially flagging debtor. 
250See supra note 92 & infra note 279 and accompanying text. 
251Gotberg, supra note 37. 
252See supra notes 68 & 69. See also Broome, supra note 50, at 96 ("By eliminating the 'reasonable 
cause to believe' requirement, Congress deliberately shifted from a policy of avoiding only those preferen· 
tial transfers that were made to creditors who had reason to know of the debtor's insolvency and may 
have therefore exerted pressure on the debtor, to a policy of preserving equal distribution, even in the 
absence of creditor pressure."). 
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dorsed the premise that preference law should be driven principally by the 
equality of distribution rationale, and noted the tendency of many of the 
preference exceptions, founded on a deterrence explanation of the law, to 
impair or destabiliz;e the policy of ratable distribution.253 Her solution to the 
troubling conflict between the two accounts of preference law is a novel one. 
Rather than attempting to reconcile some of the internally inconsistent as-
pects of this area of law by either prioritiz;ing or eliminating them, as other 
have proposed, she suggests a9apting application of the law in relation to the 
type of proceeding at issue ba~ed upon what she regards as the corresponding 
value(s) that dominates in each such proceeding. This leads her to call for 
elimination of preference recovery entirely in all Chapter 11 cases,254 save for 
the (not uncommon) situation where a liquidating plan has been confirmed,255 
and expansion of preference recovery in Chapter 7 by virtue of the abroga-
tion of those exceptions that she identifies as operating to carve out entirely 
certain kinds of transfers or creditors from preference liability, including, 
most notably, the ordinary course of business exception.256 
Although, in fairness, Gotberg describes her proposal as a "thought piece," 
and not a specific proposal for reform,257 the call for total elimination of pref-
erences in reorganiz;ation cases is much like killing the patient in order to halt 
the spread of the disease. It is true that the debtor in possession is likely to 
be more circumspect in exercising preference recovery authority due the im-
portance of preserving certain relationships necessary in its post-confirmation 
life,258 and that the direct benefit to unsecured creditors from exercise of the 
preference power may be more attenuated in Chapter 11 than Chapter 7. 
253Gotberg, supra note 37, at 65·66 (discussing the conflict between deterrence and equal 
distribution). 
254Id. at 88 (stating that the "relative unimportance of equal distribution" in the reorganization context 
belies the need for maintaining preference actions in Chapter 11). 
255Id. at 86·87 ("If chapter 11 is used as a liquidating chapter rather than an opportunity to preserve a 
debtor's going concern value, then policy considerations associated with a chapter 7 liquidation should 
predominate, and the availability of preference actions adjusted accordingly."). Given the trend of modern 
firms tending to have capital structures that are entirely consumed by multiple layers of secured debt, with 
the result being that the Chapter 11 filing becomes little more than a quick § 363 sales, followed by 
confirmation of a liquidation plan or conversion to Chapter 7, this is a big exception. See, e.g., Douglas G. 
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REv. 751, 777·85 (2002) (discussing 
the decrease in traditional stand-alone reorganizations). But see ]. Lawrence West brook, Secured Creditor 
Control and Bankruptcy Sales: An Empirical View, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. 831 (suggesting that the conven· 
tiona! picture of secured creditor control and 363 sales is inaccurate and overstated). 
256Gotberg distinguishes between what she describes as "narrowing exceptions"(§§ 547(c)(1), (3), (5) 
and subsection (i)) and "true exceptions"(§ 547(c)(2), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9) and subsection (h)). Gotberg 
does not categorize § 546(e), although it seems safe to assume she would regard it as a true exception. 
Got berg, supra note 37, at 67·77. See also supra notes 58·61 for a somewhat different classification of the 
preference exceptions. 
257Id. at 60. 
258See authorities cited id. at 65, n.65. 
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These factors, however, do not of necessity make the preference power or the 
principle of equality less important in reorgan~ation than in liquidation.259 
To begin with, recovery of preferential transfers can be a ready source of 
cash needed to cover operational costs, costs of administration and, in partic-
ular, critical to meeting the cash demands that arise immediately on confirma-
tion.260 Thus, application of the preference power can, in some cases, mean 
the difference between survival of a firm and liquidation-a not insignificant 
consideration. In addition, it bears reiterating that bankruptcy "equality" 
goals can be served other than by means of increasing the distributions to 
unsecured creditors with funds recovered in a preference action. They can 
also be achieved by assuring that claims statutorily entitled to priority re-
ceive payment before general creditors, or that the estate benefits in some 
other fashion,261 even when, as a result of recovery of that preference, general 
creditors as a group receive no increased dividend. The point is that the 
transferee who disgorges the preference is now treated just like (equally 
with) other general creditors so that the distributional hierarchy established 
by the Code is not circumvented. Furthermore, while a debtor in possession 
in Chapter 11 will often be less motivated to bring any particular preference 
claim than a trustee in a Chapter 7 case, the debtor in possession does not 
always have the final word on whether or not to pursue the preferential 
transfer262 and, in any case, the fact that some preference actions may not be 
259See Padilla v. Wells Fargo Mortgage, Inc. (In re Padilla), 379 B.R. 643 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) 
(noting that the principle of equality among creditors underlies the Chapter 13 process, and dting Young 
v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945), involving a Chapter X reorganization under the former Act). 
Gotberg does eventually acknowledge that it would be an exaggeration to say that "there is no value in 
ensuring parity among similarly situated creditors in a chapter 11 case .. ." However, she ultimately 
dismisses these concerns as associated with "extreme or 'idiosyncratic'~ transfers (id. at 89), even though 
they pertain to matters such as classification of claims, treatment of claims within classes, and the stan-
dards necessary to confirm a plan over the dissent of members of an approving class. Likewise, she ignores 
the important role that preference recovery can play in facilitating reorganization and protecting the distri· 
butional scheme in bankruptcy by assuring equality among similarly positioned creditors-regardless of 
whether this results in an increase in distributions to general creditors. See supra notes 217 & infra note 
261. 
260See, e.g., § 1129(a)(9)(A), requiring as a condition to confirmation payment in cash of all administra· 
tive claims, unless the holder of any such claim agrees to a different treatment. 
261 See Silverman Consulting, Inc. v. Hitachi Power Tools, U.S. A., Ltd. (In re Payless Cashways, Inc.), 
290 B.R. 689, 696 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) (holding that even if recovery goes to payment of administra· 
tive expenses and does not produce a dividend for unsecured creditors, there is still a benefit to the estate 
warranting exercise of the Chapter 11 trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers). See also supra notes 
39 & 217 and accompanying text. 
262With court approval, the action may be brought by an individual creditor or, not uncommonly in 
Chapter 11, by the Unsecured Creditor's Committee. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2003). See also PW Enters. Inc. v. North Dakota 
Racing Comm'n (In re Racing Servs., Inc.), 540 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that an unsecured 
creditor in Chapter 7 may sue derivatively on behalf of the estate when either the trustee consents or 
refuses to sue, provided that court finds that the suit is in the best interest of creditors and is necessary 
and beneficial to the efficient resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding); Countrywide Home Loans v. 
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filed does not itself render the poW"er to bring preference claims irrelevant or 
even less critical in Chapter 11 than in Chapter 7.263 
In addition to the foregoing, the exclusion of preference liability in Chap-
ter 11 cases would have a profound dampening effect on involuntary filings, 
not infrequently triggered by the occurrence of a large preferential trans-
fer,264 as well as on the ability to hold insiders accountable for profits they 
attain by utilizing the special knowledge they possess about the debtor.265 
Finally, the proposal gives insufficient attention to the fact that many cases 
filed, voluntarily or involuntarily, under one chapter of the Code eventually 
end up proceeding under another chapter. Merely because a case starts out 
as a Chapter 11 case does not mean it will stay a Chapter 11 case. Indeed, a 
nontrivial number of reorganization cases end up in Chapter 7.266 Cases can 
also be converted to Chapter 11 just as easily as from Chapter 11. Thus, the 
sort of all or nothing distinction Gotberg proposes in relation to preference 
DiCkson (In re Dickson), 427 B.R. 399, 403·05 (BA.P. 6th Cir. 2013) (acknowledging split of authority on 
whether a Chapter 13 debtor may be granted derivative standing to pursue an avoidance action, but 
concluding that, as a court of equity, the bankruptcy court may confer such standing if the trustee is 
unable or unwilling to act). Cf Reed v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 405 B.R. 801, 810·12 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
2009) (observing that while most circuit courts have permitted creditors committees, or even individual 
creditors, to pursue estate causes of action "~When the Chapter 11 debtor in possession refuses to sue, 
derivative standing should be viewed differently in Chapter 7 since there is not the same potential for 
conflict of interest with a trustee in place). 
26lThe proponents of further limiting the preference law vigorously point in support of their position 
to situations where trustees assert claims without proper deliberation and with an almost reckless aban· 
don. See supra note 92 & infra note 279 and accompanying text. It would be ironic indeed if, because 
debtors in possession in the exercise of proper business judgment sometimes decide to refrain from bringing 
what might be a colorable preference claim, we should conclude that the preference power should be 
uprooted entirely in Chapter 11 (and presumably chapters 12 and 13). The inability to recover prefiling 
assets could also make it more difficult to confirm a plan due to meet the "best interests • test in 
§§ 1225(a)(4) and 1325(a)(4), since, under Gotberg's proposal, the hypothetical liquidation under Chapter 
7 would include the transferred assets, but recovery of them could not be sought in the rehabilitation 
proceeding). 
264The debtor seeking to sustain the transfer could simply exercise its broad authority under § 706(a) 
to convert the case to Chapter 11 and, thereby, thwart the petitioning (and other) creditors. 
265While not the goal of a preference rule animated by equality objectives, inevitably its application 
will root out and remedy some "evil" preferential transfers, which are most likely to be made in favor of 
parties with special knowledge of the debtor's financial situation and, thus, the ability to scoop the compe· 
tition by acting before the debtor's travails become more widely known. Thus, while it is impossible for 
the system to fashion doctrine that serves simultaneously equality and deterrence without undermining 
the effectiveness of each (see supra text accompanying note 65), the two are not always mutually exclusive 
or incompatible as applied. See also supra note 172. 
2660ne older report found that of Chapter II cases filed between January 1989 and December 1997, 
34.27% are converted (presumably to Chapter 7). Karen M. Gebbia, First Report of the Select Advisory 
Committee on Business Reorganization, 57 Bus. LAW. 163, 241 (2000). An article written for the Execu· 
tive Office of the U.S. Trustee, suggests that the percentage of cases coiwerting for the three years follow· 
ing the effective date ofBAPCPA was 23.2%. Ed Flynn & Phil Crewson, Chapter 11 Filings Trends in 
History and Today, which can be found at http:/ /www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/ 
2009/ abi_200905 .pdf. 
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liability would have an enormous impact on (and present huge opportunities 
for strategic behavior in connection with) the decision by both preferred and 
non-preferred creditors of whether or not to seek (or oppose) conversion of 
the case. 
Gotberg points out that Chapter 11 is concerned with debtor survival, 
maximizing creditor repayment, and protecting the interests of constituents 
(such as employees or the community in which the debtor operates) that do 
not possess cognizable legal claims against the estate but who nevertheless 
have a stake in the outcome of the case. From this, she deduces that a strict 
policy of equal distribution "has no place in the more flexible standards ac-
corded to reorganizing businesses."267 I am not persuaded by the last point. 
As noted, the fact that equality policy operates in conjunction with other 
policy considerations in Chapter 11 that do not attend a Chapter 7 case does 
not make equality policy, properly understood, less compelling in the reorgan-
ization context.268 It means only that there are more variables at work in 
Chapter 11 than in Chapter 7, and the added complexity affects the role that 
the preference decision and preference recoveries will play in Chapter 11. 
That is to say, equality policy must be balanced and implemented vis a vis 
other considerations implicated in reorganization that simply do not exist in 
liquidation, but to conclude from this that the preference law is "both unnec-
essary and unwelcome in the reorganization context"269 strikes me as a gross 
overstatement. 
In a reply to Gotberg's innovative proposal,27° Professor Dan Busse! con-
curs with Gotberg that there is a problem with the preference law, but he 
disagrees with her both about the source of the problem and the solu-
tion271-some mighty large ""quibbles." In turn, however, his description of 
the problem is the same shopworn rant about use of the preference law to 
coerce settlements from innocent creditors, all for the purpose of "enriching 
estate professionals,"272 and his solution is a yet even larger minimum dollar 
limitation on the trustee's ability to recover prefiling transfers.273 While this 
would address what Busse! apparently considers to be the principal concern 
26
'Gotberg, supra note 37 at 88. 
268/d. at 89 (admitting that, "[t]his is not to say that there is no value in ensuring parity among 
similarly situated creditors in a chapter 11 case, or that the creditors themselves might not view this as a 
priority."). 
269/d. at 88. 
270Daniel]. Busse!, The Problem with Preferences, 100 IowA L. REv. BuLL. 11 (2014). 
271Id. at 12. By contrast, I agree with Gotberg about the source of the problem; i.e., the failure to 
frame preference law solely with reference to the equality objective, at least under the broad formulation 
of the meaning of equality in bankruptcy as I framed it above (see supra note 39). 
272Bussel, supra note 270, at 12. 
273 I d. at 13 (suggesting raising the jurisdictional floor on preference recovery from the current level of 
$6,225 to the astonishing level of $100,000 or even higher). ' 
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underlying the current preference rules, it would do so in a wholly arbitrary 
manner and, in the process, beget lots of unintended casualties. If your goal is 
to eliminate every person named .... Noah," an approach entailing the execution 
of everyone whose first name begins with the letter "N" will get the job 
done, but you are going to have some mighty unhappy "Nathans," Nelsons," 
and "Nevilles" along the way. Plus, are there any "Knowahs" out there? 
The one thing Bussel and I do agree on is that "the defenses to preference 
law are designed largely to protect innocent receipt of preferences; they do 
not apply to parties that can be shown to have deliberately subverted ratable 
distribution on the eve of bankruptcy."27 4 However, Bussel thinks this is a 
good thing and I do not. Implicit in his statement is the assumption that 
preferences are in fact about sanctioning creditors that deliberately engaged 
in opt-out behavior275 (or debtors that facilitate that result), and sending a 
warning message to other creditors that might be considering doing likewise. 
Concomitantly, his belief that creditors that had no wicked motivations in 
securing or receiving a preferential transfer should be protected from prefer-
ence liability flies in the face of the legislative history explaining the recasting 
of preference law under the 1978 Act.27 6 It is also unlikely, for reasons al-
ready discussed, that these immunity-providing defenses will effectively ac-
complish their desiderata in any given case let alone on a system-wide 
basis.2 77 Yet, in the futile effort to do so, their existence and proliferation 
tacitly perpetuates the historical commercial psychosis that has precluded the 
development of a consistent, well-grounded preference policy going back to 
the early days· of the Republic. 
A second, at least partial, proposal for reform comes from the Chapter 11 
Commission ReportP8 I use the phrase "partial proposal" because, of course, 
the focus of the Commission Report was solely on Chapter 11. Yet, there is 
no indication that the Commissioners considered their discussion of, and rec-
ommendations regarding, preference issues to be somehow specific to reorgan-
ization. Moreover, the Commission Report's Recommended Principles in 
relation to preferences seem largely a response to strident testimony received 
concerning the widespread use of the preference power for improper or ulte-
rior motives;279 grievances relating to preference law that in the past have 
274/d. at 15. Oddly, however, Busse! is prepared, by means of a significant increase in the dolJar 
threshold in § 54 7(c)(9), to give a pass to any number of creditors who may quite intentionalJy subvert the 
policy of ratable distribution. See supra text accompanying notes 216·217. 
275 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
276See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. 
277See supra text accompanying notes 65-66. 
278 See supra note 182. 
279See CHAPTER 11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 182, at 150, noting that witnesses expressed 
strong frustration with the preference law and a belief that some trustees pursued preference actions 
indiscriminately and without regard to the merits of the claims. It appears, however, that this testimony 
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been leveled without regard to its application under any particular chapter of 
the Code. The fact that the Commission Report's consideration of the issues 
bearing on the scope of preference liability and recovery was so limited 
should not be understood as advocating that its recommendations should be 
dismissed or regarded as extraneous. To the contrary, perhaps because some 
of the Commissioners appeared to have taken this testimony with a grain of 
salt,280 I believe the Commission Report's approach for dealing with the per-
ception of rampant misuse of the preference power offers a more reasoned 
response to these putative problems than many of the solutions of the past. 
However, in their totality, these recommendations do have to be viewed and 
understood as having been spawned to at least some degree by the discontent 
expressed during testimony by parties with a dog in the hunt. Furthermore, 
it is unfortunate that the Commission's work proved not to be the occasion 
for a broader reconsideration of the positive purposes to be served through 
use of the trustee's preference authority in bankruptcy. 
In any case, the Commission Report's Recommended Principles concern-
ing preference litigation are: (1) bar the trustee from issuing a demand letter, 
or instituting suit, for the return of an alleged preference unless, based on 
reasonable due diligence, the trustee has developed a good faith belief that a 
colorable claim for recovery exists;281 (2) require the trustee to plead the 
allegations constituting the claim for preference recovery with particular-
ity;2B2 (3) increase the minimum dollar amount defense of § 547(c)(9) to 
$25,000, thereafter to continue to be indexed under § 104(a);283 and (4) 
amend the venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) to: (a) clarify its applica-
tion to preference claims,284 and (b) raise the dollar limit for nonconsumer 
debts to $50,000 in the aggregate, thereafter also to be adjusted under 
was offered by affiliated member representatives of the National Association of Credit Management, indi-
viduals who (like the companies by whom they are employed) might well be expected to harbor a some-
what less than purely objective view when it comes to preference law. See id. n.555-56. 
280/d. at 151, stating that some of the Commissioners, while acknowledging the concerns of the hearing 
witnesses, nonetheless believed the instances described represented "the exception rather than the rule" 
concerning trustees' pursuit of preference claims. 
281 I d. This would include taking into account the "party's known or reasonably knowable affirmative 
defenses under § 547(c)." Id. at 148. See infra notes 311 & 314 regarding the current standard with 
respect to investigation of defenses under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. 
282CHAPTER 11 CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 182, at 148, 151 ("[L]egal conclusions or specula-
tive allegations should not be sufficient to support a preference complaint."). 
283Jd. 
284The applicability question arises because 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) expressly provides that it applies to 
proceedings arising in a case under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under Title 11. Section 
1409(b), however, by its very terms limits venue only in "a proceeding arising in or related to" a case under 
title 11. Accordingly, the argument goes that the venue limitation in§ 1409(b) does not apply to proceed-
ings that "arise under" title 11, which would include preference actions. See generally Paul R. Hage & 
Patrick R. Mohan, Does BAPCPA's Small-Dollar Venue Restriction Apply to Preference Actions, 29 AM. 
BANKR. INST.]. 26 (2011). 
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§ 104(a).285 As discussed below,Z86 with the exception of the recommenda-
tion to raise even further the low-dollar exception of§ 547(c)(9), these prin-
ciples make a great deal of sense, particularly if placed in the context of what 
I hope would be a larger solution.2 87 
Just as interesting as what the Chapter 11 Commission recommended, are 
the proposals it elected not to adopt, each of which would have represented a 
further significant and unhealthy narrowing of the breadth of preference lia-
bility in bankruptcy. Among these were proposals to: (1) create a rebuttable 
presumption under § 54 7(c)(2) that the transfer was made in the ordinary 
course of business, thus shifting the burden of proof from the defendant to the 
trustee; (2) adopt some form of fee shifting or "loser pay" rule in the context 
of preference litigation; and, most extreme, (3) eliminate preference law en-
tirely. The Commission wisely decided to pass on each of those 
propositions. 288 
C. A FEw SuGGESTIONS FOR FuTURE REFORM 
From the beginning, it seems, our approach to preference legislation has 
been consistently plagued by the lack of a single, unified, and reasonably en-
during answer to the question of, "'so why a preference law"? The orthodox 
justification for avoiding preferences in bankruptcy was to prevent preban-
kruptcy dissipation of the debtor's assets among a few favored or aggressive 
creditors.289 And therein lies the rub. Does the preference law police only 
culpable behavior that has the effect of undermining creditor equality or is it 
intended to advance the bankruptcy goal of ratable distribution among simi-
larly positioned creditors unrelated to intent? It can surely do both on occa-
sion, but not consistently; thus, the architecture of preference law must 
proceed from one blueprint or the other.29o 
The 1978 Act offered a new concept and new definition of a preferential 
285See CHAPTER 11 CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 182, at 148 & 151. Proportionately, this might 
make sense insofar as the venue floors for consumer and nonconsumer cases are concerned. See supra note 
222. However, I might caution proceeding more incrementally insofar as raising the venue floors before 
the trustee enjoys home court advantage is concerned in light of the original justification for 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1409(a). See supra note 220. 
286 See infra text accompanying notes 311-3 14. 
287 See infra notes 294-302 and accompanying text. 
288The loser pays rule is intriguing, but ultimately it places the burden award of attorneys' fees and 
costs on the distributees of the estate who are not in a position and have no ability to control the risk that 
they bear. The Commissioners also indicated a reluctance based on the nature of preference litigation, 
"which often is uncertain and involves trustees initially working with limited information." CHAPTER 11 
CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 182 at 151. Moreover, the bankruptcy courts already have discretion 
under FED. R. BANKR. P. 7054 to allow costs to a prevailing party. See, e.g., Northwestern Corp. v. 
Magten Asset Mgmt. Corp. (In re Northwestern Corp.), 326 B.R. 519, 529 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005). 
289 See Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 963. 
290See supra notes 172 & 265. 
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transfer based solely on its effect, finally shedding the law's historical entan-
glement with the exasperating requirement of proving a creditor's (or anyone 
else's) state of mind.291 But the effort was a hesitant one in the sense that the 
1978 Act also sent a signal that the law was not intended to disturb routine, 
so-called normal financial transactions;292 that its purpose was also about de-
terring the state law "race of diligence," and rewarding creditors that contin-
ued to do business with a financially distressed debtor. This left open a crack 
in the door through which some of the gains that had been achieved by the 
1978 Act in removing the historical impediments to preference recovery 
would be lost in the ensuing years. Because it is impossible to deter someone 
that does not possess (or cannot be proved to possess) the proscribed intent, 
the mental leap of faith was quickly made that all innocent transferees ought 
to be protected. This outlook formed the basis, in whole or in part, for many 
of the exceptions in § 54 7( c ),293 and produced the mounting and largely self-
interested pressure to backtrack from the decision to ignore intent; pressure 
that finally erupted in BAPCP A and persists even ten years later. 
Personally, I would retain the "no fault" definition of a voidable prefer-
ence in § 547(b) and eliminate those defenses that run counter to that con-
cept and the larger policy it implements of drawing a hard line in the dirt 90-
days prior to filing, permitting only those transactions that do not have spe-
cific preferential effect to cross.294 In short, I would not lose a moment's 
sleep or shed a single tear if the ordinary course of business defense were to 
be repealed tomorrow, or, if retained, restored to its original formulation in 
the 1978 Act.295 In addition to§§ 547(c)(1) and (c)(3), I would retain the 
291Supra note 52. See also the 1973 CoMMISSION REPORT, pt. 1, at 203·04 (describing the intent 
requirement as "the most troublesome feature" of then then current preference law). 
292Supra note 54. 
29
'See supra notes 51·57 and accompanying text. 
294This would include transfers that do not result in a diminution in the value of the estate or which 
are preferential in a technical sense only. See In re Ogden, 314 F.3d 1190, 1198 (lOth Cir. 2002)(identify-
ing as the fundamental issue in a preference claim "is whether the transfer diminished or depleted the 
debtor's estate."); see also supra notes 58· 59 and accompanying text. In addition, I accept the fact that, due 
to competing policy considerations that are sometimes regarded as paramount, certain kinds of transfers or 
transferees might warrant protection, but I think it's critical that these circumstances be closely scruti· 
nized, lest they become the mechanism for special pleasing, or the sheer number of policy-based exceptions 
begins to desiccate the structural integrity of the rule. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
295In this view I am hardly alone-despite the popularity of the ordinary course of business defense 
with the credit industry. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 43, at 776 ("In view of the feeble inspiration 
for this exception, and because the exception is completely at war with the concept of a preference and has 
no rational confining limits, the best future for present § 547(c)(2) is repeal."); Tabb, supra note 41, at 987 
(same). As enacted in 1978, § 547(c)(2) likely represented a codification of the judicially-created "current 
expense" rule under the former Act, although the legislative history of the 1978 Act never refers directly 
refer to the current expense rule. See Michael Kaye, Preferences Under the ]'{ew Banl{ruptcy Code, 54 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 197, 202 (1980) ("The underlying rationale of[§ 547(c)(2) and the current expense rule] is 
the same: no diminution of the estate, payment not for antecedent debt, and allowing the debtor to stay in 
business."). While the several rationales for the current expense rule under the 1898 Act were offered, 
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subsequent new value defense in § 547(c)(4)296 and the protection in 
§ 547(c)(5) for inventory and receivables lenders, although not because they 
reward economic activity between the creditor and the debtor during the 
preference period, though they occasionally do,297 but, more importantly, be-
cause their operation does not result in a diminution of estate assets during 
the critical preference period.29B 
On the other hand, I would eliminate any look-back period in§ 547(e)(2), 
thus rendering a secured transaction in which there is a gap between attach-
ment and perfection preferential,299 and leave it to § 54 7(c)(l) to provide 
including as an exception to the antecedent debt requirement, the point of importance for these purposes is 
that it operated to shield only short-term, routine transactions from preference recovery. See Ward & 
Shulman, supra note 125, at 19-20 (1983) (indicating that wage payments and monthly payments to trade 
creditors and utility companies are "ordinary and important transactions" that should not be treated as 
preferences). In the past, I argued in favor of retaining the ordinary course of business exception in the 
form of a current expense rule. Ponoroff, supra note 43, at 1490-95. I did so with the view that the 
defense should be limited so as to operate only when serving the most defensible justification for an 
ordinary course exception; namely, to encourage creditors to continue to do business with a financially 
beleaguered debtor. See Ponoroff & Ashby, supra note 55, at 62-70. As noted earlier, while I have in later 
years despaired of the view that creditors can be encouraged to continue dealing with distressed debtors 
by configuration of the preference rule and its defenses (see supra notes 72 & 94), I .might still accept the 
idea as defensible on other grounds. 
296Because I consider the primary justification for continuing the exception in § 547(c)(4) to be that 
the preferential funds have been restored to the estate, such that there is no preferential effect, I would 
need to add a caveat. It derives from the fact that some cases have interpreted the "remain unpaid" 
language in§ 547(c)(4)(B) to exclude postpetition payments, such as under§ 503(b)(9). See, e.g., Commis-
sary Operations, Inc. v. Dot Foods, Inc., (In re Commissary Operations, Inc.), 421 B.R. 873 (Bankr. M.D. 
Tenn. 2012) ("[T]he possibility that a debtor may pay a creditor's § 503(b)(9) claim post-petition does not 
negate the value represented by the claim that the creditor provided to the debtor. The deliveries benefit 
the estate ... regardless of whether the § 503(b )(9) claimants are paid at a later date for those deliveries."). 
For a more complete discussion of the distinction, which derives from whether the rationale for the excep-
tion is based on replenishing the estate or rewarding a creditor that continued doing business with a 
troubled debtor, is discussed at considerable length in Friedman's Liquidating Trust v. Roth Staffing Com-
panies LP (In re Friedman's Inc.), 738 F.3d 54 7 (3d Cir. 2013). I believe that it should not matter if the 
new value is repaid before or after the filing of the petition, and would, thus, support the view taken by 
Judge Diehl in TI Acquisition, LLC. v. Southern Polymer (In re TI Acquisition, LLC), 429 B.R. 377, 385 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010) ("Allowing BOTH new value credit and payment of [a] § 503(b)(9) claim elevates 
the claim of that creditor and results in double payment to that creditor."). Finally, I would note that 
some years ago I also advocated for converting the § 547(c)(4) exception from a subsequent to a net 
advance rule, on the basis that "while expanding the scope of creditor protection ... [it J would limit the 
importance of the existing preference exceptions in §§ 547(c)(1), (3), and, most importantly, (2)." See 
Ponoroff, supra note 43, at 1506. I stand by that view, but could abide the defense in either form. 
2970f course, the fact they reward this behavior does not mean they are effective in actually encourag-
ing the behavior. See supra notes 72 & 94. 
298While not condoning any one in particular, I also accept that some estate diminishing transfers will 
be preserved in the interests of advancing what are perceived as more weighty policy considerations, such 
as, for example, protecting the public commodities and securities markets. See supra notes 175-179, & 293 
and accompanying text. This is neither good nor bad from my perspective, so long as the policy-based 
exceptions are grounded in legitimate public policy decisions and do not proliferate to an unhealthy extent. 
See supra notes 63 & 188 and accompanying text. 
299See Morris, supra note 36. Cf George Dawson, An Uneasy Relationship Between the Ban~ruptcy 
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relief to creditors in situations entailing exchanges that are nearly contempo-
raneous and intended to be such. I would also restore the look-back period in 
§ 54 7(c)(3) to twenty days, thereby conforming it with the uniform version 
of Article 9, or, perhaps even better, simply define the grace period by refer-
ence to applicable state law.300 Perhaps it almost goes without saying that I 
would applaud heartily abolishment altogether of the low-dollar safe harbors 
in §§ 54 7(c)(8) and (9), since I believe there are better means to regulate 
abusive use of the preference power,301 as well as the defense in § 54 7(h) for 
creditors receiving payment under an alternative repayment plan. 
But the larger decision that still needs to be made once and for all, now 
that BAPCP A has shoved preference rules back down the rabbit hole, is 
what do we want the preference law to accomplish? In turn, that means 
deciding more broadly what model we want our bankruptcy law to adhere 
to: one that exists solely to maximiz;e outcomes for the holders of cognizable 
legal rights, or one that considers as well the interests of other stakeholders 
and possesses its own distributive norms, separate and apart from state law 
and underlying state law bargains, in pursuit of goals unique to a federal 
bankruptcy regime, such as fresh start, equality, and debtor rehabilitation.302 
There is a sharp divergence of opinion on this pivotal question, as the 
events leading up to enactment of BAPCPA clearly demonstrated.303 How-
ever, the one thing that seems clear is that the histrionics that have domi-
nated the discussion of preference policy and reform for the past twenty 
years or more about spurious preference suits designed to coerce settlements 
and that produce no additional value for unsecured creditors304 are simply 
noise that deflect attention away from the real issue.305 That issue parallels 
Reform Act and the UnifoTm Commercial Code: Delayed and Continued Perfection of Security Interests, 36 
U. FLA. L. REv. 38, 56·64 (1984) (pointing out that the Code author~es delayed perfection in cases where 
Article 9 does not, and suggesting its elimination where perfection occurs after the commencement of the 
case). 
300See T ABB, supra note 10, at 535·37 (suggesting this approach). 
301See infra text accompanying notes 311·314 
302While an entirely different subject, the trend in recent years is for many Chapter 11s to consist of 
little more than a quick § 363 sale or sales followed by liquidation. See generally Chapter 11 at the 
Crossroads: Does Reorganization N.eed Ref=?-A Symposium on the Past, Present and Future of U.S. 
Corporate Restructuring, 18 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 365, 397·00 (2010). This does not, however, 
negate the importance of equality policy in Chapter 11, although it does suggest that ways to make 
Chapter 11 more effective is an important priority, as the profession has recently come to see. See CHAP· 
TER 11 CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 182, at 12· 13. See also supra note 255. 
303See supra text accompanying notes 11· 15. 
304See supra notes 92 & 279 and accompanying text. See also Goldberg, supra note 37 (espousing the 
same concerns). 
305 As noted earlier, some of the members of the Commission issuing the CHAPTER 11 CoMMISSION 
REPORT believed that these situations might represent more the exception rather than the rule. See supra 
note 280. Also, even to the extent the problem exists, which I am willing concede to at least some degree, 
there are better ways to deal with it. See infra notes 311·314 and accompanying text. 
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the question of what model we want our bankruptcy law to conform to 
generally.30 6 In the narrow context of the preference law, the question is 
whether the goal should be 1) to promote the distributional framework estab-
lished by the Bankruptcy Code (including but not limited to ratable distribu-
tion among general creditors), which commands a model of creditor 
cooperation achieved through mandatory recovery of transfers that diminish 
the estate, or 2) simply to police the most egregious sorts of opt-out behavior, 
which then calls for the creditor competition model that infringes to the least 
extent possible on state collection remedy norms. 
If the latter, the answer is not continuing to raise the jurisdictional 
threshold for bringing preference actions, or even further tinkering necessarily 
with the venue rules. Likewise, the solution is not continuing to riddle the 
rule on preferential transfers with even more litigation-producing exceptions, 
and ever more expansive interpretations of existing exceptions, with the aim 
of shielding transfers supposedly devoid of preferential intent and, conversely, 
that are supposed to encourage creditors to do business with a beleaguered 
debtor. If preference law is deemed to be about culpable behavior, the right 
answer is the direct reintroduction of a state of mind requirement into the 
elements of a preferential transfer307 and extending presumptive validity to 
all transfers occurring within at least the ninety-day, and perhaps also the 
extended insider, preference periods.308 That approach, though roundly re-
jected in the 1978 Act due to its cumbersome application and inconsistency 
with the distributional policies undergirding contemporary bankruptcy 
law,309 would preserve private state law results to the fullest degree practica-
ble, while still maintaining at least some semblance of a bankruptcy system. 
If, however, the creditor cooperation model is the preferred solution in 
bankruptcy, as I believe it to be, then we need to accept preference law as a 
rule of strict liability, and understand that it will apply equally to transac-
tions wholly devoid of improper motivation as well as to transfers precipi-
tated by deliberate effort to circumvent the distribution rules in bankruptcy. 
I would also submit that a decision to embrace this model does not need to be 
temporized by concerns over the putative susceptibility of preference law to 
being exploited for improper purposes by greedy and unscrupulous trustees 
and their counseP10 At this juncture, those concerns are a distraction and, in 
306See supra text accompanying note 302. 
307See supra notes 43·48 & 98. 
308Proposals for shortening the preference period might also be considered on the basis that the closer 
in time the transfer to the bankruptcy filing, the greater the likelihood of intent to gain an advantage, and 
vice versa. See ABI STUDY, supra note 82 at 4 {indicating that the credit provider group favored a 
proposal to reduce the preference period for noninsiders from ninety to sixty, or even thirty, days. The 
bankruptcy professional group, however, favored retaining the status quo). 
309Supra notes 42 & 52. 
310This is neither to discount nor exaggerate such concerns {though I suspect the complaints indicate 
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any event, devitalizing the scope of preference recoveries as a means to assure 
the power is not misused is much like watering down a critical vaccine to the 
point of ineffectiveness because of its potential to actually produce the dis-
ease its intended to inhibit in some very small number of cases. 
The truly abusive use of the preference power, to whatever extent it does 
actually occur, can also be dealt with by a combination of existing controls 
over groundless and vexatious litigation,311 coupled with sensible proposals 
to expand those controls, such as those proposed in the Chapter 11 Commis-
sion Report of requiring exercise of due diligence by the trustee before assert-
ing a demand or formal claim for preference recovery and insisting that 
preference claims be pled with particularity.312 Moreover, such reforms do 
not necessarily have to await further congressional action. Many of these 
measures are already available to the court as a matter of general case admin-
istration authority.313 In turn, additional procedural controls along these pro-
practices that are not as widespread as the reality), but simply to suggest that they divert our focus from 
the more critical issue of first principles in preference law. 
311 There is general agreement that the bankruptcy court has authority to issue sanctions against both 
a litigant and counsel for proceeding unreasonably or vexatiously under FED. R. BANKR P. 90ll(c), 28 
U .S.C. § 1927, as well as pursuant to the court inherent authority to supervise the proceedings that take 
place before it. See, e.g., In re Green, 422 B.R. 469, 473·74 (S.D.N.Y. 2009 (bankruptcy courts have the 
same inherent authority as district courts as well as under 28 U .S.C. § 1927); Kahn v. Mahia (In re Kahn), 
488 B.R. 515 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013); NEGT Energy Trading Holdings Corp. v. Orrick, Herrington & 
Sutcliffe L.L.P. (In re Nat'! Energy & Gas Transmission, Inc.), Adv. No. 05·09048PM, 2009 WL 902058 
(Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 27, 2009). See also Hermosilla v. Hermosilla (In re Hermosilla), 450 B.R. 276, 290·91 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (stating that Rule 9011 embodies the policy of promoting ~·responsible behavior 
on the part of [attorneys)' and requires them 'to conduct [themselves] in a manner bespeaking reasonable 
professionalism and consistent with the orderly functioning of the judicial system,'" citing Featherston v. 
Goldman (In re D.C. Sullivan Co., Inc.), 843 F.2d 596, 598 (1st Cir.1988), affd in part on rehearing en 
bane, 878 F.2d 1478 (1989)). In most situations, however, the failure to investigate the availability of 
defenses to preference liability will not alone justify an imposition of sanctions sunder Rule 90 11. See infra 
note 314. Cf In re Excello Press, Inc., 967 F.2d 1109, 1111·1112 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that, while, 
ordinarily, it will be not be unreasonable for a plaintiffs counsel to fail to conduct a prefiling investigation 
regarding affirmative defenses, at times an attorney may have a responsibility to examine "whether any 
obvious affirmative defenses bar the case."). 
312See supra notes 281-282 and accompanying text. I would also not object to increasing modestly the 
dollar limits in 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) that must be exceeded before venue is proper in the district where the 
case is pending rather than where the defendant resides, although for reasons discussed earlier it is not 
clear that this would make nearly as big a difference as the other proposed reforms. See supra Part Vl.F. 
But see supra note 220. See also Daniel J. Busse!, A Third Way: Examiner as Inquisitor, 91 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 59 (2016) (suggesting that examiners could be profitably used as an alternative to the "litigate or sell" 
model not only to assess the bare legal sufficiency of avoidance claims, but also to investigate actively the 
facts and apply the law in making a determination of the legal merits of such claims). 
313 In addition, a court concerned about misuses or abuses of the trustee's preference power has other 
tools at its disposal to assure that does not occur. A textbook example can be found in Judge Jernigan's 
order regarding pursuit of preference actions in In re Brook Mays Music Co., No. 06·32816-SGJ, 2007 
WL 4960375 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2007), involving an increasingly common scenario of a piecemeal 
liquidation through § 363 sales in a Chapter 11 case, followed by conversion to Chapter 7. In her conver· 
sion order, Judge Jernigan directed the trustee to prepare a report detailing potential preference claims, 
including those recipients who possess § 503(b )(9) claims and other information bearing on the utility of 
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posed lines will put more bite into the tools currently available to the 
bankruptcy court to police the filing of preference actions undertaken for an 
improper purpose by making the sanctionable behavior more conspicuous.31 4 
Once these concerns are laid to rest, the determination of whether dis-
tributive fairness and economic welfare are best served by the model of credi-
tor cooperation or creditor compet1t10n can be made without the 
complicating considerations that, to date, have blurred our judgment about 
the future direction of preference law. Quite obviously, I believe the former 
is superior to the latter in an insolvency or reorganization setting and should 
thus guide the crafting of preference law doctrine in the future. The larger 
point, however, is that the train can go east or i-t can go west, but it cannot 
go in both directions at the same time.315 And, when it tries to do so, it goes 
nowhere. In turn, the direction chosen in relation to preferences will be part 
of the answer to the larger question of the purposes and policy of our bank-
ruptcy law-whether it is to be little more than a federal assignment for the 
benefit of creditors (with the added tweaks of the availability of the auto-
matic stay and the power to discharge debts) or whether the structure and 
such claims, such as likely defenses. Specifically, the court indicated its concern over the trend in large 
bankruptcy cases for the trustee to simply sue all transferees with ~reckless abandon" and no consideration 
of whether individual claims make economic sense. Referring to the phenomenon as ~preference run 
amok," Judge Jernigan indicated that she wished to set some ground rules prior to appointment of the 
trustee. In response to the trustee's Preliminary Report, which the court described as thoughtful and 
helpful (id. at *2), the court was able to eliminate certain sorts of transfers (e.g., to priority claimants, 
parties to executory contract that were ultimately assumed, etc.) and, in the process, reduced the number 
of defendant-entities receiving transfers during the ninety-day preference period from over 1,400 to 189. 
The court also directed that the trustee must, at least forty·five days prior to initiating any preference 
action, make demand on the party that would be the subject of the action and allow such party twent-y 
days to respond with information that could be relevant to the existence of a good defense. Id. Finally, 
the court indicated its "consternation" over preference litigation being waged where "there is little chance 
that unsecured creditors are going to real~e any benefit" given the size of superpriority administrative 
expense priorities that was given to secured lenders in connection with postpetition financing. Id. at 3. 
The court, acknowledged, however, that the standard is "for the benefit of the estate" and not the un· 
secured creditor pool, and, thus, was not prepared to order a "blanket ruling" barring preference litigation 
if the only parties likely to benefit would be professionals and secured or undersecured lenders. I d. See 
also supra notes 39, 217, & 261 discussing the value of pursuit of preference claims, and their serving of the 
equality objective of the law, even when the proceeds from recovery do not inure to the benefit of general 
creditors. 
314Currently, the failure of the trustee to conduct a prefiling investigation to ferret out the existence of 
affirmative defenses will not alone give rise to sanctions under FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. See Moore v. Lief, 
Cabraser & Heiman (In re Keegan Mgmt. Co.), 78 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2000); Berger Indus., Inc. v. Artmark 
Prods. Corp.) (In re Berger Indus., Inc.), 298 B.R. 37 (Bankr. E.D.NY 2003). See also supra note 311. If, 
however, the Code or rules were revised in a manner that placed certain affirmative duties on the trustee, 
including a requirement of due -diligence with respect to the validity of the claim, as a condition precedent 
to bringing a preference claim, the failure to comply with the same would present a much clearer instance 
of bad faith or lack of "reasonableness" than is currently the case so as to justify the imposition of 
sanctions. 
315Though application of an equality-based rule may sometimes have a deterrent effect, and vice versa, 
one objective must be the dominant one in the crafting of the rule. See supra note 172. 
2016) BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCES 397 
composition of the bankruptcy law extends beyond a surface-level fa~ade to 
include a substantive role in dealing with the complicated circumstances of, 
and competing interests implicated by, financial distress and other business-
related problems that find no satisfactory solution under state or other 
nonbankruptcy law.316 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Eliminating preference recovery in Chapter 11 on the grounds that the 
equality objective is less pressing in reorganizations than in liquidation is un· 
wise as well as unworkable. 31 7 An insistence upon a showing of a direct 
connection between preference recovery and distributions to general credi-
tors, is equally impractical. What matters, ultimately, is beneflt to the es· 
tate,318 whether manifest in greater distributions to general unsecured 
creditors or providing the cash ·critical to cover the expenses necessary to 
administration of the estate or assuring confirmation of a plan of reorganiza· 
tion. Insistence upon an inexorable casual chain running from the avoided 
transfer to specific dollars in the hands of general creditors is an exercise in 
missing the point, as is the largely self-serving grumbling about reckless de-
ployment of the preference law. These concerns are paltry in the grand 
scheme of things and relate only in the most attenuated sense to the funda-
mental question of what kind of bankruptcy system we want in the future. 
If we have anything at all to be thankful to BAPCP A about ten years 
later, it is that the law placed into sharp focus, perhaps more so than ever 
before, the problem that has afflicted preference recovery since the Constitu· 
tional Convention decided that bankruptcy law would be federallaw. 319 We 
came tantalizingly close to resolving the problem with the 1978 Act. So 
close, in fact, that over the next nearly 30 years we were able to delude 
ourselves into believing that the train actually could go east and west simulta-
neously .. It is clear now, as we look at the fractured state of the preference 
law, itself merely a microcosm for the fractured state of our outlook on bank-
316Since early on after enactment of the 1978 Act, it has been clear, particularly in the case of reorgani· 
zation, that bankruptcy serves a broader set of purposes than simply responding to financial distress in a 
more efficient manner than state law. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied 
Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Ban~ruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 919, 966-
67 (1991). 
317See supra text accompanying notes 258·259 
318See supra notes 39, 217, & 261. See also Stalnaker v. DLC, Ltd. (In re DLC, Ltd), 295 B.R. 593, 
607·08 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003) (holding that an estate may be benefitted by exercise of a trustee avoiding 
power even when there are no unsecured creditors, and distinguishing Harstad v. First Am. Ban~ (In re 
Harstad), 39 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 1994), where the estate had terminated prior to commencement of the 
action). 
319See Weisberg, supra note 34, at 3 (~American bankruptcy law has never decided what to do about 
the crucial but elusive concept of the voidable preference."). 
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ruptcy in society at large, that the only principled way to proceed is to 
choose a direction for the future and follow it, realiz;ing that the course will 
never be a perfectly straight or orderly one. 
I recogniz;e the argument that BAPCP A may in fact have represented not 
just the latest reflexive reaction to the 1978 Act, as I perceive it to be,320 but 
rather that epiphanic decision about direction. Were that the case, I would 
personally be sorry to see this erosion in our commitment to the cooperative 
goals of the bankruptcy system in favor of a decision to embrace the wasteful 
competition associated state law remedies. But if it is not the case, then we 
face a watershed moment about the political economy, and an urgent need to 
act. Decisions necessarily involve taking risk; it is easy to procrastinate and, 
in a political environment, easy to obfuscate the fact that one even faces a 
decision point. Deciding, however, to avoid making a choice is itself a deci· 
sian, and more often than not a decision that partakes of the worst features of 
all the available choices. I fear that we have lived with that kind of gloomy 
compromise long enough. 
320Although, as my late colleague, Jean Braucher, summed it up, "[t]he problems with the 2005 Act 
are breathtaking." Braucher, supra note 18, at 97 (" ... it is important not to lose sight of the fact that 
"most of the provisions of the 1978 Act are still in place."); Acceptance Remar~s of the Honorable W. 
Homer Dra~e,]r., 24 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 9, 11 (2008). Thus, I do not regard BAPCPA as unalterably 
foretelling the future direction of bankruptcy law, as much as I see it as an aberrational example of every· 
thing that is wrong about interest group capture over a major piece of legislation. 
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